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The Panama Canal turnover was not expected to end well. As the U.S. Senate 
deliberated upon the Panama Canal treaties in 1977, opponents painted a grim portrait of 
the canal’s future under Panamanian control. They warned of a toxic combination of 
Panamanian incompetence, malfeasance and greed. A common argument portrayed 
Panama as a politically unstable tropical backwater. To make matters worse, the threat of 
Soviet domination loomed. How could a poor country of 3.6 million people operate and 
maintain a complicated and internationally vital waterway? Very well, it turned out. 
This dissertation evaluates how Panama exceeded the alarmingly low 
expectations of its critics. In doing so, it details and analyzes the doomsday projections 
regarding the December 31, 1999 Panama Canal turnover. The research situates those 
concerns in the context of academic literature on state-owned enterprise management, 
and questions whether such profound skepticism was warranted in the case of Panama. 
To evaluate Panama’s performance operating the canal, the dissertation reviews a range 
of published material, including independent analyses of Panama’s canal management, as 
well as internal evaluations. It also provides independent qualitative and quantitative 
reviews of Panama’s record, including comparisons to the U.S. canal administration, 
interviews, a survey by the author of executives at multinational shipping companies, and 
a Panama national public opinion poll by the author. 
The dissertation adopts a case study approach and relies upon process tracing and 
thick description to determine the factors that contributed to Panama’s successful canal 
management. The analytic narrative is not chronological. It begins with a general 
discussion of state-owned enterprises; evaluates Panama’s canal management; explores 
iii 
 
the roots of Panama’s success; explains why predictions of Panama’s performance 
proved wildly inaccurate; and identifies risks to the Panama Canal Authority’s continued 
efficiency. The dissertation concludes by highlighting potential best practices for other 
countries operating consequential state-owned enterprises. 
Adviser: Professor Riordan Roett, the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced 
International Studies 
Readers:  Francisco Gonzalez, Matthias Matthijs, Robert Devlin, Kevin 
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Chapter 1: Introduction: Objectives and methods 
 
Overview 
 The Panama Canal turnover was expected to go badly. Throughout the 
negotiations over the turnover treaties, and especially during the U.S. Senate debates in 
1977, opponents painted a grim portrait of the canal’s future. The two treaties passed by 
only a single vote.
1
 A decade into the phased transition to Panamanian ownership, 
scholars and the U.S. public still remained deeply skeptical.
2
 How could a poor country 
of 3.6 million inhabitants operate and maintain a complex and internationally vital 
waterway that the United States had run since its opening in 1914? Very well, it turned 
out. In the 2012 fiscal year, the canal set a tonnage record.
3
 Since the United States ceded 
control, accidents are way down.
4
 Revenue, profits and traffic are way up. A $5.25 billion 
expansion is doubling capacity. Panama’s economy expanded by 10.7 percent in 2012, 
three times the regional average,
5
 and has continued to grow at an impressive rate. The 
canal accounts for 22 percent of Panama’s GDP.
6
 
This dissertation evaluates how Panama exceeded the alarmingly low 
expectations of its critics. It reviews the doomsday predictions for the December 31, 1999 
canal turnover; the two decade transition to Panamanian ownership; and the first 15 years 
of Panamanian management. These developments are discussed in the global context of 
                                                             
1
 The Senate passed both treaties by a vote of 68 to 32, one vote above the two-thirds threshold. 
2
 A CBS News poll in May 1989 found that 26 percent of respondents believed the United States should not 
comply with its treaty obligation to transfer the canal to Panama. 
3
 Panama Canal Authority, Annual Report, 2012, p. 13. 
4
 Interview by author with Miguel F. Rodríguez, manager of canal operations, August 15, 2013, Panama 
City, Panama. 
5
 Panama’s 2012 GDP from the International Monetary Fund’s “Regional Economic Outlook, Western 
Hemisphere,” May 2013; regional GDP from the United Nations’s “World Economic Situation and 
Prospects,” December 2013. 
6
 International Monetary Fund, Article IV consultation for Panama, 2012. 
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state-owned enterprises, which are commonly characterized by patronage, debt and 
incompetence.
7
 Building upon the literature on public administration, organizational 
behavior, corruption and state-building, the research sets out to offer a richly detailed and 
nuanced case study that advances state-owned enterprise theory and extrapolates lessons 
for state-owned enterprises worldwide. (More broadly, insights into state-owned 
enterprise management should contribute to the wider debate over the proper role and 
size of government, and whether a developmental state is a sufficient condition for 
growth,
8
 an impediment, or something in between.) 
To evaluate Panama’s success, the research relies in part upon semi-structured 
interviews with Panamanian and U.S. actors who played central roles in the treaty 
negotiations; the transition to Panamanian ownership; and Panama’s canal management. 
Interview participants include three former Panamanian presidents – Martín Torrijos 
(2004 to 2009), Nicolás Barletta (1984 to 1985) and Aristides Royo (1978 to 1982) –
former Panama Canal CEO Alberto Alemán (1996 to 2012), former U.S. Secretary of 
State James Baker (1989 to 1992) and former U.S. President Jimmy Carter (1977 to 
1981). To complement these and other elite perspectives, the research involves a national 
public opinion poll in Panama, and a survey of global shipping executives who have used 
the canal under U.S. and Panamanian management. Historical research includes archival 
reviews of newspapers in the United States, Panama and the former Panama Canal Zone;
9
 
transcripts of U.S. Senate hearings; memoirs; and documents in the Jimmy Carter Library 
                                                             
7
 Arief Budiman, Diaan-Yi Lin and Seelan Singham, “Improving Performance at State-Owned 
Enterprises,” McKinsey & Company, May 2009. 
8 Meredith Woo-Cummings (editor), The Developmental State (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 
1999). 
9
 For example, The Panama Star, founded in 1849, circulated widely in the former Panama Canal Zone and 
provides a window into the views of U.S. citizens living in Panama regarding the treaties and the transition 
to Panamanian control. 
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and Museum and at the Biblioteca Roberto F. Chiari (the Panama Canal library in 
Panama City, Panama), and the National Archives and Library of Congress. For 
quantitative analysis, the research reviews historical data to compare the performances of 
U.S. and Panamanian canal authorities on a variety of metrics; a discussion of the 
significance of Panamanian management (a binary independent variable) on these 
performance metrics relative to exogenous independent variables, such as trends in global 
trade and economic growth in regions that rely upon the canal. Finally, to convey the 
complexities of canal administration, and enrich the narrative of the dissertation, the 
research incorporates direct observation of canal operations, including a ride-along 
aboard a Panamax cargo ship transiting the canal, and a tour of the canal expansion site.
10
 
The relevance of the dissertation is magnified by the absence of similar studies,
11
 
and by the timing of the completion of this research, just as Panama completes its historic 
canal expansion. That development will focus global attention on Panama’s performance 
managing the waterway, and raise questions about the Panama Canal Authority’s record 
that this research attempts to address. 
At the same time, the research contributes to the theoretical understanding of 
state-owned enterprise governance. These policy-relevant lessons apply equally to 
economically influential firms such as national oil and mining companies and to smaller 
operations that cumulatively represent substantial contingent liabilities for national 
governments. The legitimacy and solvency of countless governments depends upon a 
firmer understanding of this issue. State-owned enterprises are ubiquitous. In parts of 
                                                             
10
 The ride-along, on August 18, 2013, involved a full, 12-hour canal transit aboard the NYK Meteor 
container ship, which travels from Busan, China, to New York City, N.Y.; the tour of the canal expansion 
was led by Panama Canal Authority engineer Luis Ferreira on August 23, 2013. 
11
 Scholars have largely overlooked this period in the otherwise carefully chronicled history of the canal.  
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Africa, they account for half of economic activity; in parts of Asia, Eastern Europe and 
Latin America, they control as much as 15 percent of the economy.
12
 Some are profitable, 
such as the Corporación Nacional del Cobre de Chile (CODELCO), the world’s largest 
copper producer.
13
 Others, however, drain government resources and represent a 
contingent liability (implicit and explicit) that threatens to bankrupt the central 
government. The challenge of effectively managing state-owned enterprises is as relevant 
to micro states such as Grenada – where there are 29, including a gravel concern
14
 – as it 
is to China – where there are 20,000, including banks whose politically motivated, 
countercyclical lending threatens a financial crisis.
15
 In Latin America, Panama’s success 
is contrasted most notably by the national oil companies in Mexico and Venezuela, 
whose payrolls are larded with unqualified political appointees and whose revenues are 
ravenously siphoned by central authorities rather than reinvested. Other examples, inside 
and outside the hemisphere, abound.  (Chapter 2 provides a fuller history of state-owned 
enterprises and the most common management and oversight challenges.  Chapter 6 
discusses the recent scandal at Brazil’s national oil company Petróleo Brasileiro.) 
 
Research Problem 
 The basic question motivating and structuring this research is how Panama 
succeeded in effectively managing the Panama Canal in the face of low expectations and 
high obstacles. 
                                                             
12
 Budiman 2009, p. 1. 
13
 Profit in 2012 equaled $7.5 million, according to CODELCO’s annual report, 
http://www.codelco.com/memoria2012/site/edic/base/port/inicio.html. 
14
 International Monetary Fund, Article IV consultation for Grenada, 2012. 
15




 President Jimmy Carter’s negotiations over the Panama Canal turnover provoked 
deep anxiety. The U.S. government had controlled the canal since it opened in 1914, 
linking the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. Republicans, including influential U.S. Senators 
Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) and Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.), led a national campaign against the 
handover. These and other opponents argued that the planned turnover jeopardized U.S. 
national security by threatening to deny U.S. merchants and Navy vessels access to the 
50-mile long waterway. Critics warned of skyrocketing tolls; an end to first-come, first-
served queuing; and the replacement of technocrats in the canal administration with 
corrupt and blundering Panamanian political appointees. Skeptics questioned the capacity 
of a small, developing nation with a history of corruption, political instability and 
authoritarian government to manage a complex, strategically important piece of global 
infrastructure. 
The job requirements included not only operating the canal, but also repairing 
vessels; managing ports; running the Panama Canal Zone railroad, prisons and zoo; and 
maintaining roadways and power, communications and water systems.
16
 The loudest 
criticisms originated in the Panama Canal Zone; “Zonians,” the U.S. citizens who 
claimed the most intimate knowledge of Panama’s incapacities,
17
 insisted Panama was 
“too backward to run the canal.”
18
 (The influence of the Zonians is discussed in Chapter 
5.) Panamanians themselves were concerned; a political cartoon at the time showed one 
of Panama City’s wildly painted city buses, known as diablos rojos, or “red devils,” 
                                                             
16
 Denison Kitchel, The Truth about the Panama Canal. New Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington House, 1978, p. 
133. 
17
 John P. Augelli, “The Panama Canal Treaties of 1977: Impact and Challenges,” Yearbook: Conference of 
Latin Americanist Geographers, Vol. 11 (1985), p. 75. 
18
 Adam Clymer, Drawing the Line at the Big Ditch: The Panama Canal Treaties and the Rise of the Right 
(Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of Kansas, 2008), p. 4. 
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floating through the locks.
19
 In the United States, a “truth squad” toured the country and 
sent millions of letters and raised millions of dollars to fight the treaties.
20
 It did not help 
that Panama was governed by the strongman Omar Torrijos, an “antagonistic and 
unstable” dictator, in the words of Ronald Reagan, whose opposition to the turnover 
served as the centerpiece of his 1968 campaign for the Republican presidential 
nomination.
21
 These anxieties nearly sunk the treaties. 
For their part, advocates stressed the canal’s vulnerability to sabotage by 
disillusioned Panamanians, and the regional and global opposition to continued U.S. 
control. (In 1973, the United Nations Security Council met in Panama to address the 
issue,
22
 and the resulting resolution, vetoed by the United States, would have prohibited 
states from any measures “to coerce another state in order to obtain from it the 
subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights.”
23
) Ultimately, U.S. Senate debate 
on the Panama Canal treaties dragged on for six weeks, the longest treaty battle since 
deliberations over the Treaty of Versailles.
24
 In the end, the treaties achieved the required 
two-thirds majority by a single vote, 68 to 32. 
Fears over the turnover persisted. Over time, the rhetoric moderated from the late 
1970s, when Rep. Philip Crane (R-Ill.), in Surrender in Panama: The Case Against the 
Treaty, had condemned Panama as an “impoverished tropical backwater,”
25
 a “poverty-
                                                             
19
 Interview by author with Ricaurte Vásquez, former canal chief financial officer, August 2, 2013, Panama 
City, Panama. 
20
 Michael J. Hogan, The Panama Canal in American Politics: Domestic Advocacy and the Evolution of 
Policy (Carbondale, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1986), p. 7. 
21
 Clymer 2008, p. 21. 
22
 Thomas M. Leonard, Panama, the Canal and the United States: A Guide to Issues and References 
(Claremont, Calif.: Regina Books, 1993), p. 89. 
23
 United Nations Security Council Resolution 330, March 21, 1973. 
24
 Hogan 1986, p. 7. 
25
 Philip Crane, Surrender in Panama: The Case Against the Treaty (New York City, N.Y.: Dale Books, 





 and a “backward banana republic”
27
 that had no hope of 
effectively managing the canal. Still, anxiety lingered. In his 1998 book, Panama’s 
Canal: What Happens When the United States Gives a Small Country What It Wants, 
Mark Falcoff lamented the venal political culture and “historic patterns of public 
administration” in Panama, where “Panamanians of all classes have regarded government 
agencies as so much booty to be distributed among followers of the ruling party.”
28
 A 
decade after the treaties were signed, the Panama Canal again seized U.S. public attention 
during the December 20, 1989 U.S. invasion of Panama. “Operation Just Cause” had 
various causes, including criminal indictments in Florida against Panamanian President 
Manual Noriega for cocaine trafficking. Undoubtedly, however, the future of the canal 
factored into President George H.W. Bush’s decision. Noriega, who governed Panama 
after Torrijos’s 1981 death in a plane crash, had “systematically violated the American-
Panamanian canal treaties.”
29
 In justifying the invasion to Congress, Bush said a 
continuation of Noriega’s rule would mean “the continued safe operation of the Panama 
Canal and the integrity of the canal treaties would be in serious jeopardy.”
30
 Later, in the 
months before the 1999 Panama Canal turnover, the U.S. public again turned its eyes to 
the canal. Once more, observers registered their objections. Up to the moment of the 
turnover, Robert McMillan, a former chairman of the Panama Canal Commission, 
                                                             
26
 Ibid, p. 4. 
27
 Ibid, p. 103. 
28
 Mark Falcoff, Panama’s Canal: What Happens When the United States Gives a Small Country What It 
Wants (Washington, D.C.: AEI Press, 1998), p. 59. 
29
 Gilboa, Eytan, “The Panama Invasion Revisited: Lessons for the Use of Force in the Post Cold War Era,” 
Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 4 (1995), p. 539. 
30




remained “very apprehensive about how efficiently Panama would run the canal.”
31
 
President Bill Clinton, Vice President Al Gore and Clinton’s secretary of state, Madeleine 
Albright, declined to attend the historic turnover ceremony. 
On December 31, 1999, the canal finally changed hands. Fifteen years later, it is 
clear the hysteria was unjustified. By all measures, Panama is living up to its 
responsibilities. It has invested mightily in canal modernization and safety.
32
 Usage and 
revenue are up, with over 14,000 vessels from more than 100 countries transiting 
annually. In the 2012 fiscal year, the canal set a record, facilitating transit of 333.7 
million tons of cargo.
33
 Accidents are rare. Closures are unheard of. As feared, tolls are 
up significantly. Those increases, however, have not diverted ships around Cape Horn 
and sent the canal into “bankruptcy and closure.”
34
 In perhaps the clearest sign of 
Panama’s unexpected achievement, Panama is completing a $5.25 billion canal 
expansion. The project involves deepening the Pacific and Atlantic canal entrances; 
widening and deepening the navigational channels leading to Gatún Lake; deepening the 
Culebra Cut; and installing two new sets of locks – “PostPanamax” ship elevators 40 
percent longer and 60 percent wider than the original locks – to add a third lane of transit 
and permit passage by larger vessels. The project is doubling canal capacity.
35
 Before the 
Panama Canal Authority approached lenders to finance the expansion, Moody’s Investors 
Service assigned the authority an A2 rating. 
                                                             
31
 Robert R. McMillan, Global Passage: Transformation of Panama and the Panama Canal (Charleston, 
S.C.: BookSurge Publishing, 2009), preface. 
32
 Amber Moss, “What benefits Do You See the Expansion Project Bringing Panama?”, Latin America 
Advisor, April 27, 2006. 
33
 Panama Canal Authority, Annual Report, 2012. 
34
 Philip M. Crane, Surrender in Panama: The Case Against the Treaty (New York City, N.Y.: Dale Books, 
1978), p. 13. 
35
 Whitefield, Mimi, “Panama Canal’s $5 Billion Makeover Could be Boon for South Florida,” The Miami 
Herald, November 17, 2012. 
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Panama, of course, could still stumble. However, sufficient time has passed to 
judge, and learn from, Panama’s performance. Outside observers have noted that the 
canal authority “enjoys an exceptionally strong operating position,” having “successfully 
navigated the transition from U.S. management.”
36
 In Panama, the public expressed a 
powerful vote of confidence in 2006, when a national referendum on the authority’s 
ambitious expansion project attracted the backing of 80 percent of voters. 
This dissertation examines how Panama sidestepped the political and 
administrative catastrophes that so many analysts and U.S. lawmakers predicted. To 
address that question, it tests the hypothesis that Panama’s success is largely attributable 
to the sophisticated institutional design of the Panama Canal Authority, in particular its 
robust autonomy from the central government, and the narrow scope of its mission. Of 
special interest is the intellectual development of the authority’s unique structure, and the 
social and political processes involved in the drafting and passage of the legislation and 
constitutional amendment that established the authority. These reforms set up the 
authority’s 11-member board, with members serving staggered nine-year terms and 
authorized to write their own budget, with the national legislature permitted only an up or 
down vote. The constitutional amendment requires profitability,
37
 and eschews the 
conflicting mandates that bog down so many state-owned enterprises.
38
 At the same time, 
the dissertation is not methodologically handcuffed by institutionalism. The research also 
examines the historical, political and sociological factors that have prevented a single 
amendment to the Panama Canal constitutional article and legislation, and led Panama’s 
                                                             
36
 Hu, Chee Mee, “Moody’s Assigns a Prospective (P) A2 Rating to the Senior Unsecured Debt Obligations 
of the Panama Canal Authority in Conjunction with the Expansion Project,” Moody’s Investors Service, 
September 10, 2008. 
37
 Constitution of Panama, Title XIV, Article 316. 
38
 Budiman 2009, p. 1. 
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political class to honor the authority’s independence in practice. This part of the analysis 
includes a review of the legacy of U.S. canal administration, and the extraordinary role 
the United Nations Development Program played in post-war Panama, where it organized 
a series of national dialogues on the future of the Panama Canal. That there remains in 
this dissertation a strong focus on institutional design results from a review of the 
literature on state-owned enterprises, and the observation that in most respects other than 
the Panama Canal Authority’s design, Panama shares characteristics with developing 
countries in which state-owned enterprises have struggled mightily. 
To test this hypothesis, the research considers the significance of other 
independent variables affecting Panama’s performance, such as the infrastructure, 
personnel, policies and norms inherited from the United States; the lengthy, phased 
transition to Panamanian control; the threat of international intervention continuously 
disciplining Panama and canal authorities; global trade trends; and the leadership of the 
first Panamanian canal administrators. These alternative explanations for Panama’s 
success undoubtedly help explain Panama’s performance. (For example, in the most 
recent scholarly treatment of the canal, Noel Maurer and Carlos Yu noted that the two-
decade transition to Panamanian control meant the canal “entered the twenty-first century 
better managed than ever before in its history.”
39
) However, this research demonstrates 
that exogenous factors played relatively minor roles in determining Panama’s 
performance. True, the canal was in tip-top shape at the time of the turnover.
40
 However, 
that was largely because Panamanian canal officials had demanded a pre-turnover audit 
                                                             
39
 Noel Maurer and Carlos Yu, The Big Ditch: How America Took, Built, Ran and Ultimately Gave Away 
the Panama Canal (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2010). 
40




by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers that led to a $1 billion modernization.
41
 True, the 
lengthy, phased transfer permitted Panama to acquire needed human capital. The 
transition, however, was also plagued by racism against Panamanian canal officials and 





There is no shortage of academic literature and popular historical writing on the 
Panama Canal. After all, Europeans began dreaming of a transisthmian shortcut as far 
back as the 16th century. Historians exhaustively documented canal construction, 
beginning with the 1881 arrival of French engineers who sought unsuccessfully to 
replicate the sea-level design they used at Suez (e.g., David McCullough’s 1978 The Path 
Between the Seas: The Creation of the Panama Canal, 1870 – 1914, covering the French 
and U.S. undertakings). The canal is also an object of fascination for, inter alia, maritime 
historians, engineers and medical historians (who are interested in the advances in 
knowledge of mosquito-borne illnesses, such as yellow fever and malaria, during canal 
construction).
43
 Journalistic works (e.g., Adam Clymer’s 2008 Drawing the Line at the 
Big Ditch: The Panama Canal Treaties and the Rise of the Right) mostly focus on the 
impacts of the canal debate on U.S. domestic politics. However, nowhere in this ocean of 
literature is there a contemporary, comprehensive evaluation of the political economy of 
Panama’s canal management. After the turnover failed to produce political and 
                                                             
41
 Alemán, Alberto, “The Story That Panama Decided to Write, The Panama Canal Through the Years,” 
ReVista, Spring 2013. 
42
 Ana Elena Porras, Historias Canaleras: Doce Testimonios de la Transición (Panama City, Panama: 
Universidad de Panamá, Instituto de Estudios Nacionales, 2007), p. 75. 
43
 For example, John M. Barry, The Great Influenza: The Story of the Deadliest Pandemic in History (New 
York City, N.Y.: Viking, 2004). 
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administrative failures, journalistic and scholarly attention turned elsewhere. There have 
been no serious attempts to make sense of Panama’s success, refine state-owned 




To explain Panama’s performance, the dissertation relies upon a multi-method, 
historical case study approach that involves qualitative and quantitative techniques. To 
justify the selection of the case, the research focuses intensively on Panama’s canal 
administration to demonstrate its success relative to the U.S. government’s performance 
prior to the turnover,
44
 and compared to other state-owned enterprises worldwide. 
Relevant data includes quantitative performance metrics (e.g., revenue, profit, speed of 
transit, accidents and availability of critical Panama Canal equipment) contained in 
independent audits of the Panama Canal Authority, the authority’s annual reports and its 
internal evaluations. Annual reports from the authority’s immediate predecessors – the 
U.S. government’s Panama Canal Company, and the U.S.-led, binational Panama Canal 
Commission that oversaw the canal during the transition – permit comparative analyses. 
To obtain the perceptions of important stakeholders, the research involves a survey of 
executives at global shipping firms that have utilized the canal under U.S. and 
Panamanian management. The research accesses this group, in coordination with major 
industry associations, through a poll that addresses satisfaction with the Panama Canal 
Authority, perceptions of its transparency and related topics. To encourage candor, 
                                                             
44
 Given that the U.S. government administered the canal as a non-profit operation, comparisons of 
financial performance will be approached with caution. 
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interviews are conducted anonymously and data is examined in the aggregate (i.e., not on 
an individual basis). 
Given that the hypothesis relates to the Panama Canal Authority’s institutional 
design, the research pays particular attention to the authority’s legal relationship to 
Panama’s central government; its hiring and procurement practices; and its internal 
affairs capabilities. These characteristics are considered in the context of other 
Panamanian government institutions and in comparison to state-owned enterprises 
globally. Because this dissertation is also concerned with how these structures came 
about in Panama, and how they survived on paper and in practice, the research follows 
the process tracing method. This method – though somewhat limiting in terms of the 
external validity of findings – is well suited to explaining outcomes that result from a 
multitude of interacting, independent variables.
45
 In this case, these variables include the 
intellectual origins of the authority’s design; the political learning of Panamanian elites 
following the traumatic Noriega years and the 1989 U.S. invasion of Panama; factors that 
engendered elite support and popular backing for the Panama Canal Authority’s 
independent structure
46
; and conditions that permitted the effective implementation and 
maintenance of the authority’s autonomy. Absent the causal explanations that process 
tracing generates, the research would be at risk of excessive formalism, i.e., it would 
potentially place undue emphasis on legalistic factors at the expense of important 
intervening variables, such as the social and political processes that permitted the 
establishment and maintenance of the legal attributes correlated with successful 
                                                             
45
 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences 
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2005), p. 206. 
46
 Gerardo L. Munck, “The Past and Present of Comparative Politics,” in Gerardo L. Munck and Richard 
Snyder, eds., Passion, Craft and Method in Comparative Politics. Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2007. 
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management. Additionally, process tracing permits an accessible presentation of the case 
that involves narrative and analytical elements.
47
 
In terms of data collection, as discussed, the research relies upon in-depth, semi-
structured interviews with current and former Panama Canal officials and influential 
active and retired Panamanian policymakers, union leaders and others. This method plays 
to the strengths of the author, a Spanish-speaking, experienced interviewer and former 
reporter for The Boston Globe. These interviews have several aims including: identifying 
the intellectual authors of the Panama Canal Authority’s design; determining how 
Panama achieved elite and social consensus, with the help of United Nations 
Development Program-led civil society dialogues; and explaining how Panama avoided 
the biggest threat to successful canal administration – mismanagement through chaotic 
and predatory rent-seeking and the politicization of the Panama Canal Authority. Other 
key informants interviewed include former U.S. officials involved in the treaty 
negotiations – including former President Jimmy Carter – and individuals involved in the 
U.S. canal administration and the transition to Panamanian control. The research also 
includes a public opinion survey conducted by the author of a representative sample of 
the Panamanian population (1,228 respondents, aged 18+, living in Panama, covering the 
entire national territory) to understand public opinion as it relates to the canal. Finally, to 
represent and contextualize the objections to the turnover, the research reviews the 
positions of protagonists in the protracted debate over the Panama Canal treaties, such as 
former U.S. Sen. Bob Dole (R-Kan.) and conservative activist Richard Viguerie, whose 
tireless opposition to the treaties involved novel campaign tools. The data obtained from 
                                                             
47
 Andrew Abbott, Methods of Discovery: Heuristics for the Social Sciences (New York City, N.Y.: W.W. 
Norton & Co., 2004), p. 175. 
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the interviews and surveys complement documentary sources – such as memoirs,
 48
 
newspaper archives, Senate hearing transcripts and declassified U.S. government 
documents – related to U.S. canal management, the transition to Panamanian control, and 
Panamanian canal management. In selecting these sources, the dissertation considers their 
historical and historiographical contexts;
49
 for example, it evaluates whether a writer or 
speaker was agitating for or against the canal treaties in the United States or Panama.
50
 
The fieldwork includes two trips to Panama City, Panama, and research at the Johns 
Hopkins University libraries, the Library of Congress, the National Archives, and the 
Jimmy Carter Library and Museum. 
Given the varied nature of the qualitative data in the dissertation – including 
reviews of primary source materials, academic literature, interviews, and technical 
performance metrics – diverse analytical methods are employed. The advantages of 
methodological pluralism are well documented.
51
 For this research, qualitative data is 
viewed from perspectives that include, inter alia, the perceptions of elite actors; theory 
on collective social action and social organization; and Panamanian political culture as it 
relates to public corruption, transparency, and the separation of powers. In all cases, the 
analysis distinguishes between the actual actions of individuals, institutions and social 
groups and their descriptions of their roles and relative influence as revealed in 
interviews, memoirs and through other first-person accounts. 
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 For example, U.S. canal treaties negotiator Sol M. Linowitz’s The Making of a Public Man: A Memoir 
(New York City, N.Y.: Little, Brown, 1985). 
49
 Martha C. Howell and Walter Prevenier, From Reliable Sources: An Introduction to Historical Methods 
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2001), p. 19. 
50
 Although Panama was governed by an authoritarian regime at the time, the canal treaties were subject to 
a national referendum. 
51
 Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln, Collecting and Interpreting Qualitative Materials (Thousand 
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 As discussed, there are potential challenges to the external validity of the 
observational, n=1 design.
 52
 That said, in this Panama Canal case study, the change in 
national ownership effectively presents two cases of Panama Canal institutional design 
and management; stated generically, there are multiple observations on the dependent 
variable. Furthermore, each of the 100 years of canal management generated data that is 
used for comparative purposes in this dissertation. Still, the Panama Canal case does have 
its share of sui generis characteristics, which somewhat limit the universality of research 
conclusions. These include, as mentioned, the Panama Canal’s high international profile, 
with the implication that the threat of international intervention motivates good behavior. 
(Though the idea of another invasion is farfetched, the issue is nontrivial, given memories 
in Panama of the 1989 U.S. invasion.) The dissertation is also cognizant of potentially 
problematic antecedent variables,
53
 such as Panama’s inheritance from the United States 
of functioning canal infrastructure (e.g., locks, locomotives and tug boats), as well as 
U.S. policies and norms (e.g., merit-based hiring and competitive bidding) that are 
otherwise uncommon in Panama. Taken together, these elements suggest a potential path 
dependency that the dissertation acknowledges and addresses. Panama’s decades of 
confrontation with the United States over ownership of the canal – a conflict central to 
Panama’s modern history – also sets apart the experience of this particular state-owned 
enterprise from the broader universe of government-run corporations. 
Additional challenges to the dissertation’s efforts to extract conclusions that can 
be generalized relate to the nature of the canal business. As a natural monopoly, its 
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competitors are less obvious than for other state-owned enterprises. Additionally, the 
Panama Canal’s infrastructure is nonstandard as compared to an electric utility or 
railroad. Finally, the administrators of the Panama Canal do not experience political 
pressure to maintain low prices, since the Panamanian public is not an important 
customer – a key difference from the standard state-owned enterprise. Many state-owned 
enterprises, such as national oil companies, face statutory mandates or political pressure 
to subsidize domestic consumption and other state-owned enterprises at great fiscal 
expense. In Brazil, for example, the national oil company, Petróleo Brasileiro (Petrobras), 
sells imported fuel at a loss to limit inflation and social unrest. 
Moreover, the dissertation accepts that “there are no globally valid rules for 
organizational design,” and thus “the field of public administration is necessarily more of 
an art than a science.”
54
 As with any human endeavor, the social, political and legal 
context are relevant to the management of any particular state-owned enterprises, and are 
“embedded in ever-changing institutional and cultural configurations.”
55
 Therefore, any 
theory related to state-owned enterprise design and administration should carry the 
standard caveat, “depending on circumstances and some exceptions.”
56
 That is to say, the 
best practices for the Panama Canal Authority are not necessarily identical to those for 
the Tennessee Valley Authority, let alone a state-owned Chinese bank or coal plant. 
Nevertheless, there are strong arguments for this research design, and for using 
the Panama Canal case study to identify best practices from the Panamanian experience 
                                                             
54
 Francis Fukuyama, State-building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century (Ithaca, N.Y.: 
Cornell University Press, 2004). 
55
 Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Usable Theory: Analytic Tools for Social and Political Research 
Source (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2009), p. 6. 
56
 Charles E. Lindblom, Inquiry and Change: The Troubled Attempt to Understand and Shape Society 
(New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1990), p. 139. 
18 
 
and advance the theoretical understanding of state-owned enterprises and related theories 
on public administration, corruption, “islands of excellence” and state-building. 
Notwithstanding advances in quantitative methods and data management tools, many 
broadly applicable theories are initially based on a particular case.
57
 Moreover, the 
dissertation’s methodological approach is particularly well suited for Panama, which 
exhibits characteristics normally considered perilous for state-owned enterprises: public 
corruption, poor governance, poverty, inequality, populism and limited rule of law. 
Furthermore, Panama’s particularistic characteristics do not substantially limit the 
external validity of the conclusions of the Panama Canal case study. For example, as with 
the Panama Canal, Venezuela’s state-owned oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela 
(PDVSA), is profoundly important to the Venezuelan national economy, yet PDVSA’s 
chronic mismanagement challenges a simplistic “golden goose” explanation for 
Panama’s success. In Mexico, the 1938 nationalization of oil resources is celebrated as a 
national holiday and is arguably as culturally significant to Mexicans as the recuperation 
of the Panama Canal was to Panamanians. Yet unlike Panama, Mexico underinvested in 
Petróleos Mexicanos (Pemex), leading to chronically declining production. Contrary to 
the conventional wisdom, the Panama Canal, like other state-owned enterprises, does face 
competition, from alternative shipping routes such as the Suez Canal and from the 
intermodal (ships, trucks and trains across the United States) alternative to reaching the 
U.S. East Coast from East Asia. Finally, the Panama Canal Authority might have been 
born with a leg up on other state-owned enterprises, but it could have easily squandered 
that advantage by jettisoning U.S. management practices and destroying its infrastructure 
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through misuse and poor maintenance. In this context, an understanding of the origins of 
Panama’s success should be of interest to theorists and practitioners.  
20 
 




 Panama skeptics had plenty of ammunition against President Jimmy Carter’s 
proposed canal turnover. There were, after all, ample arguments regarding the country’s 
chaotic politics,  poor governance and disinterest in maintenance, not to mention crude 
stereotypes about Latin America. But for some critics, the singularly unimpressive record 
of government-run businesses was reason enough to forecast catastrophe for the canal in 
Panamanian hands. Historically, state-owned enterprises had struggled even in wealthy 
societies. Panama was to be especially treacherous ground. Poverty, income inequality 
and underdevelopment would provide a powerful temptation for public officials to divert 
resources from the canal for social spending.
58
 Widespread public corruption, meanwhile, 







State-owned enterprises did not always have such a bad rap. Scholarly and public 
opinion on this subject has evolved over the past five centuries. In some eras, state-owned 
enterprises were credited with driving national prosperity. For example, in the thick of 
the “Brazilian miracle” – presided over by a technocratic military dictatorship (1964 to 
1985) – one observer concluded that “sustained economic development requires more 
than following the dictates of the international market and getting prices right; indeed it 
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may on occasion involve rejecting such signals.”
60
 At other times, economists dismissed 
state-owned enterprises as unaffordable state overreach. Their critique of “state bloat”
61
 
applied most of all to developing countries like Panama, guilty of a stark imbalance 
between what Francis Fukuyama calls state “scope” and state “strength.” In other words, 
it referred to institutionally weak governments playing an outsized role in economic 
management. 
 Regardless of the prevailing scholarly opinion, governments have been trying 
their hand at business for ages. In the seventeenth century, the United Kingdom, France, 
Spain, Portugal and the Netherlands established multinational trading companies that 
operated for the following two centuries.
62
 Government ties furnished tremendous 
authority and perks, including subsidies; exemptions from customs dues; the use of 
government ships; ownership of foreign lands; and even the power to sign treaties, hire 
soldiers
63
 and build forts. The policy motivation was mercantilist; governments sought 
wealth and influence by regulating commerce, imposing tariffs on imports and operating 
trading companies to guarantee a positive balance of trade.
64
 Protectionism alone was not 
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The popularity of mercantilism – or at least state encouragement of exports – has 
waxed and waned since the days of the Dutch East India Company (1602 to 1799). But 
state-owned enterprises have never totally gone out of style. In the nineteenth century, 
Prussia’s Otto von Bismarck funded his government by running railroads, mines, 
factories and farms.
66
 His successors followed his lead. In 1926, the German government 
established Lufthansa as its national carrier. A decade later, in 1937, Adolf Hitler 
founded Volkswagen to manufacture an affordable automobile. (During World War Two, 
he directed its factory to churn out warplanes, bazookas and bombs.) Later, European 
governments catching up with the industrialized United Kingdom also embraced the 
“entrepreneurial state.” In the Soviet Union, of course, virtually all commercial 
enterprises belonged to the state. But in France, too, the authorities operated railroads, 
airlines and electric utilities for centuries. State-owned enterprises – publically owned 
entities that derive their revenue not from taxation but from the sale of goods and services 
– have known few geographical or ideological boundaries. 
The establishment of state-owned enterprises – and the nationalization of those 
born in private hands – has occurred for a variety of reasons, including: 
1. Ideology, such as skepticism about the productive efficiency and social 
equity of markets; 
2. Social policy goals, such as increased employment; 
3. Economic development objectives, such as the search for countercyclical 
fiscal policy tools; the desire to prevent the exploitation of natural 
monopolies; and an attempt to “foster modernization in the neglected 
sections of otherwise developed economies, or stimulate growth in 
strategic sectors of the economy by initiating public activities”
67
; 
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5. To develop economies of scale in desirable industries; 
6. To prevent “wasteful competition,” such as competition that “relied upon 
misinforming customers, predatory behavior to drive rivals out of business 
and the cutting of costs by sacrificing reliability and safety”
69
; 
7. National security priorities, such as the desire to guarantee supplies of 
iron, steel, gunpowder and oil; 
8. To overcome private sector financing limitations in capital-intensive 
industries;  
9. To permit an “infant industry” to survive its initial production period, 




10. To manage the systemic risks of major bankruptcies (with respect to so-
called too big to fail firms). 
 
Wading into the subject of state-owned enterprises, it is hard not to tumble into 
the broader intellectual and political debates over the proper size and role of government. 
That particular fight has been raging at least since Adam Smith. (Or perhaps even earlier, 
since Jean-Baptiste Colbert’s writings on industrial policy.) In 1776, in “The Wealth of 
Nations,” Smith assigned a limited role to government: secure the national defense, 
assure public security and establish institutions that no private enterprise could operate 
profitably.
71
 That third category is subject to considerable interpretation; for example, it 
could arguably include public education and even health care. It does not, however, 
envision government-run airlines. In Smith’s view, state economic management is beside 
the point. An economic actor who “intends only his own gain” inadvertently acts in ways 
that strengthen a society’s economic health. Taken together, self-serving economic agents 
keep resources efficiently deployed and the economy growing. Smith, of course, has 
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always had critics. Friedrich List, for one, warned governments not to rely blindly upon 
comparative advantage based on resource endowments, such as a relatively high number 
of workers or relative abundance of certain natural resources. Instead, presaging modern 
industrial policy, he called upon governments to assure that national “productive powers 
are awakened and developed” (italics in original),
72
 even if that involves short-term costs. 
“A nation capable of developing a manufacturing power,” List wrote, “acts quite in the 
same spirit as that landed proprietor did who by the sacrifice of some material wealth 
allowed some of his children to learn a productive trade.”
73
 
 The Smith-List debate was polite compared to 20th century disagreements over a 
government’s ideal role in economic management. Friedrich Von Hayek, writing during 
World War Two, considered state economic intervention not merely inefficient, but as a 
one-way ticket to authoritarianism. Grudgingly, he accepted that “in no system that could 
be rationally defended would the state just do nothing.”
74
 However, he insisted that too 
much economic control leads to too little civil liberty. Government economic control, 
Hayek argued, requires disregarding individual preferences, and so attracts to office 
individuals (“the ruthless and unscrupulous”
75
) who are attracted to dictatorial powers. 
You could tell by the title of his book – “The Road to Serfdom” (1944) – that he did not 
take the subject lightly. “Once you admit that the individual is merely a means to serve 
the ends of the higher entity called society or the nation, most of those features of 
totalitarian regimes which horrify us follow of necessity.”
76
 Karl Polanyi, writing in the 
same era, was decidedly less suspicious of government. He rejected a society whose 
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economy was governed by the free market’s “invisible hand,” as popularized by Smith. 
“Such an organization of economic life is entirely unnatural,” Polanyi wrote in 1944, 




 This debate, of course, has never been settled. Recent iterations focused on 
disagreements over the proper sequencing of economic and political liberalization in 
authoritarian societies. Some scholars argued that democratization promoted economic 
liberalization and economic growth through the establishment of the rule of law – one of 
Smith’s preconditions for a functioning market. Others wielded empirical data to 
demonstrate that growing economies tended to sustain democratic government whereas 
democratizing, economically underdeveloped countries often saw democratic institutions 
stumble as new civil liberties permitted destabilizing demands for income 
redistribution.
78
 Today, debates over economic intervention and industrial policy often 
focus on the effectiveness of Keynesian policies, or on the rejection of the Washington 
Consensus and the inconclusive search for a new guiding philosophy. There is somewhat 
less of a push for the pure laissez-faire framework, and somewhat more of a push for the 
argument, advanced by José Antonio Ocampo in his 2006 paper “Market, Social 
Cohesion and Democracy,” that “the economic system must be subordinated to broader 
social objectives.” Still, important works continue to be published on both sides of the 
divide, including Howard Pack and Kamal Saggi’s “The Case for Industrial Policy,” also 
published in 2006, and research by Dani Rodrik, Ricardo Hausmann and Justin Lin. 
Fortunately, these controversies need not be settled in an effort to trace the history of 
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state-owned enterprises, evaluate their effectiveness and desirability, and extract lessons 




The heyday for state-owned enterprises began in the interwar period, as the Great 
Depression brought capitalism into disrepute.
7980
 Reformers saw state-owned enterprises 
as an antidote to a variety of supposed market failures, and as a counterweight to 
excessively powerful corporations. This was as true in defeated Germany – which 
restructured its financial system – as it was in the victorious United Kingdom, which 
partially nationalized British Petroleum and established the British Broadcasting 
Corporation in 1922.
81
 Italy nationalized its railroads. The Netherlands established a salt 
company. Government rescues of failing firms fueled the trend. In the 1970s, for 
example, the British government governed Rolls Royce and Jaguar. Canada created the 
Canadian National Railways, after World War I, to prevent a disruptive bankruptcy.
82
 
(During the Great Recession that began in 2008, a similar motivation led the United 
States to establish the Troubled Asset Relief Program and purchase a 61 percent stake in 
General Motors
83
 and a 92 percent stake in the American International Group, the world’s 
largest insurer at the time.
84
) In general, the Japanese government refrained from running 
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businesses. Similarly, the United States generally preferred regulation to direct 
participation in private sector affairs. That said, the U.S. government operated a national 
postal service and parceled out public land to promote residential development and 
subsidize the transcontinental railroad and land-grant colleges.
85
 While the  
United States was relatively anti-statist (President Calvin Coolidge (1923 to 1929) 
famously remarked that “the chief business of the American people is business”), city 
governments operated water systems, wastewater treatment plants, electric utilities and 
hospitals. 
By the early 1980s, state-owned enterprises were generating a quarter of 
manufacturing output in many industrialized countries and an even higher percentage in 
poorer regions.
86
 No longer were governments only focused on non-rivalrous, non-
excludable goods – such as clean air, the national defense or the rule of law – that are 
universally accessible and whose use by one individual does not diminish the quantity 
available to others. Even the broader category of public goods – such as education – no 
longer marked the limit of a typical state’s reach. Public employees worldwide were 
suddenly growing tobacco, mixing cement and assembling airplanes. The level of 
autonomy of these enterprises varied greatly. In the United Kingdom, government 
ministers had to fight for influence over the independent boards of directors that operated 
state-owned enterprises. (The ministerial interest in greater oversight authority was 
natural, given the scrutiny by parliament, culminating in 1957 with the establishment of a 
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legislative committee to oversee nationalized industries.
87
) By contrast, economic losses, 
in the United Kingdom and elsewhere, motivated relatively high levels of government 
involvement in the daily management of railroads, coal mines and other industries. The 
pursuit of social goals – such as maintaining low inflation by controlling prices – further 




The state-owned enterprise trend began to peter out in the 1970s, undone by the 
clumsy performance of most state-owned enterprises, such as airlines and 
telecommunications firms. Their financial results were by and large “abysmal,” and in 
many countries, their operation was believed to have a “pernicious effect on the economy 
as a whole.”
88
 State-owned enterprises, never skilled at making money, had reward 
structures favoring ever growing expenditures, with a manager’s prestige measured by 
the number of his or her subordinates.
89
 In Poland, state-owned enterprise losses equaled 
9 percent of GDP in 1989.
90
 In Pakistan, the return on capital for state-owned enterprises 
averaged just 2 percent in the 1970s and 4 percent in the early 1980s, compared to an 
average rate of inflation of 12 percent.
91
 In Brazil, in the late 1970s, the rate of return on 
equity for state-owned enterprises was one-half the return earned by the private sector. 
Not surprisingly, privatization quickly became a fashionable policy option. 
Changes in ownership structure of state-owned enterprises came about in radically 
different circumstances, but these transitions had in common a clear preference for 
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shrinking government. Over all, between 1988 and 1993, governments privatized 2,655 
firms.
92
 In Chile in the early 1970s, the military rulers empowered the “Chicago Boys” – 
Chilean economists trained at the University of Chicago – to implement “El Ladrillo” 
(“The Brick”), an orthodox adjustment strategy that reversed the reforms of deposed 
socialist President Salvador Allende (1970 to 1973). In addition to drastic expenditure 
cuts (public spending plummeted from 39 percent of GDP in 1974 to 23 percent in 1981), 
the strategy involved massive privatizations, beginning with banks.
93
 A similar process 
occurred throughout South America’s Southern Cone (comprising the countries of 
Argentina, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay). Gradually, governments rejected economic 
strategies originally conceived during the Great Depression, such as high tariffs and the 
promotion of government as a producer and entrepreneur that could compensate for 
evaporating export markets.
94
 In Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s United Kingdom 
(1979 to 1990), a divestiture drive squeezed state-owned enterprise activity to 1.9 percent 
of GDP in 1991 from 6.1 percent in 1978.
95
 Between 1974 and 1980, Chile sold 130 
state-owned enterprises, with a value of more than $500 million.”
96
 In the former Soviet 
Union, only several thousand state-owned enterprises remain. In China, the total has 
dropped from hundreds of thousands to as few as 20,000.
97
 (Those that remain are not 
always best in class. State-owned banks, for example, engage in questionable lending that 
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has raised the prospect of widespread defaults that could imperil China’s financial 
system.
98
) In 2014, Cuba, still governed by the Marxist Castro brothers, authorized state-
owned enterprises to retain up to 50 percent of their profits, up from 30 percent. The 
United Kingdom has begun requiring local governments to invite private sector bids for 
basic government services, with government departments permitted to compete, a 
practice also used in Australia and New Zealand. 
In the historiography of this subject, the arguments are sometimes exaggerated. 
Points of view as often as not reflect fundamental biases about the proper role of 
government, with combatants presented “a choice between the principle that production 
management should be private, unless specific circumstances prevail under which public 
management is called for, and the principle that production management should be 
public, unless special circumstances prevail under which private management is called 
for.”
99
 To some degree, state-owned enterprises were caught in the cross-fire of a general 
assault on economic intervention. If government should stay out of economic 
management, in other words, it most certainly should not be running businesses. A newly 
popular argument held that “even when it appears that government action would actually 
be effective, there is something of a presumption in favor of policies and programs 
requiring a minimum of administrative and bureaucratic input. This is both because 
policies, once in place, appear to have a life of their own, and because they divert scarce 
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As the tide turned against industrial policy, state-owned enterprises earned special 
consideration. Starting in the mid-1980s, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the 
World Bank, multilateral development banks and the U.S. government played an 
important role in urging indebted countries to rein in their public sectors. Champions of 
this view – known as the Washington Consensus – held state-owned enterprises in 
especially low regard. The World Bank’s 1983 World Development Report singled out 
state-owned enterprises as a chronic source of fiscal strain. It characterized them as jobs 
programs, whose overmanning hurt employee morale and brought about “disturbing” 
financial outcomes. Examining a sample of 27 developing countries, World Bank 
economists found that transfers to state-owned enterprises averaged more than 3 percent 
of GDP. The World Bank’s findings were a broadside against the very idea of a state-
owned enterprise (SOE): “Efficiency is highest when an enterprise strives to maximize 
profits in a competitive market, under managers with the autonomy, motivation and 
capability to respond to the challenge of competition. Inefficient enterprises would not be 
able to compete and would go bankrupt. But SOEs seldom face such conditions.”
101
 The 
World Bank acknowledged that efficiency was theoretically attainable by government-
run businesses. But its overall advice was clear: sell them for cash, to save on subsidies 
and above all, because “private industry is managed more efficiently than state 
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 The World Bank report concluded: “A strong case can be made for letting 




According to the neoliberal arguments of the Washington Consensus, not even 
Bismarckian efficiency could match the effectiveness of private sector incentives, with 
managers motivated by a share of the profits, or at least answerable to profit seeking 
owners. The other private sector advantage was counterintuitive: drop the bottomless 
state support so the threat of bankruptcy could focus a manager’s mind. By this point, 
economists had generally accepted that “the mark of a capitalistic society is that 
resources are owned and allocated by such nongovernmental organizations as firms, 
households and markets”
104
 (emphasis added). Thanks in part to the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, in 1991, the neoliberal extensions of that argument increasingly took hold among 
academics, elites and policymakers worldwide. This occurred even in countries such as 
Argentina, which since the 1930s had based its development model on industrialization 
through nationalization and an abiding hostility toward foreign ownership.
105
 The new 
mantra for reform: “Stabilize, deregulate, open up and privatize.”
106
 Empirical evidence 
backed up the shifting public opinion. Ghana’s Cocoa Marketing Board exemplified the 
self-destructive conflicts inherent to the state-owned enterprise model. The board, 
established in 1947, was called upon simultaneously to protect farmer incomes; prevent 
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scarcity; avoid high consumer prices; and generate tax revenue. In the end, it favored its 
revenue role. Over time, its imposition of stratospheric export taxes discouraged 
production; export volumes fell by 80 percent as farmers switched to maize, rice and 
other crops.
107
 Meanwhile, state-owned enterprises that actually turned a profit often 
came to regret it. Earnings quickly passed into the central government’s hands, both 
through high taxes and embezzlement. That pattern incentivized careless spending and 
excessive personnel costs. At the same time, comparative studies added weight to the 
argument that private actors generally outperform their public counterparts running 
airlines, hospitals, electric utilities and garbage collection.
108
 This was also demonstrated 
in the industrial sector,
109
 a prime target for policymakers with a taste for business. Worse 
yet, the sputtering state-owned enterprises not only wasted public financial resources, but 
they often failed to provide needed goods and services. Soon, scholars were predicting 
that the decline of state-owned enterprises was “irreversible.”
110
 
“Most remarkable of all has been the radical change in the opinion of both the 
public and elites toward the role of the state in the economy. This change has 
played a fundamental role in the development of the neoliberal consensus that has 
dominated economic policy since the 1980s. Part of this consensus has included a 
belief in the structural inability of SOEs to avoid distorting political interference, 
and consequently in the long-term superiority of private businesses, no matter 




In this climate, policymakers who refused to loosen their grip on the economy 
were seen as self-serving, disinclined to reduce their power to distribute government jobs. 
                                                             
107
 Shirley 1983, p. 77. 
108
 James T. Bennett and Manuel H. Johnson, “Public versus Private Provision of Collective Goods and 
Services: Garbage Collection Revisited,” Public Choice Vol. 34, No. 1 (1979): p. 55. 
109
 Anthony E. Boardman and Aidan R. Vining, “Ownership and Performance in Competitive 
Environments: A Comparison of the Performance of Private, Mixed and State-Owned Enterprises,” Journal 
of Law and Economics Vol. 32, No. 1 (1989): p. 26. 
110
 Toninelli 2000, p. 22. 
111
 Bellini 2000, p. 27. 
34 
 
In countries that did not experience broad liquidations and privatizations of state-owned 
enterprises, economists also complained of collective action obstacles that blocked the 
spontaneous emergence of a protest movement demanding better governance. The 
public’s difficulty evaluating public sector worker performance – particularly in poor 
countries with low education levels
112
 – also reduced the demand for reform. Meanwhile, 
general public disengagement – as close to a law of nature as political science has yet 
produced – liberated party leaders to focus on their “internal constituency,”
113
 in other 
words, party insiders and supporters. Similar phenomena explained the rarity of related 
good governance reforms such as meritocratic recruitment and promotion; competitive 
salaries for civil servants to reduce the temptation of corruption; the creation of 
anticorruption agencies; the imposition and implementation of clear anticorruption rules; 
and open bidding for contracts,
114
 or the establishment of an independent procurement 
authority.
115
 Conflicting views on the role of the state in economic management were no 
longer taken seriously. So in cases where civil society was not stepping up, the IMF 
quickly mobilized. Through its famous conditionality, its loan requirements led to 
privatizations throughout the developing world. 
In some policy circles, the elimination of state-owned enterprises was seen as a 
solution to any and all economic troubles. This time around, the arguments were as varied 
as the motivations had been for the earlier wave of nationalization, such as efforts to: 
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1. Balance budgets by cutting off subsidies to state-owned enterprises; 
2. Improve overall economic performance through increased opportunities 
for private enterprise; 
3. Reduce inflation by curtailing state expenditures and the monetization of 
deficits; 
4. Increase innovation through “debureaucratization”116; 
5. Respond to pressure from countries whose private sector firms preferred 
not to compete with coddled, state-owned enterprises; and, 




State-owned enterprises in the extractive industries have been so problematic that 
their failures spawned an entire academic literature that argues that countries would be 
actually better off without oil or precious metals underfoot. Resource-rich countries such 
as Nigeria, Zambia, Sierra Leone, Angola and Saudi Arabia grow more slowly than 
resource-poor countries such as South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore.
117
 
True, there are exceptions, such as oil-rich Canada, Norway and Australia, and diamond-
rich Botswana.
118
 The economically mighty United States was the world’s top mineral 
producer in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.
119
 It is also important to point out that 
many problems associated with extractive industries are unrelated to the management of 
the designated state-owned enterprises. For example, a large oil sector, whether privately 
or publicly controlled, vacuums up labor and capital and thereby shrinks a country’s 
manufacturing and agricultural sectors. At the same time, “Dutch disease” causes a 
country’s currency to appreciate, further squeezing export operations, and stifles 
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productive and export diversification, which is essential for growth and 
development.
120121
 Nor should state-owned enterprises be blamed for the misspending of 
the government revenues they produce, even when those earnings finance the appallingly 
repressive tactics of leaders such as the late Saddam Hussein of Iraq and the late 
Muammar el-Qaddafi of Libya. Petro states, where state-owned enterprises are arguably 
the worst of all, are 50 percent more likely to be ruled by authoritarians.
122
 However, the 
oil money that permits the quashing of opposition could presumably come just as easily 
from taxing Chevron as from running oil rigs in-house. Similarly, state-owned enterprises 
can do little about the economically destabilizing volatility of global commodity prices. 
In general, however, state-owned enterprises in the extractive industries have been 
justifiably blamed for retarding economic development and poisoning the political 
culture. The lack of transparency at these entities permits almost cartoonish levels of 
theft. Oil revenues, for example, are routinely stolen by public officials. Stolen, that is, on 
a grand scale. At these state-owned enterprises, the necessary “tight coupling” of 
accountability and sanctions is unraveled both by government complicity and by opaque 
revenues and spending.
123
 Oil-rich, dirt-poor Nigeria is an evergreen example of the 
resulting “voracity effects.”
124
 In February 2014, Nigeria’s optimistically named 
president, Goodluck Jonathan, fired the central bank governor, Lamido Sanusi, after 
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Sanusi blew the whistle on the state-owned Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation for 
failing to transfer $50 billion in revenue over an 18-month period.
125
 In addition to 
monumental thievery, state-owned enterprises in the oil business are also vulnerable to 
influence by political parties. In Mexico, the state-owned oil company Petróleos 
Mexicanos, known as Pemex, allegedly funneled $100 million to Institutional 
Revolutionary Party (PRI) candidate Francisco Labastida’s failed 2000 presidential 
campaign. Nor was that the first time Pemex apparently diverted public funds for partisan 
use; critics say the PRI treated Pemex as its “own piggy bank” throughout the PRI’s six 
decades of uninterrupted power.
126
 Sadly, Pemex’s behavior was typical for Latin 
America, where scarce public funds often serve partisan ends.
127
 In Chile, for example, 
President Salvador Allende doled out management positions at the national copper 
company using a quota system that rewarded political parties in his leftist coalition based 
on their relative vote totals in the previous election.
128
 Wealthy countries are hardly 
immune. In France, the oil company Elf Aquitaine has also channeled funds to political 
parties. In 2003, the authorities prosecuted 37 individuals for involvement in that scandal, 
including several former ministers.
129
 The Italian oil and gas firm Eni has been subject to 
similar accusations. Like the theft of funds, the diversion of resources for political 
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purposes hurts state-owned enterprise performance by raising operating costs and 
lowering efficiency, while eroding public confidence in public institutions.
130
 
These forms of “systemic corruption”
131
 at state-owned oil companies have 
another pernicious impact: capital-intensive firms are forced to borrow heavily. This was 
particularly true in the 1970s, when global commodity prices were high and oil reserves 
served as attractive collateral for loans.
132
 Despite sky-high oil prices, demands on the 
public purse in oil-producing countries outpaced increases in revenue, leading to cycles 
of fiscal deficits and heavy borrowing in international capital markets.
133
 Excess global 
liquidity, fueled by petrodollars from the Middle East, also contributed. Those funds 
found their way to Latin America, where grandiose public works projects and run-of-the-
mill skimming vacuumed up new oil revenues quicker than they could accumulate in the 
public treasury. By the 1980s, Venezuela, despite holding the world’s second-highest 
proved oil reserves,
134
 had borrowed so heavily that it paid foreign banks $0.40 of every 
dollar it earned from oil sales.
135
 “The boom swelled the aspirations of policymakers, 
raised expectations and instantly exacerbated the rent-seeking behavior of actors 
accustomed to the distributive habits of the past.”
136
 In this political environment, tax 
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reforms are a tough sell, even in the face of unsustainable fiscal imbalances. It is also 
difficult to promote economic diversification. As discussed, the high demand for one 
natural resource leads to an appreciating currency that renders other exports less 
competitive (the so-called “Dutch Disease”); a nation’s best and brightest misdirect their 
talents away from entrepreneurship and toward the competition for government favors 
and jobs in the country’s leading industry
137
; and the high cost of oil discovery and 
extraction drains capital from other productive sectors. Consequently, the exaggerated 
reliance upon a single sector only intensifies. 
The natural resource sector is subject to ideological fervor. Sometimes earnestly, 
often cynically, leaders worldwide have inflamed popular passions to justify their firm 
grip on extractive industries. In some instances, their arguments revolve around 
legitimate industrial policy objectives, such as the belief that unless the state controls 
these sectors, developing economies will “resign themselves to a position of perpetual 
economic inferiority.”
138
 By contrast, assuring state control of the oil sector permits 
development of related industries. This type of thinking has been, and remains, common. 
In the 1960s, Iran sought more out of its oil and natural gas than tax revenue and 
royalties. It promoted industrialization and increased agricultural yields through the local 
production of fertilizers, petrochemicals and electricity generation.
139
 In the 1980s, 
nationalized oil companies in the Middle East were seen as “engines of change, playing a 
central role in their industrialization policies.”
140
 Today in Bolivia –  the “Saudi Arabia of 
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lithium” – the state is not content to mine the Uyuni salt flats and export the valuable 
metal. Instead, the marching orders for state miners involve the development of a 
manufacturing empire to churn out batteries for smart phones and electric cars. Never 
mind that in impoverished Bolivia, with its low-skilled workforce, relatively 
unadulterated mineral fuels and lubricants account for more half of all exports by 
value.
141
 State planners are still thinking big. “Bolivia is a country blessed with natural 
resources, but these have been ransacked by outsiders over the years and Bolivians have 
been left with peanuts,” José Bustillos, the director of operations at the Corporación 




Backlash to the Backlash 
The backlash against state-owned enterprises was in some respects unfairly harsh. 
Most of the metrics used to evaluate state-owned enterprise performance focused 
narrowly on profits. As discussed at length, however, governments do not establish – or 
nationalize – these firms with profits in mind. In Shanghai, for example, the government 
explicitly designated three types of state-owned enterprises, with only one of the 
categories interested in maximizing profits.
143
 (The other two focus on strategic projects 
or municipal operations.) Additionally, the politicization of state-owned enterprises is not 
unavoidable. Governments have found various ways to keep their meddling to a 
minimum. By setting up independent boards of directors, policymakers have to varying 
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degrees insulated state-owned enterprises. In France, a system of contracts introduced in 
the late 1960s frontally addressed conflicts between the financial goals and social 
objectives imposed on state-owned enterprises. For French railroads, for example, these 
contracts provided compensation for the requirement to operate unprofitable routes. 
Other governments have created oversight boards so that government ministries do not 
engage directly with state-owned enterprise managers. Outside, nonpartisan audits have 
helped improve accountability. Even in China, which has generally not favored autonomy 
for state-owned enterprises, publically run companies are not all still seen as “muscle-
bound goons.”
144
 This is particularly true of Chinese state-owned enterprises that have 
been partially privatized, such as the computer maker Lenovo, which bought IBM’s 
personal computer division in 2004. As Chinese government control has lessened, so has 
government support. From 1994 to 2005, 3,658 Chinese state-owned enterprises failed,
145
 
and cost-cutting led to tens of millions of layoffs. Examining these and other cases of 
successful, middle-of-the road reforms, it is clear that absolute autonomy from the 
government might not be necessary. “Insulation does not mean that government 
bureaucrats must be surrounded by stone walls and moats”
146
; indeed, as a state-owned 
enterprise ages, it often develops a self-sustaining esprit de corps that wards off political 
intervention. In the United States, for example, the civil service has become an influential 
lobby that agitates against patronage.
147
 
Furthermore, in instances where a state-owned enterprise seems distracted from 
its core business, that is often by design. In Kazakhstan, for example, President Nursultan 
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Nazarbayev sees the public railroad company Temir Zholy, known as K.T.Z., as a 
potential global leader in railroad manufacturing and an engine of industrialization. At 
the same time, he treats the company like an employment and social services agency. One 
in every 54 workers in Kazakhstan is on the K.T.Z. payroll and in some towns, the K.T.Z. 
stationmaster oversees schools and roads.
148
 At times, companies such as K.T.Z. manage 
to turn a profit. However, that often reflects monopolistic pricing rather than skilled 
management or a commitment to economic efficiency. After all, even profit maximizing 
managers find themselves subject to disruptive government interventions in cases where 
profits are a secondary concern. Policymakers, for example, often set prices for a state-
owned enterprise’s inputs and outputs. “The state has used SOEs as a policy instrument 
to achieve all sorts of goals, not only economic development, but also political goals and 
relief of distribution pressures. SOEs have been required to employ individuals with 
certain political affiliations or to confer largess on certain interest groups.”
149
 These and 
other interventions are not all financially harmful; state-owned enterprises often enjoy 
cheap capital and direct government subsidies. Either way, the substantial government 
involvement complicates a simple profitability analysis. 
Alternative approaches to measuring state-owned enterprise performance are 
similarly problematic. “Social audits” – evaluating a firm based on its broader mission – 
require governments to specify, and ideally quantify, their goals for a firm’s “double 
bottom line.” In another challenge, a comparison of a firm’s operations with its past 
performance assumes consistent government intervention. In cases of privatization, a 
comparison of a firm under both ownership structures must take into account legal 
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reforms that give private investors the ability to set prices and change staffing and 
compensation levels, flexibilities that public managers often lacked. Similarly, 
privatizations tainted by corruption or political favoritism – or that simply establish a 
privately owned monopoly overseen by a powerful regulatory authority – also frustrate 
efforts to determine a clear relationship between ownership structure and performance. 
The tendency of governments to unload the worst performing state-owned enterprise 
further muddies the water. Finally, comparisons with private sector performance are also 
difficult because state-owned enterprises are clustered in low-growth industries. (Though 
plenty of private sector actors have found a way to turn a profit drilling oil and mining 
gold and iron ore.) The empirical evidence underlines these analytical challenges. In 
Latin America, privatized infrastructure has generated only modest financial returns, 
particularly for water and transportation.
150
 Further complicating the debate is evidence 
that within countries, state-owned enterprises themselves vary widely in effectiveness.
151
 
The defense of state-owned enterprises does not rely exclusively on challenges to 
the metrics of success (e.g., profitability) or manner of comparison. It is also bolstered by 
examples of governments that have given privately owned competitors a run for their 
money. Brazil’s great modernizer, the bespectacled strongman Getúlio Vargas (1930 to 
1945, 1951 to 1954), inherited a corrupt, ragtag bureaucracy when he seized power in 
1930. Such was the disarray that the Brazilian government could not keep track of its 
own debts thanks to careless recordkeeping.
152
 In response, Vargas established the 
Administrative Department of Public Service to oversee Brazil’s civil service and 
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government procurement. The new agency demonstrated that Brazil’s government was 
not irredeemably venial and incompetent. Gradually, the Administrative Department of 
Public Service increased its authority, eventually overseeing the national budget. It did 
not survive Vargas’s ouster in a coup d’état. But when Vargas returned to the presidency, 
he again challenged assumptions about Brazil’s public sector. This time, his strategy 
involved “bolsoes de eficiencia,” literally “pockets of efficiency,” such as a newly 
created national development bank, the Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico 
e Social, known as BNDES. Staffed by former officials of the Administrative Department 
of Public Service, its success convinced Vargas’s successor to set up other autonomous 
entities, including the Fundação Getulio Vargas, a respected research institution and 
university that, like BNDES, still operates and is considered an “island of excellence” in 
Brazil. In France, decades before its privatization in 1996, the automaker Renault, at one 
time the largest car manufacturer in Europe,
153
 was widely considered well-run.
154
 In 
India, economic liberalization initially nearly crushed the State Bank of India, which saw 
its market share nosedive from 35 percent to 15 percent. However, its new chairman, Om 
Prakash Bhatt, reanimated the bank, which has 200,000 employees across 10,000 
branches. In 2008, after two years of growth under Bhatt, it became the largest bank in 
India in terms of market capitalization.
155
 Chief Operating Officer Idris Jala pulled off a 
similar turnaround at the state-owned Malaysia Airlines, which was all-but bankrupt 
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when Jala arrived in 2005. The airline had suffered from the standard symptoms of state 
management, including an obese payroll and costly government mandates, such as 
requirements to fly unprofitable routes. Taking advantage of the airline’s financial crisis, 
Jala altered flight frequencies, eliminated routes and cut costs, including through the sale 
of the airline’s headquarters in Kuala Lumpur. In 2007, Malaysia Airlines recorded 
record profits.
156
 In general, as governments liberalized formerly closed economies 
following the “lost decade” of the 1980s, a handful of state-owned enterprises rose to the 
occasion. 
Remarkably, these “islands of excellence” have in some cases vanquished the 
ultimate state-owned enterprise boogeyman: corruption. Mobutu’s Congo and 
Stroessner’s Paraguay are classic, colorful tales of patrimonialism. Of the more 
pedestrian variety, there is the Mexican police
157
 and the Indian civil service.
158
 Less 
known – and sometimes short-lived – are the counterpoints. The powerful anticorruption 
agencies in Hong Kong and Singapore.
159
 Uganda’s success in discouraging the theft of 
school funds by publicizing government grants in local newspapers.
160
 Efren Plana’s 
rescue of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, a notorious den of corruption in Ferdinand 
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There is no consensus regarded the catalysts for reforms that help establish 
successful state-owned enterprises, or prevent a prompt reversal of fortune. As with much 
good government reform, state-owned enterprise improvement often comes about 
because of a charismatic leader. In other situations, crises help. Corruption scandals, for 
example, engender public outrage that can force political leaders to act. In the United 
States, for example, it took the murder of President James Garfield, shot at a Washington, 
D.C. railway station by a disgruntled jobseeker,
162
 to bring about civil service reform.
163
 
Helpfully, scholars have identified common elements in the few cases of state-
owned enterprise success.
164
 They include: 
1. The presence of competition, including through an export orientation; 
2. Financial autonomy; 
3. Managerial autonomy; 
4. Clear objectives; 
5. Access to capital markets, permitting private investors to provide 
apolitical scrutiny and guidance; 
6. Explicit compensation for the costs of pursuing social objectives, as is 
common in France, Italy and Sweden;  
7. Limits to and centralization of government oversight to avoid “confusion, 
duplication and excessive control”
165
; and, 
8. An independent, merit-based hiring system. 
 
In some circles nowadays, the Washington Consensus has become a bigger 
punching bag than the long-vilified state-owned enterprises. Neoliberal economists who 
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treated government as a type of inferior good and fixated on fiscal consolidation, might 
have robbed states of the ability to institute “systemic, proactive public interventions that 
can assist the private sector in overcoming structural constraints on innovation, 
productive transformation and export development.”
166
 As discussed, there is no 
quarreling with the depressing data on the failures of state-owned enterprises. Defenders 
of state-led development, however, blame those stumbles on the “lack of experience, 
competence and expertise among personnel charged with carrying out projects; the 
diversion of needed funds to other uses; and the subversion of reform goals by politicians 
and bureaucrats uncommitted, for whatever reason, to their achievement.”
167
 True, state-
owned enterprises have been a breeding ground for corruption. But corruption is not only 
present in countries with governments that operate large businesses. Infamously, in the 
former Soviet states and elsewhere, it was market liberalization that led to, or at 
minimum exacerbated, widespread corruption.
168
 This was particularly true of botched 
privatizations, where government officials put insider information up for sell. It remains 
true in the private sector today, as was notoriously demonstrated by the Enron bankruptcy 
in the United States in 2001. Critics of the Washington Consensus also reject the 
inevitability of special interests capturing public institutions, including state-owned 
enterprises. As David Truman has observed, civil society can provide effective checks 
and balances on state capture through “overlapping membership;”
169
 as individuals join 
multiple groups – protectionist manufacturers, for example, are also consumers – no 
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individual wants any single group to dominate society. Additionally, the prospect of the 
formation of a rival group limits overreach by influential associations and economic 
actors.
170
 Europe offers examples. Some of the world’s least corrupt countries – including 
Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands and Sweden – have some of the world’s largest public 
sectors.
171
 The economic development focus of various international institutions has 
gradually shifted to reflect this new thinking on the proper role of government. The 
United Nations Development Program, for example, has deemphasized budget cutting, 
instead calling for greater spending on fighting poverty and investing in health and 
education. As early as the mid-1980s, scholars were already making the case for 
“bringing the state back in.”
172
 Peter Evans warned that “attempts to dismantle the state 
or make it wither away risk perverse consequences.” 
173
 Anyway, he wrote, “state 
involvement is a given. The appropriate question is not ‘how much’ but ‘what kind?”
174
 
Vivek Chibber made a similar argument: “The choice is over how to have the state 
intervene in the economy, not whether to have it intervene” (emphasis in original).
175
 
Case studies have challenged the conventional wisdom that “state intervention in 
the economy necessarily generates distortions that hurt economic growth,” a claim Atul 
Kohli rejected as “plagued by empirical and logical problems.”
176
 By contrast, 
industrialization has often depended upon state intervention, as seen in Brazil, India and 
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 The private sector powerhouses in Japan have long enjoyed government-
guaranteed financing, tax breaks, publically funded marketing and other support.
178
 True, 
there are always voices proclaiming the state not only merely dead, but really most 
sincerely dead. Or at least downsized to “virtual” status.
179
 However, these analystst now 
have to share the stage. Ha-Joon Chang, in “Kicking Away the Ladder,” argued that the 
biggest advocates for laissez-faire government themselves relied upon heavy state 
intervention to industrialize.
180
 Great Britain, for example, was a “relatively backward 
economy” that imported technology and exported raw wool. That was until it banned 
imported wool cloth and restricted the export of raw wool to promote the development of 
local manufacturing. In the United States, none other than Alexander Hamilton 
popularized the infant industry argument and helped erect high tariffs to catalyze 
industrialization. (Polyani wrote “The Great Transformation” while living in Vermont.) 
Lately, even the authors of the Washington Consensus have begun promoting so-called 






 Despite the shifting views of state-owned enterprises, there is little doubt that over 
all, these firms continue to struggle financially. Importantly, much of the problem arises 
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from their basic ownership structure, in which the officials in charge have no financial 
stake in the business’s success. The consequences are not merely academic. For large 
countries, state-owned enterprises might be wasteful, but they are not systemically 
dangerous. In small states, however, they at times present an almost existential threat. 
The danger lies in what is known dryly as contingent liability; though a state-owned 
enterprise might be financially independent on paper, economic and political factors 
compel central government bailouts in tough times. The problem is that the veneer of 
independence permits governments to avoid establishing adequate reserves to address a 
“major hidden fiscal risk.”
182
 It also creates a moral hazard that leads state-owned 
enterprises to borrow irresponsibly. This is obviously the case with explicit government 
guarantees, but it also occurs with an implicit promise of rescue. 
“Once a contingent liability falls due and requires government financing, 
however, the government has limited choices: it can increase the deficit, incur 
additional public liabilities without reporting any increases in the deficit, cut some 
envisaged expenditures, levy more taxes, sell state assets, default on some 
obligations or engage in some combination of these activities. Each of these 
actions challenges government performance and credibility, with an attendant 
reduction in the effectiveness of future policies, compromises political stability 









Better planning is frequently complicated by the lack of transparency in state-
owned enterprises. Readers of the reports the IMF publishes after Article IV 
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consultations – the periodic, economic full body scans that detect signs of economic 
distress – are familiar with this challenge. In 2012, for example, the IMF mission to the 
Caribbean island of Grenada discovered that it was “very difficult to monitor and assess 
SOEs financial status since they don’t report systematically.”
185
 Despite a law mandating 
reporting, less than half of the country’s 29 state-owned enterprises submit audited 
financial statements to parliament. The situation is similar throughout the Caribbean, 
where small islands favor big governments. In 2011, IMF staff warned Barbados about its 
subsidies to state-owned enterprises, recommending it “consider privatization and 
outsourcing where feasible.”
186
 As with Grenada, Barbados’s 2011 Article IV report 
highlighted a lack of transparency at state-owned enterprises, complaining that “data are 
not systematically and promptly reported.”
187
 Two years later, IMF inspectors again 
singled out Barbados’s public enterprises. This time, Barbados was in the “throes of a 
financial meltdown.”
188
 The IMF recommended that the country appoint a high-level 
oversight committee to police state-owned enterprises, notorious for flouting laws 
requiring financial reporting and subject to political interference. 
“Oversight and accountability with respect to the operations of the statutory 
bodies is lacking. The Ministry of Finance confirmed that most SOEs have not 
submitted financial reports for several years, undermining the fiscal planning 
framework and the integrity of the budget process. The decision to reduce 
transfers to public enterprises is welcome, but these must translate into reforms at 
public enterprises in order for the adjustment to be effective. In particular, new 
business plans are needed to inform resource allocation, staffing, whether to spin 
off commercial activities, how to improve targeting of support to the vulnerable 
groups and whether to raise tariffs.”
189
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Seven of Barbados’s nine largest state-owned enterprises lose money – including the 
Caribbean Broadcasting Corporation and Queen Elizabeth Hospital – even when 
government subsidies are counted as revenue. A government task force recommended 
that 18 of the 40 state-owned enterprises be closed or merged to avoid redundancy and 
inefficiency. Nevertheless, the overall risk to the central government is hard to pin down. 
“The lack of up-to-date financial information means that a significant element of the 
public finances is not being reflected in the government’s fiscal planning. These include 
contingencies to the central government resulting from off balance sheet activities, 




Dragging Down the Average: Latin America 
 In Latin America since the 1920s, the national oil company has been the 
emblematic state-owned enterprise. The region set the global trend of oil nationalizations, 
starting with Mexico (1938), Colombia (1951), Brazil (1954), Ecuador (1973) and 
Venezuela (1976).
191
 (Other regions followed, with nationalizations in Egypt in the 1960s 
and Iraq, Algeria and Saudi Arabia in the 1970s.) The performance of Latin America’s 
petroleum behemoths conforms to the worst case scenario predicted by Washington 
Consensus economists. In fact, some scholars blame Latin America for the very concept 
of the “resource curse”; the region’s extraordinary indebtedness and stagnant economies 
in the 1980s overwhelmed previous cases where favorable resource endowments were 
correlated with relative prosperity.
192
 For this reputation, Latin America cannot blame 
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declining terms of trade, a longtime regional hobbyhorse that has not always withstood 
the test of accumulating data
193
 (though it continues to have defenders
194
). Instead, the 
causes of Latin America’s underdevelopment include public corruption, patronage, and 
government meddling that erodes trust between the “technostructure” and its government 
overseers.
195
 History might have played a role. Spanish capitalism involved centralized, 
royal control over underground resources as well as tobacco and other products.
196
 But 
the more likely culprit for overeager and underwhelming economic management is 
politics, with considerations such as plant location and prices commonly residing in the 
hands of politicians instead of businessmen.
197
 
However it came about, the results of the region’s missed opportunities can be 
measured in current account deficits and lost foreign exchange. Again, the oil sector is 
emblematic. In 2011, Argentina became a net energy importer, despite enviable oil and 
natural gas reserves.
198
 Due to inadequate investment in refining capabilities, over the last 
decade Latin America doubled its reliance on the United States for diesel and gasoline.
199
 
The situation is not improving; by 2020, Latin America is expected to import 9 million to 
10 million barrels of oil per day. “The failures of governments to establish a national 
consensus on public enterprises deprived the firms of a relatively fixed and stable 
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environment and subjected their operating milieus to the vagaries of political, regime, 
ministerial or bureaucratic changes.” From the start, “continual change became the only 
constant for most petroleum enterprises – change of company name, change of 
organizational goals, change of corporate form, change of management structure and 




Mexico nationalized its oil sector and established Pemex to promote 
industrialization through universal access to cheap oil. From the start, however, political 
goals such as import substitution, prevailed over Pemex’s business priorities. The 
industrialization scheme failed. Until the North American Free Trade Agreement, Mexico 
was basically an oil-exporting economy. Pemex, meanwhile, served as a “bottomless font 
of patronage.”
201
 To this day, the company is chronically deprived of resources. 
Underfunding has taken a toll. Over the past decade, production has fallen from 3.5 
million barrels per day to less than 3 million.
202
 (The country’s drug war, of course, has 
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not helped; the violence has touched Pemex through kidnappings of executives and oil 
theft from pipelines by drug cartels.
203
) In Argentina, the state oil company Yacimientos 
Petrolíferos Fiscales, known as YPF was taxed into oblivion. The situation in Brazil is 
worse. Brazil’s state-owned Petróleo Brasileiro, known as Petrobras, should be flying 
high. In 2006, it found massive off-shore oil deposits and boasted that the discovery 
would “catapult the company, in the upcoming years, to a new oil reserve and production 
level, ranking it among the major operators.”
204
 Eventually, the company promised, the 
fields would yield more than a million barrels of oil per day. That might still prove true. 
However, for now, the company resembles the region’s classic “parasitic parastatal.”
205
 
The so-called pre-salt oil – 23,000 feet below the sea, beneath rocks covered by a layer of 
salt that is in some places 6,562 feet thick – has not transformed Petrobras’s fortunes. 
Production has dropped to 1.9 million barrels per day from 2.11 million in 2011.
206
 In 
2008, Petrobras was ranked as the world’s sixth-largest company. Since then, its market 
value has dropped by one-third.
207
 The company suffers from a headache shared by its 
counterparts throughout the region: the forced provision of subsidized oil to domestic 
consumers. It pursues this policy despite the fact that in Brazil, as elsewhere, the biggest 
oil users are typically the wealthiest in society. The subsidies proved increasingly costly 
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as economic growth in Brazil
208
 increased sales of cars and trucks and the demand for 
petroleum products outpaced domestic production.
209
 Over all, primary energy 
consumption in Brazil increased by more than one third over the past decade.
210
 As a 
result, Petrobras imports fuel at world prices and sells it at a considerable loss. The 
imports – as much as 215,000 barrels per day of gasoline and diesel – have taken a toll; 
since 2011, Petrobras’s refining division has lost $18.3 billion.
211
 (This was before oil 
prices collapsed and a bribery scandal devastated the company.) There are reasonable 
reasons to maintain the interventionist policies, including a desire to control inflation. 
The company’s projected growth also makes it an attractive tool for industrial policy, as a 
potential driver of employment in a range of industries, such as shipbuilding. Domestic 
politics is also a factor. Many Brazilians, including Petrobras workers, have been 
suspicious of the company since it was partially privatized in 1997. (Brazil established 
Petrobras in 1953, the culmination of “the oil is ours” movement, and it maintained its 
monopoly over the industry for 44 years.) Debate over how to handle the pre-salt oil and 
its promised riches has sparked protests, including an “Occupy Petrobras” encampment at 
the company’s Rio de Janeiro headquarters. 
None of that lessons the impacts on company finances. The losses are particularly 
worrisome in light of another government mandate: that Petrobras and local partners 
receive a majority of contracts for drills, ships and platforms needed to extract the 
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estimated 50 billion barrels of pre-salt oil.
212
 To play its outsized part, Petrobras needs all 
the cash it can get its hands on. The required subsidies on domestic gasoline sales, 
however, are forcing it to borrow to cover the $237 billion in planned investment over the 
next five years. As a result, the company’s debt has jumped to $185 billion from $40 
billion in 2008.
213
 In the first six months of 2013, debt increased by $16.3 billion.
214
 
Petrobras’s total borrowing in 2013 – $20 billion – included an $11 billion bond sale that 
was the largest ever for an emerging market company.
215
 Petrobras now owes $86.5 
billion, making it the world’s most indebted oil company. Meanwhile, the required 
participation of local firms is causing further complications. Under government rules, 
Petrobras is guaranteed a 30 percent stake in every project and operates the fields. 
Foreign partners must buy half of their supplies locally, regardless of cost. The impact of 
this “state-heavy strategy”
216
 was evident in October 2013, when Brazil auctioned off the 
first pre-salt field, five years after it discovered the oil. Several multinational oil 
companies stayed on the sidelines, including Exxon and Chevron, in part because of the 
leading role reserved for Petrobras in the development of the Libra field.
217
 The 
government’s required $7 billion signing bonus and 80 percent cut of the proceeds also 
dampened enthusiasm.
218
 The month of the auction, Moody’s Investors Service 
downgraded Petrobras, to Baa1 from A3, citing its high debt and negative cash flow. 
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“Political pressures,” Moody’s wrote, meant no end was in sight to petroleum subsidies. 
None of this is new for Petrobras. In the 1980s, Brazilian policymakers used Petrobras to 
bail out a variety of foundering industries through its purchases of alcohol, pig iron and 
steel, and sales of subsidized fertilizer and petrochemicals.
219
 (Chapter 6 discusses 
Petrobras’s recent, extreme struggles amid an apocalyptic corruption scandal.) 
This cross-subsidizing by state-owned enterprises is common in the region. 
Historically in Argentina, the state oil company not only provided discounted crude to the 
state-owned railway, but turned a blind eye when the railway failed to pay its bills. 
(Pemex was also hurt by a deadbeat state-owned railroad.) Nor is Petrobras the only 
national oil company to contend with debilitating government mandates. In Venezuela, 
the government’s agenda for Petróleos de Venezuela, known as PDVSA, extends far 
beyond profitability. As in Brazil, conflicting mandates have eroded PDVSA’s profits 
and productivity. Former President Hugo Chávez (1999 to 2013) “long opposed 
PDVSA’s strategy of maximizing market share through increased production, 
reinvestment of profits abroad and lower prices.”
220
 Once in office, he attacked the state-
owned enterprise’s independence. His efforts provoked two major worker strikes. 
Ultimately, however, he succeeded in seizing control, after he dismissed PDVSA’s 
president and 18,000 workers and executives, and replaced its governing board. Having 
converted PDVSA into a presidential slush fund, Chávez habitually diverted its revenues 
to social programs, state projects and foreign assistance. For more than a decade, oil 
proceeds financed “ambitious public spending, wage hikes, extension of credit to 
traditionally marginalized sectors, nationalization schemes [and] limits on private-sector 
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 Revenues also paid for clientelistic “social missions” – providing health care, 
schooling and housing to poor communities where the government enjoyed strong 
support – and for a chain of discount convenience stores. The program remains the 
largest of its kind in Latin America.
222
 
Previous governments also raided PDVSA’s accounts. Former President Luis 
Antonio Herrera Campins (1979 to 1984), for example, extracted billions of dollars from 
a special account set up to preserve 10 percent of the company’s profits for its internal 
use. However, the extraction of revenues by Chávez and his successor, Nicolás Maduro 
(2013 to present), has been dramatic. Ultimately, it has made it impossible for PDVSA to 
invest in its infrastructure or in oil exploration. That handicap – coupled with a 
nationalization spree that discouraged foreign direct investment in Venezuela – had 
predictable consequences. Oil production fell by 30 percent under Chávez.
223
 In 
November 2013, Petrobras pulled out of a joint refinery after PDVSA could not come up 
with its portion of the cash.
224
 At the same time, Chávez directed PDVSA to supply 
gasoline at extraordinarily low prices domestically. Today, gasoline in Venezuela is the 
cheapest in the world; with the price fixed at 6 cents per gallon for the past 15 years, 
drivers spend more tipping the gas station attendant than filling their tank.
225
 Thanks to 
refining challenges, PDVSA imports much of its gasoline, paying world prices. 
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Meanwhile, the subsidized oil promotes profligate consumption; since 2001, domestic 
consumption is up 39 percent.
226
 That, in turn, cuts into oil exports, which account for 95 





In attempts to explain why Latin America “fell behind” other developing regions 
– a popular academic pastime – the missteps of Latin American state-owned enterprises 
loom large. This was not the only factor by a long shot. The region also suffered from its 
historic failures to invest in human capital, reduce inequality and address poverty, as well 
as its weak institutions and onetime passion for autarchic economic policies.
228
 Still, 
Latin America’s poor management of state-owned enterprises plays an important role in 
comparative studies. Like Latin America, the Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Finland, 
Norway and Sweden) were poor, agricultural and burdened by income inequality until the 
mid-1950s. As in Latin America, Scandanavia relied heavily upon natural resources, such 
as timber and iron ore, for economic growth. The similarities, however, diminished over 
the next three decades. Scandinavian industrial policy focused on promoting private 
sector exports, taking advantage of a sustained and dramatic expansion of international 
trade. In Latin America, import substitution industrialization, largely through state-owned 
enterprises, dominated. As a result, per capita GDP in Finland, once equal to the levels in 
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Chile and Uruguay, was nearly three times as high by the mid-1980s.
229
 In Sweden and 
Finland, the forest and metal industries still account for at least one-fifth of the industrial 
labor force and produce a quarter of exports.
230
 At the same time, Scandanavia’s export-
orientated, private sector firms – such as Swedan’s Ericsson and Finland’s Nokia – have 
gained global market share in a way almost none of Latin America’s state-owned 
enterprises ever did. Latin America, a region whose economic growth was long based on 
exports, saw its share of world trade fall by half between 1950 and 1980.
231
 
Perhaps the most common and least flattering comparison is Latin America and 
East Asia. Though the Asian Tigers – Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore – 
were as dirigiste as Latin American governments in the early post-war period, those 
states directed investment through market-oriented, export-focused policies, and focused 
on bolstering private sector firms.
232
 The resulting economic “miracle” again drew 
attention to the plight of Latin American “laggards.” 
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Chapter 3: Has the Panama Canal Authority efficiently managed the canal, and 
even exceeded the U.S. record? Assessing Panama’s premier state-owned enterprise 
 
Introduction 
 C.B. Fenton has been servicing ships in the Panama Canal since 1916, two years 
after the waterway opened. For a century, it has ferried mail and newspapers aboard 
launches to transiting vessels; transported crewmembers to shore for doctors 
appointments; arranged ship repairs; and, like a maritime bail bondsman, hunted down 
crewmembers who failed to return from shore leave. As the U.S. government prepared to 
get out of the canal business in 1999, C.B. Fenton executives held their breath. 
The company’s president, Robin Morland, had spent his life in the Panama Canal 
Zone. Born in 1942 in Colón, he attended Cristóbal High School, riding the historic 
Panama Canal railway to play the Balboa High School Bulldogs in baseball. His father, 
Gilbert Morland, had moved to Panama in 1931. He married the daughter of a Brooklyn 
mariner who in 1916 began piloting ships through the locks. In 1958, he bought C.B. 
Fenton. Twenty years after Carter and Torrijos signed the canal treaties, Robin Morland 
was not convinced Panama was prepared to run the waterway. He worried about workers 
knocking off early, inadequate dredging and having to pay bribes to move ships through 
the locks. 
As it turned out, Panama did not stumble out of the gate. The Panama Canal 
Authority, Morland said, processes paperwork in a flash, accommodates last-minute 
requests – say, for tugboat assistance through the locks – and makes rapid-fire decisions 
63 
 
compared to the previous U.S. administration. “Panama has done a wonderful job,” he 
said. “It’s a business now. Everyone has been pleasantly surprised.”
233
 
Morland is not alone in his praise for the Panama Canal Authority. Against all 
odds, Panama’s premiere state-owned enterprise has exceeded practically all 
expectations. Panama’s performance has been mostly overlooked; sidestepping 
management missteps is hardly front page news in a region where governance failures 
have opened the door to gangland mayhem and rampant drug running.
234
 But those who 
come in contact with Panama’s canal are universally impressed. “If you look at 
performance metrics, they haven’t fallen down anywhere,” Christopher L. Koch, 
president of the World Shipping Council, a leading industry group, said. “They have done 
a fine job of it.”
235
 Noel Maurer, co-author of a 2010 history of the canal, “The Big Ditch: 
How America Took, Built, Ran and Ultimately Gave Away the Panama Canal,” agreed. 






Panama’s strong performance is evident in most quantitative measures. The canal 
authority is obsessed with metrics. It clocks a ship’s time crossing canal waters; how 
often line handlers meet a ship on time; how frequently tugboats are out of service; and 
the punctuality of canal pilots navigating the locks. To keep tabs on environmental 
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conditions in the canal watershed, the authority monitors 22 indicators including forest 
cover, water quality and farming practices.
237
 
Throughout the 1990s, observers predicted a Three Stooges routine of bumbling 
seamen. Instead, in its first full year running the canal, toll revenue increased by $5.3 
million and the accident rate fell to its lowest level since 1947.
238
 In the 2003 fiscal year, 
the authority supervised 172 days free of accidents, the best performance in a half 
century.
239
 The accident rate remained low in subsequent years, thanks to training and 
investments in navigational aids such as lighthouses, buoys, beacons, bank lights and 
technology for pilots. 
Panama’s success is most evident in the category most important to Panamanians: 
profit. From 2000 – Panama’s first year running the waterway – to 2013, net income 
rocketed to $1.2 billion from $142 million, a nominal increase of more than 800 percent 
(Figure 1). Toll revenues – the main driver of profits – exploded. In 2000, the canal 
collected $430 million from passing vessels; in 2013, shippers handed over $1.8 billion. 
Total revenue in 2013 hit $2.4 billion, compared to $769 million in 2000. It helped that 
the canal faced no direct competition, permitting it to set the market price for its services. 
Tolls have risen repeatedly, and significantly, under the Panamanians; up twice in 2002 
(8 percent, 4.5 percent); three times in 2007 (5.7 percent, 14.2 percent and 10.1 percent); 
and once in 2011 (12 percent), 2012 (5 percent) and 2013 (5 percent). Changes in the toll 
structure also inflated revenues, after Panama instituted a system that charged different 
fees for different classes of ship, such as container ships and tankers. Panama also 
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charges for on-deck cargo space and it operates a convenient, but exorbitantly priced, 
reservation system. “The transition was smooth,” Panama’s colorful ambassador to the 
United States, Mario E. Jaramillo, said in 2012.
240
 “Small is beautiful.” 
  
From day 1, shippers did not stray to alternate routes (Figure 2). “Panama has 
won over its skeptics, proving that a small Central American country can manage one of 
the world’s greatest maritime shortcuts as efficiently as the United States,” the Journal of 
Commerce, a major industry publication, concluded in 2002.
241
 The same year, Lloyd’s 
said any doubts about Panama’s ability to run the canal had “totally disappeared.”
242
 “The 
ships didn’t crash,” Ricaurte Vásquez, the canal’s first Panamanian chief financial 
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Panama recorded similar trends in the quantity of cargo it has handled. Tonnage 
increased in all but three of the first 14 years Panama controlled the canal (Figure 3), as 
the waterway drew increasingly larger ships.
244
 The cargo includes everything from 
wheat, sorghum, corn and rice to crude oil and gasoline, iron, copper and zinc, coal, 
chemicals, salt, fertilizers, cars and trucks, lumber, and sugar and bananas, all hauled 
aboard container vessels, dry bulk carriers, refrigerated ships, tankers and vehicle 
carriers. From 2000 to 2011, tonnage increased by 3.1 percent annually on average, led 
by spectacular growth in containerized cargo moving between Asia and the East Coast of 
the United States, and buoyed by rapidly expanding vessel size.
245
 Panama’s “ownership 
of the Panama Canal since the end of 1999 has been an unqualified success,” Ambler H. 
Moss Jr., U.S. ambassador to Panama from 1978 to 1982, said. “The canal makes more 
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revenue, puts through more ships per day and has a better safety record than it did when 






Obviously, Panama’s management of the canal is hardly the only factor in its 
performance. The vicissitudes of global commerce also govern the fate of canal finances. 
There are frequent, exogenous shocks, such as the 2008 global financial crisis that sent 
tonnage tumbling 1.1 percent, as shipments of construction materials to the United States 
declined. The business cycles of major canal users – principally the United States, China 
and Japan – also play a role. In the 2002 calendar year, for example, growth was sluggish 





As a result, the 2002 fiscal year saw canal transits drop 2.3 percent and tonnage tumble 
2.8 percent. Broader, global economic trends also register. Shifts in manufacturing to 
South and Southeast Asia, for example, help the Suez Canal at Panama’s expense, due to 
the shorter navigation time from that region’s ports to the U.S. East Coast.
249
 
Local phenomena have outsized impacts on the canal, both positive and negative. 
The discovery of oil in Prudhoe Bay, Alaska, in 1968 boosted canal traffic, but traffic 
dropped rapidly in 1983, when the tranisthmian oil pipeline opened.
250
 The temporary 
closure of Venezuelan oil refineries in 2003 deprived the canal of oil tanker tolls.
251
 The 
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spectacular growth of the Chinese economy – Chinese GDP increased by 9.2 percent on 
average from 1996 to 2005 – and China’s inclusion in the World Trade Organization, in 
2001, produced consistent increases in Latin American raw materials shipped through the 
canal to China. In the other direction, total tonnage from Asia to the U.S. East Coast grew 
annually by 5.1 percent on average from 2000 to 2011. Economic growth in the United 
States lifts the quantity of Japanese cars sailing through the canal, while natural disasters 
in Japan, such as the 2011 Fukushima nuclear meltdown, have the opposite effect. 
Drought in the United States hurts the U.S. grain harvest, and lowers canal traffic. 
China’s astonishing appetite for coal, iron ore and oil means much of the natural resource 
exports from Australia, Indonesia, Africa and the Middle East stick to their own 
hemisphere, never touching the canal.
252
 “The number of transits does not depend solely 
on the canal. It is a variable affected by various factors related to the global economy, 
which is impacted by natural events, wars, economic cycles, geopolitical strategies and 
the canal’s capacity.”
253
 (An area for future research would involve regression analyses 
designed to isolate the significance of canal management from other variables that help 
determine canal outcomes. The relevant data is available – including variables such as 
annual tonnage, revenue, accidents, transit speed and personnel – dating back to at least 
1980. That permits analyses that would compare U.S. and Panamanian canal 
management, controlling for external factors such as economic growth in the United 
States and Japan, both major canal users,
254
 and over all changes in global trade patterns.) 
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Industry trends matter, too. The increasing size of vessels has been doubly helpful 
to the Panama Canal Authority; the authority bills based on cargo capacity, so larger 
ships offer more revenue in fewer transits, potentially reducing water use in the locks, 
gridlock and accidents. On September 19, 2007, the authority ushered 25 Panamax 
vessels through the canal, a record number at the time.
255
 Today, these gigantic container 
ships make up a quarter of all traffic, and provide more than half of toll revenue. 
Containerization was also a godsend to the Panama Canal. Dry bulk carriers once 
dominated the canal, hauling grain, coal and other commodities. Today, it is largely a 
container canal, plied by liner services running container ships on set schedules. In the 
future, the canal expects a boost from another outside development, the shale oil and gas 
revolution in the United States. That business opportunity, the result of a wholly 
unanticipated technological development, will send LNG shipments through the canal to 
Japan, South Korea, China and Taiwan. By contrast, the Trans Pacific Partnership, 
designed to increase trade across the Pacific Ocean, could hurt the canal’s bottom line. 
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Against all odds, the authority has kept spending under control. As a result, its 
profit margin – net income divided by revenue – consistently exceeds 50 percent, up from 
12.6 percent in 2000. The increased revenue and profits have provided a windfall for the 
Panamanian government (Figure 4). By law, after covering operating, investment, 
modernization and expansion costs, all surplus revenue goes to the Panamanian treasury. 
(The canal pays no taxes.) In 2000, the Panama Canal Authority directly contributed 
$201 million to the Panamanian budget; that figure topped $1 billion in 2011 and again in 
2012. In its first decade under Panamanian management, the canal generated $4.7 billion 
for government coffers, compared to a total of $1.9 billion in 86 years under U.S. 
control.
256
 Through 2011, the authority had plowed $6.6 billion into the Panamanian 
treasury, at an annual growth rate of 16.1 percent. 
 
 
The authority also generates more than $340 million annually in indirect 
payments to the Panamanian government, from sources such as employee income taxes 
and social security taxes.  A 2008 study, commissioned by the Panama Canal Authority, 
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found that the canal’s over all contribution to Panama’s GDP averaged 4.8 percent from 
2000 to 2008, using a narrow definition of the canal’s economic impact (Figure 5). 
“This contribution exceeds 10 percent when including the multiplying impact that 
happens when the workers spent their salaries in the purchase of goods and 
services, as well as if the multiplying impact is considered over the suppliers of 
merchandises and services [to the canal]. A relevant conclusion of the study was 






The “logistic and transportation conglomerate” tied to the canal, the study found, 
accounts for more than a third of Panama’s GDP, and 15 percent of government income. 
This includes activity in the sprawling Colón Free Trade Zone, as well as canal-related 
services such as the sale of fuel to ships; large ports on both sides of the canal; ship 
maintenance and repair; and water shuttle services. As an additional helping hand to 
Panamanian authorities, canal operating areas are company towns, where the authority 
handles security, firefighting, street maintenance, public lighting, street cleaning, traffic 
control and garbage collection. It not only provides drinking water to communities in the 
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former Panama Canal Zone, but also sells water to Panama City, San Miguelito, Colón, 
Arraijan and La Chorrera, cleaned in two canal-owned filtration plants, warehoused in 18 
canal-owned water towers and transported, thanks to seven canal-owned pumping 
stations, through 43 miles of canal-owned pipes. The authority also operates two 
hydroelectric plants – Madden and Gatún – with an installed capacity of 36 and 24 
megawatts, respectively, and a thermoelectric plant with an installed capacity of 91 
megawatts. The canal, meanwhile, draws hundreds of thousands of visitors per year, 
magnifying its economic impact. In a world of money-losing, debt-burdened, state-owned 
enterprises, the Panama Canal Authority’s contributions are extraordinary. 
 
Reinvestment 
Perhaps most surprising is that the authority’s consistently increasing profits have 
not come at the expense of capital investment. Unlike its peer state-owned enterprises – 
such as the Latin American oil giants Pemex (Mexico) and PDVSA (Venezuela) 
discussed in Chapter 2 – the Panama Canal Authority’s transfers to the Panamanian 
treasury are calculated only after deducting its annual capital investments. The authority 
is not shy about using that privilege. In some years, it reinvests more than $300 million. 
Over all, through 2011, it invested $1.9 billion in the business (Figure 6). It widened, 
deepened and straightened the famed Culebra Cut,
258
 the canal’s toughest passage. 
Purchased tug boats. Replaced thousands of feet of tow tracks for the locomotives that 
pull ships through the locks, and bought modern locomotives. It deepened Gatún Lake, 
the artificial body of water in the center of the canal. And it bought equipment with eye-
popping price tags to upgrade the aged fleet inherited from the United States, including a 
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$100 million cutter suction dredge, a $46 million backhoe dredge and a $19 million 
drilling and blasting barge. In addition to the new equipment, it pours millions into 
dredging. “The fear of failing in maintenance has motivated everyone,” Abdiel Pérez, the 





Twenty-one year-old Pérez, whose office overlooks the Miraflores locks, started 
at the canal in 1978 as a mechanic’s apprentice. His current job is arguably the least 
romantic, but most important, at the authority: keeping century-old infrastructure in 
working condition. It is also the area where most observers expected Panama to fall down 
on the job. Sweeping judgments about cultural attributes are always perilous. Even Pérez, 
however, concedes that Panama lacks a maintenance culture. Most of the country’s 
buildings went up less than two decades ago, he said. Maintenance jobs lack prestige. 
Nevertheless, the Panama Canal Authority has a maternal attitude toward its equipment 
and infrastructure. Instead of “fixed time” repairs – replacing a part automatically after a 
predetermined period of use – canal engineers conduct periodic reviews to identify 
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problems in advance; the “predictive maintenance” model often involves the analysis of 
samples in a laboratory to determine when maintenance is required. That is no small task 
for an operation with ancient equipment, that accommodate 14,000 ships a year and run 
24 hours a day.
260
 The authority spends tens of millions of dollars annually keeping up its 
three dams; maintaining lock gates and lock locomotives; and keeping its tugboats, 
launches, cranes and dredges operational. In 2001, for example, total maintenance 
spending hit $175 million, including $58 million alone on the three sets of locks. As a 
result, delays at the locks have fallen from 10,000 minutes per year in the 1990s to fewer 
than 1,000. (Yes, they measure that, too.) In 2013, the authority hosted a conference on 
its maintenance policies – the First International Maintenance Congress – where it 
boasted of its record to 400 participants and a panel of 12 foreign experts. 
Panamanians are not the only ones benefiting from the authority’s success. 
Despite a relentless increase in the size of cargo ships – and associated increases in 
navigational challenges  – vessels are navigating the canal at ever greater speeds. In 2000, 
a journey through the canal lasted 29.4 hours on average. In 2013, the Canal Waters Time 
– a measure that includes waiting time outside the canal – was only 24.5 hours. Over that 
period, Canal Waters Time fell by 17 percent, though the improvements were 
inconsistent (Figure 7). 
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The Panama Canal Authority has resisted pressure to lard its payroll with 
politically connected Panamanians. Still, is it not a particularly lean operation. After 
trumpeting a ruthless, profit-driven attitude to replace the supposedly lumbering U.S. 
bureaucracy, the authority did not exactly downsize. In its first decade, the number of 
employees dropped only twice. In 2013, it hit 10,098, up from 9,157 in 2000, a 10 
percent increase (Figure 8). Payroll is no small matter; in the 2013 fiscal year, the canal 
authority paid $389.8 million in salaries.
261
 That year, personnel services and employee 
benefits accounted for 67 percent of total expenses. (The next biggest expense, fuel, 
consumes about 10 percent of the budget.) From 2000 to 2009, over all annual  
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As was inevitable, praise for the canal authority has not been universal, especially 
among its unionized workforce. Disgruntled employees have marched to the Panamanian 
legislature in protest, filling the gallery as union leaders lashed out against the canal 
authority’s leadership, the non-renewal of contracts for manual laborers and a supposed 
diversion of maintenance funds to the canal expansion. In August 2013, as tensions 
flared, canal unions published a scathing, nine-page, color magazine titled, “Trabajador 
Canalero, La Maravilla Olvidada” (“Canal Worker, the Forgotten Miracle”). Styled after 
the canal’s official “Tu Canal” newsletter, it carried the ominous  headline, “The Panama 
Canal, What They Don’t Want You to Know.” The editor’s note set the tone; it 
condemned the canal authority’s “authoritarian” labor code, and warned that Panama’s 
infamous “fifth border” had persisted beyond the U.S. exodus.
263
 The list of grievances 
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was long and sundry: a “highly unfavorable labor climate” put canal operations at risk
264
; 
the four Canadian-built, Z-Tech 6000 tugboats the authority purchased were a “true 
nightmare,” polluting and dangerous for their crews;
265
 the eight Chinese-built tugboats 
the authority purchased were no better, poorly designed and assembled;
266
 and the 
authority squandered $1 million renovating the residences of the administrator and his 
deputies.
267
 “They have totally lost the vision that made this canal a wonder of the 
world,” the unions warned. Instead, the canal authority had developed “an oppressive 
administration of its workforce that sooner or later would destroy the canal.”
268
 
“Since the transfer of the canal, much of the Panama Canal Authority’s effort has 
involved media spectacles and a flood of praise for executives, but scant 
acknowledgement of the workers who, far from the comfortable, air conditioned 
offices, make the canal operation’s success possible. These employees labor day 





In 2012, 6,000 workers assigned to the canal expansion went on strike to demand 
higher wages, claiming that the consortium expanding the canal had failed to pay 
overtime and alleging a lack of workplace safety.
270
 In 2014, the International Transport 
Workers’ Federation alleged that the Panama Canal Authority had engaged in union 
busting when it attempted to shut down the tugboat captains union.
271
 Nevertheless, canal 
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workers appear to be generally satisfied, or at least satisfied enough to stick around. 





Recent labor complaints have failed to color public opinion about the Panama 
Canal Authority’s record. Back in 2000, however, the Panamanian public was generally 
unimpressed with the canal authority. In fact, arguably no one has been more surprised by 
Panama’s success than Panamanians themselves. Leading up to the transfer of the canal, 
many Panamanians did not feel up to the task. A famous political cartoon imagined a 
diablo rojo – the colorful, provocatively painted, privately operated city buses that 
symbolized urban chaos in Panama City – floating through a canal lock. That is not to say 
that the turnover of the canal was unpopular. Far from it. On the day of the transfer, 
December 31, 1999, thousands of Panamanians climbed rain-soaked Ancón Hill for the 
ceremony, “a momentous, solemn event that would remain indelibly impressed on the 
minds of the Panamanian people.”
273
 The crowd spilled onto the 113 marble steps that 
lead to the historic canal Administration Building from the marble Goethals memorial. 
Yet at the time, 42 percent of Panamanians thought Panama was incapable of running the 
canal, with 17 percent fearing a deterioration in maintenance.
274
 
Gradually, however, the authority won over its countrymen. By 2001, 64 percent 
of Panamanians were optimistic about the canal’s future.
275
 In 2006, 80 percent of 
Panamanians expressed pride in the canal. These changes in public opinion reflect, at 
least in part, the canal authority’s dogged commitment to marketing. Few Panamanians 
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have direct contact with the canal. Nevertheless, the authority bends over backwards to 
impress locals. It built visitor centers “so all Panamanians could admire the patrimony 
that they had been deprived of for so many years.”
276
 It offers paid internships for college 
students – including 445 in the 2003 fiscal year alone
277
 – and signed an agreement with 
the University of Panama to facilitate academic exchanges. It holds an annual charity 
drive, channeling employee donations to dozens of causes. It sends emissaries to local 
schools to preach about the canal’s importance, distribute promotional materials and a 
teacher’s handbook, and donate books. It woos history and geography teachers.
278
 It 
sponsors opera performances. In 2007, it began publishing a monthly magazine, “El 
Faro,” inserting 100,000 copies into the newspapers La Prensa and Critica.
279
 The next 
year, it launched a TV program, “Tu Canal al Día.” Its “Tu Canal” in-house newsletter 
advertises canal merchandise, including mugs and key chains. For the canal’s centennial, 
in 2014, the Miraflores Visitors Center hosted “Magical Nights at the Panama Canal” 
featuring fireworks, live music and dancing and costumed characters portraying the failed 
French canal builder Ferdinand de Lesseps and George Washington Goethals, the U.S. 
engineer who successfully completed the canal. On August 15, 2014 – exactly 100 years 
after the SS Ancon inaugurated the Panama Canal – the Panama Canal Authority served a 
500-pound cake in the shape of a canal lock and hosted a televised centennial gala with 
Panamanian singer Rúben Blades and a team of acrobats performing.
280
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The Panama Canal Authority is a relentlessly self-promoting operation, favors 
grandiose prose and fixates on its role in history. It has called the canal’s “seamless 
transfer” to Panamanian control the singular development since the canal’s opening.
281
 
Reflecting on the 2001 fiscal year, before Panama had a full 12 months of canal 
management under its belt, the chairman of the canal authority board, Ricardo Martinelli, 
a future president of Panama, declared victory. “From the moment we assumed full 
responsibility for canal operations, we have demonstrated to the world that we are indeed 
highly capable of managing an enterprise of this magnitude,” he said.
282
 To mark a 
decade of Panamanian ownership, the authority published a 302-page, hard cover volume 
celebrating its achievements. “This book is dedicated to each and every Panamanian,” the 
canal administrator at the time, Alberto Alemán Zubieta, wrote in the prologue, “because 
the Panama Canal lives in each of us.” 
The Panama Canal Authority’s annual reports are purposefully characterized by 
the same overwrought prose and corporate cheerleading. “With unrelenting will, we labor 
to operate, maintain and improve the Panama Canal,” the 2005 report announced. In 
2007, it summed up its management as “spotless.” In 2008, it nominated itself as “a 
model of excellence, integrity and transparency.” Though hard-nosed and profit-driven, 
the company is also prone to philosophical musings. In 2009, it said “destiny has allowed 
us to fulfill the dreams of the generations of Panamanians that fought to recover our most 
strategic resource.” It returned to that theme in 2010 – the year the canal saw its 1 
millionth transit
283
 – calling the canal’s success “an unmistakable demonstration of how 
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much a nation can do when it faces its destiny with determination.” In 2013, the report 
was even more effusive. The canal was “one of the wonders of the world”; Panama was 
“helmsman of a first world company”; and the canal authority had “built a faultless 
management model of excellence, integrity and transparency.” The result? “An 
impeccable reputation and image, which is an object of national and international respect, 
admiration and recognition.” 
 
Vote of Confidence 
In 2006, all those efforts to win friends and influence Panamanians were put to 
the test. The authority had decided to widen the canal and according to Panama’s 
constitution,
284
 that required a national referendum. President Martín Torrijos (2004 to 
2009) formally announced the referendum at the Atlapa convention center in Panama 
City on April 24, 2006. On its face, the proposal should not have been controversial. 
Canal authorities had studied the project for decades. (In fact, the United States began 
excavation for a wider canal in the 1930s, to accommodate large Navy ships, but the 
outbreak of World War Two interrupted the project.) In the 1980s, a joint study by the 
United States, Japan and Panama warned that the canal was already approaching its 
maximum capacity. A class of container ships too wide for the canal locks – limited to 
ships no longer than 964 feet, deeper than 39 feet or wider than 105 feet – was increasing 
in popularity. In 1989, Saul Bellow described one of his characters as so large, “she made 
you look twice at a doorway. When she came to it, she filled the space like a freighter in 
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 By 2005, some container ships were twice the Panama Canal limit, and 
oil tankers were five times as large.
286
 Vessels from Asia that were excluded from the 
Panama Canal sailed around the southern tip of South America, adding 21 days to their 
trip to the U.S. East Coast, and raising costs tenfold.
287
 In Egypt, the rival Suez Canal, a 
sea-level maritime shortcut, could already accommodate these behemoths. Additionally, 
an expanded Panama Canal would accommodate liquefied natural gas carriers for the first 
time, a potentially lucrative market, given Japan’s interest in Gulf Coast natural gas.
288
 
Meanwhile, there was hardly space for the ships that could still fit in Panama’s canal. 
Increasing trade to the U.S. East Coast and Europe from manufacturers in Japan, South 
Korea, Taiwan and China was overwhelming the canal.
289
 If maintenance or malfunction 
shut down a lane of service temporarily, as many as 100 vessels ended up bobbing in the 
sea for days awaiting transit.
290
 “The canal’s expansion,” concluded LatinFinance at the 
time, “is becoming urgent.”
291
 The World Shipping Council, in a report before the 
referendum, agreed: 
“The preferred route for the cargo moving between North Asia and the U.S. East 
Coast and Gulf is that via the Panama Canal, due to the shorter transit and the 
ability to use fewer vessels when compared with the Suez route. But without 
expansion of its capacity to handle more vessels and larger vessels, the Panama 
Canal will become an increasingly less viable and competitive option to maintain 
its essential position as one of the world’s great trade gateways. The Panama 
Canal Authority’s proposed plan for expansion is based on a sound and well-
reasoned analysis of both the future market demands of world trade and what 
Panama needs to do to maintain its role in the world economy.” 
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The expansion, according to its boosters, was expected to create 7,000 direct 
jobs,
292
 and produce 40,000 new jobs over all, taking into account indirect impacts
293
 
such as massive spending on local cement to build the new locks and on housing for local 
and foreign construction workers. The project also promised to protect the Panama trade 
routes; enrich local port managers, insurers and shipping and freight companies; 
quadruple the canal authority’s annual contributions to Panama’s treasury;
294
 and during 
construction, add 1 percent annually to Panama’s GDP growth.
295
 The canal authority 
said its recruiters would hunt for a diverse army of new personnel, including dredge 
operators, oilers, open-air blasting experts, drill equipment operators, launch operators, 
budget analysts, masons, fitters, carpenters, blast handlers, welders, electricians, 
surveyors, engineers, programmers and seasoned operators of excavators, tractors, cranes 
and drills.
296
 After construction, the expanded canal would require a permanently 
expanded workforce, staffed by newly hired pilots and tugboat captains, pipefitters, 
shipfitters and metal forgers, blasters, dredge operators and locomotive drivers. 
The Panama Canal Authority mused about the expansion from the moment it 
inherited the waterway. In 2001, it announced “pre-feasibility studies” for a potential 
expansion.
297
 (In all, it would spend $40 million
298
 on more than 130 studies addressing 
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) In 2002, the proposed expansion “commanded priority status”
300
 at the 
authority. Canal expansion supporters said the waterway, “once a modern, multilane 
highway,” had become “an old, congested country road.”
301
 To reanimate the 
infrastructure, the expansion would double canal capacity by adding a third lane of locks; 
dredging the canal access channels on the Atlantic and Pacific sides; expanding and 
deepening existing navigation channels; and increasing the maximum functioning level of 
Gatún Lake, which provides the fresh water for filling the locks to lift and lower ships. In 
a visit in 2005, President George W. Bush stopped by the Miraflores locks, let pass a ship 
carrying Chilean lumber to Mexico and unequivocally endorsed the expansion.
302
 “It’s in 
our nation’s interest that this canal be modernized,” he said. To Panama’s government, 
the project had built up an air of historic inevitability. President Martín Torrijos was the 
son of former Panamanian strongman Omar Torrijos, whose negotiators wrested the canal 
from U.S. hands. Martín Torrijos’s vice president, Samuel Lewis Navarro, was the son of 
Gabriel Lewis Galindo, Omar Torrijos’s famed ambassador to the United States during 
the treaty negotiations. “It was time to pass the baton to the next generation, and make 
sure we didn’t mess it up,” Samuel Lewis Navarro said. “When our turn came, we 
stepped up to the plate.”
303
 
The Panamanian public saw things differently. The canal authority likes to 
describe Panamanians as the canal’s “owners and sole shareholders.”
304
 At the time, 
however, the canal authority was widely regarded as insular, elitist and secretive, despite 
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its relentless public outreach. Some derided the canal as a “colony,” and its administrator 
as an “emperor.” (To this day, Panama City taxi drivers complain they do not know their 
way around the neighborhoods bordering the canal.) Nor was the referendum merely a 
popularity contest for the canal authority. Panama had come to depend upon canal 
dividends, and the complex and costly expansion project, if mismanaged, could imperil 
the whole enterprise. Critics wrangled over the future distribution of the additional 
earnings an expanded canal might generate. Others raised environmental concerns;
305
 the 
project would require bulldozing 583 acres of forest, 203 acres of shrubbery and 707 
acres of grasslands,
306
 and the relocation of anteaters, squirrel and howler monkeys, 
crocodiles and snakes. (To reassure conservationists, project planners promised that 
construction would not cause the total extinction of any local fauna.) Homeowners, 
farmers and fans of the four national parks near the canal feared displacement.
307
 
Engineers and economists forecast construction cost overruns and a crushing debt 
hangover, complaining that Panama was “risking its most important asset on dubious 
engineering and financial assumptions.”
308
 
Nor did everyone accept the canal’s promises of broader economic impacts in the 
short- and long-term. The canal is not only culturally isolated from Panama, it also stands 
economically apart in many ways. Repeated attempts to strengthen economic linkages 
have yielded only modest success. The canal, for example, directly accounts for only 0.5 
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percent of jobs in Panama.
309
 Its activities offer limited benefit to Panama’s chronically 
struggling, domestically oriented economic actors, such as its indigenous communities 
and legions of poor farmers. (Agriculture is Panama’s number-one employer outside 
Panama City.) As for the expansion, the flood of public spending would no doubt provide 
the economy short-term tailwinds, adding to a geyser of public infrastructure spending. 
(In addition to the canal expansion, Panamanian construction crews would also be busy 
digging the country’s first subway, part of a $14 billion investment plan Martinelli 
announced upon taking office.
310
) However, some economists argued that the canal 
expansion’s forecasted contributions – the so-called “multiplier effects” – would be 
largely limited to the construction sector and producers, mainly overseas, of capital 
goods. (Others disagreed, pointing to the likely positive impacts on the Colón Free Trade 
Zone on the Atlantic side of the canal.
311
) Following the expansion, it remained to be 
seen whether over all traffic or tonnage would dramatically expand. To some degree, the 
expansion would be a defensive maneuver, designed merely to preserve market share, 
keeping Panama Canal customers from Suez and the U.S. intermodal system that 
connects U.S. West Coast ports with U.S. East Coast markets.
312
 (Panama Canal capacity 
would indisputably increase, to 50 to 55 vessels per day, from 36 to 40.
313
) 
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The specter of overindebtedness loomed large, even after the authority pledged to 
finance the expansion through its own revenues, not Panamanian sovereign bonds. 
Interest on the debt needed for the expansion, critics argued, would overwhelm any 
revenue gains.
314
 Fernando Manfredo, a former acting canal administrator, questioned the 
authority’s cost and revenue estimates.
315
 “The feasibility of this proposal,” one analyst 
observed, “remains to be demonstrated and, at best, would mean the central government 




For many in Panama, the vote was also a referendum on the canal authority itself. 
Had tiny Panama’s state-owned enterprise demonstrated the skill, grit and integrity to 
tackle a $5 billion megaproject? Six years into Panama’s canal administration, 
government and canal officials were surprised Petróleo Brasileiro by the lingering doubt. 
Dogged by questions about rampant corruption in Panama’s central government and its 
implications for canal project management, Torrijos grew frustrated. “It’s like if I said 
that all men cheat on women,” he explained. “Some of them do, but not all.”
317
 It was a 
colorful metaphor, but it apparently did little to ease concerns over Panama’s “notorious 
reputation for brazen malfeasance.”
318
 (“The expansion is necessary, but we all have to 
watch closely, make sure there isn’t embezzlement and corruption,” a Panamanian 
advertising executive, Igor Meneses, told The New York Times on the day of the 
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referendum. “'With that kind of money, there’s a lot to steal.”
319
) “The past,” Torrijos 
acknowledged, “is haunting our future. It’s a weight on this referendum.” The vote was 
repeatedly delayed, in part out of fears of a potentially negative outcome.
320
 Torrijos 
himself was unpopular, and “Panamanians tend to take any referendum on any subject as 
an opportunity to express their displeasure with the government.”
321
 Election authorities 
had registered 267 interest groups taking sides in the referendum campaign, including 66 
in opposition, powered by intellectuals, leftist organizations and former President Jorge 
Illueca.
322
 In July 2006, the legislature approved the expansion. The next month, three 
months before the vote, only half of Panamanians said they supported the project. In 
September 2006, with a month to go, the outcome remained too close to call. In one poll, 
a quarter of opponents said they lacked confidence in Panama’s ability to administer the 
expansion.
323
 “It’s something that should unite our country,” lamented Juan Carlos 
Varela, then an opposition politician and later Panama’s president.
324




For the first time, the canal’s stodgy engineers and technicians had to romance the 
Panamanian public. The mobilization looked like a presidential campaign. The authority 
assigned 60 individuals to promote the canal expansion; deployed a bus screening 
promotional videos; participated in 100 public debates; answered 21,268 phone calls to 
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an authority hotline; and attracted 34,500 visitors to 16 information centers
326
 in nine 
provinces.
327
 Canal representatives barnstormed the isthmus, traveling to the northern San 
Blas islands in the Caribbean, home to isolated Kuna Indians; to the rainforested Darién 
on the Colombian border to the east, where The Lonely Planet’s “Dangers & 
Annoyances” advisory warns of kidnappings, narcotraffickers and Colombian guerrillas; 
and to the Bocas del Toro archipelago by Panama’s western border with Costa Rica, a 
hippy vacation hub originally built by the United Fruit Company. “We weren’t used to 
that, we had to hit the streets,” Eduardo Antonio Quirós, who served on the canal board 
of directors for nine years, recalled.
328
 Buttoned-up, boardroom dwelling senior canal 
officials also fanned out. Quirós journeyed 160 miles outside Panama City to the Hotel 
Piramidal, in Santiago, in central Panama. Five hundred people had gathered for his 
presentation on the expansion and afterward, they interrogated him for three hours about 
the project. It was clear the authority’s leadership, performance and institutional design 
were under a microscope. “It was a great opportunity for the country to approve the 
model,” he said. (The government helped, too. Torrijos and Lewis, his vice president, 
campaigned hard for the referendum, promising to funnel proceeds from the expansion to 
local governments to fund projects selected at community meetings.
329
 
Ultimately, the authority made five important concessions to rescue the project: 
1. It set a minimum for the annual dividend it pays the Panamanian treasury, 
eliminating the downside risk for the country; regardless of construction 
costs and future debt service, the authority’s annual surplus payment 
would not fall below the level in the 2005 fiscal year; 
2. It altered construction plans to exclude new reservoirs that would have 
displaced communities; 
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3. It promised to build a new bridge for cars to cross the canal at its 
economically depressed Atlantic side; 
4. It committed to providing quarterly written updates on the project to the 
president, legislature and the nominally independent comptroller’s office, 
and to submitting the canal administrator and the chairman of the 
authority’s Board of Directors to semiannual congressional hearings; and, 
5. It agreed to oversight from a seven-member ad hoc committee comprising 
representatives from the National Council for Organized Labor 
(CONATO); the National Council for the Private Enterprise (CONEP); 
Panama’s civic clubs; the University Presidents Council; the Ecumenical 
Committee; and representatives designated by the legislature and the 
president. 
 
On October 22, 2006, Panamanians finally weighed in. Voters faced a single 
question: “Do you approve of the proposal for the construction of a third set of locks for 
the Panama Canal?” Polls remained open from 7 a.m. to 4 p.m. By day’s end, the 
authority had earned an impressive vote of confidence. The referendum passed easily, 
backed by 78 percent of voters. Only 44 percent of registered voters participated in the 
referendum, but that seemed to reflect the widespread belief that the authority had already 
won the debate. Torrijos called it an “historic decision, perhaps the most important of this 
generation.” Curators of the Miraflores Visitors Center, overlooking the Miraflores locks, 
encased in glass the referendum ballots, green for “Sí,” red for “No.” Aléman, the 
Panama Canal chief operation officer, was considered a future presidential candidate. 
 
Hat in Hand 
 The referendum was not the only vote of confidence the Panama Canal Authority 
needed for the megaproject to advance. Someone had to pay for it. So the canal authority 
launched a road show, subjecting itself to global investor scrutiny for the first time. 
Because the authority had never issued debt, it was not tracked closely by the major 
investment banks. Sovereign debt analysts monitored canal revenues, given their 
91 
 
importance to the Panamanian budget and economy. In the world’s major financial 
centers, however, the canal had mostly flown under the radar. In that context, the 
authority had its global debut in 2007, when canal executives made presentations on the 
expansion in New York City, London and Hong Kong, meeting with 160 financial 
institutions.
330
 The presentations – to First Union Bank, Citibank, Credit Suisse, Barclays, 
Societe Generale and others – emphasized the Panama Canal Authority’s “complete 
independence from the central government” and the prohibition against strikes by canal 
workers.
331
 New to capital markets, the authority asked Moody’s to evaluate it for the 
first time. On September 10, 2008, Moody’s awarded the authority a Prospective (P) A2 
rating.
332
 The rating was monumental for several reasons. For one, it was substantially 
higher than the Panamanian government’s own Ba1 non-investment grade rating at the 
time.
333
 Additionally, Moody’s issued the rating amid a global financial crisis
334
 that 
threatened to reduce canal traffic, and only three days after the Federal Housing Finance 
Agency had placed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in government conservatorship and 
only five days before the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy and Bank of America’s rescue of 
Merrill Lynch.
335
 On a scale of 1 to 21, with1 representing the lowest credit risk, 
Moody’s gave the authority a “5.” In evaluating the authority, Moody’s weighed heavily 
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the uniqueness of its service and the high barriers to entry. The Panama Canal, it 
concluded, “is a unique infrastructure asset that is competitive and unlikely to be 
replicated.” In its “unique market,” it said, “the canal enjoys an exceptionally strong 
operating position.” Moody’s also looked carefully at the authority’s financial 
performance since the turnover. 
“The canal has been operating as an independent asset of the Panamanian 
government since 2000, hence there is sufficient operating history against which 
to assess the [authority’s] business model and to analyze future projections. The 
[authority] has successfully navigated the transition from U.S. management to 
operation as a wholly-owned enterprise of the Government of Panama,” Moody’s 
said. 
 
Still, as a borrower, the Panama Canal Authority was somewhat risky. The authority 
would rely on a single asset to generate the earnings to service its multibillion dollar debt. 
Moreover, the loan for the expansion would be completely unsecured; Article 45 of the 
canal authority’s organic law, approved on June 11, 1997, prohibits the use of canal 
revenue or assets as collateral.
336
 For its part, the Panamanian government offered no 
guarantees for the loan. This contrasted with more traditional limited recourse project 
finance. For example, a lender financing a bridge construction typically ends up owning 
the bridge if the borrower defaults. (Either way, repossessing the Panama Canal would 
not be easy, even for litigious Wall Street creditors like Elliot Management.) Finally, the 
terms of these loans would deprive lenders of any role in canal management; offer a 20-
year maturity; and grant the authority a ten-year grace period. 
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In other ways, however, the expansion project was attractive to lenders. Unlike 
with traditional infrastructure finance, the canal authority would be generating revenue 
throughout the construction phase. The loan was attractive for other reasons as well: 
1. The canal operated behind a “moat,” i.e., it faced limited competition, and 
the canal authority (literally) relied upon “tolls,” i.e., reliable, repeating 
revenues, for all of its income; 
2. The canal authority’s lightly levered construction financing plan was 
relatively conservative, with the $5.25 billion project relying upon only 
$2.3 billion in borrowing, far below the common 75 percent debt-to-25 
percent equity ratio in infrastructure finance; 
3. The canal authority had zero debt on its books (previously, it had only 
used current revenues and ordinary course reserves for capital needs); 
4. The canal authority was required to pay a minimum annual dividend to 
Panama’s central government, effectively restricting any future borrowing 
that could result in an unsustainable debt burden;
337
 and, 
5. The canal authority faced no currency risk, as canal revenues are in U.S. 
dollars, the denomination of its proposed loans. 
 
There was also the authority’s proven business model and corporate organization, 
and its demonstrated success over seven years. As a result, among investors, the interest 
was “tremendous,” recalled Franco Uccelli, a senior analyst at J.P. Morgan.
338
 In 2007, 
he attended the Inter-American Development Bank’s annual meeting in Guatemala 
City,
339
 where a senior canal authority official delivered a presentation on the expansion. 
It was standing room only and “all the market participants were salivating,” Uccelli said. 
 By the time Panamanians approved the referendum, lenders had been tracking the 
potential megaproject for a decade. The Panama Canal Authority “was this great asset, 
this great corporation with no debt,” Uccelli said. Despite the global recession, “the 
market was ready and very much hoping they would come to market.” Ultimately, 
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however, investors would be disappointed. The authority – possibly for political reasons, 
but more likely for lower interest rates and a longer repayment schedule – opted to 
borrow exclusively from multilateral development banks. On October 14, 2008, Torrijos 
authorized $2.3 billion in borrowing. On December 9, 2008, at a ceremony attended by 
Torrijos and Inter-American Development Bank President Luis Alberto Moreno, the 
authority signed agreements with five multilateral and official bilateral lenders: $500 
million from the European Investment Bank; $800 million from the Japan Bank for 
International Cooperation; $400 million from the Inter-American Development Bank; 
$300 million from the International Finance Corporation, at the World Bank; and $300 
million from the Development Bank of Latin America (Figure 9). The multibillion dollar 
loan, Torrijos said, signaled international confidence in “the strong financial position and 
management of the Panama Canal.”
340
 
Despite the global economic turmoil, “everyone wanted a piece of this deal,” 
according to Christopher C. McIsaac, who represented the six lenders for the British law 
firm Clifford Chance. “Wall Street would have loved to do the deal.”
341
 The Inter-
American Development Bank highlighted the importance of the expansion for regional 
commerce. “Our loans to support the expansion of the canal are in line with our collective 
objectives of supporting economic growth, facilitate world trade, build infrastructure with 
a solid environmental focus and create employment opportunities,” Moreno said. “It’s an 
uncommon opportunity to participate in a transaction that involves all these elements at 
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 For its part, the Japan Bank for International Cooperation emphasized 
the canal’s importance to Japanese shippers exporting to the U.S. East Coast, noting that 
ships originating from and destined for Japanese ports made up 14 percent of all canal 
traffic in 2007, making Japan the canal’s third-biggest user.
343
 McIsaac, however, said the 
strength of the canal business and its clear ability to repay the loans was the driving 
factor. “It’s a cash cow, it’s incredibly valuable,” he said. “When you look at the business 
of the Panama Canal, it doesn’t get any better than that. It’s vital and irreplaceable.” 
Moss, the former U.S. ambassador to Panama, was also not surprised the authority did 
not have to beg for its loans. “The Panama Canal, entirely in Panamanian hands since 
2000, has been hugely successful,” he observed.
344
 “Since the turnover, it has 
experienced increased revenues, added to daily ship transits and maintained a low 
accident rate. For that reason, Panama was able to raise $5.25 billion on the private 
capital market to expand the canal, while offering no government guarantees.” 
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On September 3, 2007, Panama inaugurated the canal expansion by detonating a 
hillside beside the waterway.
345
 The explosion at Paraíso Hill, a blast “felt around the 
world ,” drew 30,000 spectators.
346
 Torrijos stood beside Jimmy Carter and Presidents 
Álvaro Uribe of Colombia; Antonio Saca of El Salvador; Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua; 
and Manual Zelaya of Honduras. From there, the expansion project would involve: 
1. Construction of two sets of enormous locks – long enough to 
accommodate the Empire State Building laid on its side
347
 – to be accessed 
through 10-stories high, Dutch-designed, Italian-built gates that separate 
the three steps and use double door, rolling gate technology that makes it 
easier to maintain the locks (the gates do not need to be removed to be 
repaired at a shipyard);  
2. The inclusion of three water reutilization basins; 
3. The widening and deepening of navigational channels in Gatún Lake and 
the canal entrances at the Pacific and Atlantic; and, 
4. The deepening of the Culebra Cut. 
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The design also called for a four-mile long, 715-feet wide access channel, parallel to the 
original canal and 33 feet above Miraflores Lake, connecting the new Pacific locks with 
the Culebra Cut by bypassing the Miraflores and Pedro Miguel locks. (In the original 
canal, the two-lane Gatún locks raise ships entering from the Atlantic to the level of 
Gatún Lake, 85 feet above sea level. Ships from the Pacific must transit both the 
Miraflores and Pedro Miguel locks, two lanes apiece, before achieving their cruising 
altitude.) The new locks on both sides of the canal would extend 1,401 feet in length and 
180 feet in width, the size of four football fields, to use a popular unit of measurement. 
To get a sense of the scale of the new canal, consider the size of the original waterway. 
Its ancient lock chambers –110 feet by 1,000 feet – are as high as an eight-story building. 
Its miter gates – seven-feet thick, 62 feet wide and as tall as 72 feet – weigh as much as 
300 elephants. By comparison, the new locks dwarf the original version, 40 percent 
longer and 60 percent wider. 
To the Panama Canal Authority, the referendum was “one of the most 
transcendental steps taken by the Panamanian people in the nation’s history.”
348
 Yet the 
successful vote and effortless financing did not erase all concerns about the project. In the 
days leading up to the Paraíso Hill groundbreaking, analysts still fretted about potential 
cost overruns.
349
 In the United States, that anxiety deepened in July 2009, when Panama 
passed over U.S. engineering giant Bechtel for the lucrative contract to build the new 
locks. Instead, Panama chose a consortium – Grupo Unidos por El Canal – led by the 
Spanish builder Sacyr, that had underbid Bechtel by $1 billion. The decision followed a 
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review by 15 Panama Canal Authority officials, with input from 40 outside experts.
350
 
Still, Panama’s vice president privately expressed misgivings about the low bid.
351
 Canal 
engineer Luis Ferreira, hired in 2008, recalled the Pacific side construction site in those 
days as a mosquito infested jungle, overrun by sloths, reindeer, caimans, agoutis and 
coatis.
352
 The 6,000 canal expansion workers, including hundreds of Chileans, 
Colombians, Nicaraguans, Peruvians and Caribbeans, faced driving rain and lighting. 
The gargantuan undertaking started off smoothly. Living up to its environmental 
commitments, the authority planted thousands of seedlings throughout Panama to 
compensate for trees it cut down, and relocated more than 5,800 creatures from the 
construction zone.
353
 Eager to avoid cost overruns, the authority contracted international 
experts to “develop the most accurate and transparent cost and schedule estimates 
possible.”
354
 The construction plan incorporated contingencies of one year and $1 
billion.
355
 To cut costs, the authority’s crews – and the dredges Mindi and Rialto M. 
Christensen and drill boat Thor – handled navigational dredging and deepening. 
Excavated material was repurposed to make concrete for the locks and dikes for the new, 
raised canal channel. In 2010, the expansion was still ahead of schedule and under 
budget,
356
 timed to finish by the canal’s 2014 centennial. Thousands of workers staffed 
day and night shifts, breaking now and again to let archeologists recover artifacts dating 
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back to the French canal diggers. To promote transparency, a Webcam filmed 
construction and a telephone hotline and e-mail inbox (ampliacion@pancanal.com) 
collected questions. The expansion, one study concluded in 2011, offered “an outstanding 
case study and best practices example of project risk management.”
357
 
 Sensing it was on a roll, the canal authority chronicled every moment of its 
“magnum opus.”
358
 To do so, it established a new multimedia office – the 
Communication and Historic Documentation Section – with a $2.5 million budget.
359
 Its 
20 employees included four photographers and videographers to document the expansion; 
three archivists to collect artifacts for safekeeping in a warehouse at Corozal Oeste; and 
writers to compile an oral history of the expansion. The photographers shot 225,000 
images, and the videographers captured 230,000 hours of video. So far, the authority has 
published two volumes of photographs titled, “The Panama Canal Expansion: Portraits of 
an Historic Undertaking.” It interviewed 250 workers for the oral history. It archived 2 
million documents and 900 symbolic objects, ranging from construction uniforms to the 
detonator that ignited atop Paraíso Hill to inaugurate construction.
360
 It commissioned 
five Panamanian painters – Amalia Tapia, José Inocencio Duarte, Carlos González 
Palomino, Roberto Vergara del Cid and George Scribner – to capture the construction 
courtroom sketch-artist style, in watercolor, oil and acrylic. Finally, it invited spectators 
to watch the project live, inaugurating an observation center to watch the new Atlantic 
locks come together. 
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Outside the construction site, the maritime shipping industry evolved just as 
Panama predicted. In the intervening years, the West Coast shipping business in the 
United States had expanded by luring zaftig vessels sized out of the Panama Canal.
361
 To 
fill the shelves at Target, Home Depot, Lowe’s and Wal-Mart, ships had continued to 
increase in girth. Even the cruise ship industry planned ships too large for the canal.
362
 
Competitors saw opportunities. Neighboring Nicaragua threatened to build a larger, 
competing canal. (See Chapter 6 for details on the Grand Nicaraguan Canal.) Mexico 
flirted with a competing, intermodal option, floating a plan to connect its coasts through 
new highways and railways – a plan also considered by Guatemala, El Salvador and 
Honduras.
363
 (The so-called “canal seco,” or dry canal, in Central America would involve 
construction of a modern Pacific Ocean container terminal in El Salvador and major 
upgrades to two Caribbean ports, Puerto Cortés in Honduras and Puerto Barrios in 
Guatemala.) Others, meanwhile, prepared for the new era following the Panama Canal 
expansion. The project sparked an “arms race” among East Coast ports, including in 
Norfolk, Baltimore, Miami, New York and New Jersey.
364
 Shippers readied plans to shift 
away from West Coast ports.
365
 Thanks to the Panama Canal Authority’s early decision 
to expand, The Financial Times daydreamed about a “post-Panamax renaissance” for 
Panama. Panama’s economy surged. In 2010, Standard and Poor’s upgraded Panama’s 
rating to investment grade.
366
 Vice President Joseph Biden, a longtime booster of the 
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 visited the construction site in 2013
368
 and thanked 
Panamanians for their “courage to embark on this significant adventure.”
369
 The 
expansion, he said, “protects Panama’s unique place in the world economy as a new 
generation of massive container ships and tankers hits the high seas.”
370
 
As it turned out, the canal expansion timeline and budget were unrealistic after 
all. The authority had promised to finish the project by 2014, the canal’s centennial. 
Instead, the estimated completion date slipped two years, to 2016. In January 2014, 
Grupo Unidos por el Canal, led by the Spanish construction giant Sacyr,
371
 threatened to 
suspend construction over a bitter and costly payment dispute. In a communiqué, the 
consortium cited “big financial problems” and demanded $1.6 billion in additional 
payments from Panama.
372
 The canal authority, Sacyr said, had provided inaccurate 
information to bidders,
373
 including faulty geologic data that resulted in a $120 million 
cost overrun for construction of a temporary dam and additional cost overruns for cement 
production. Martinelli backed the canal authority, but he also blamed authority officials 
for choosing the consortium, calling its selection “the chronicle of a death foretold.”
374
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Critics of the original contract reemerged in an I-told-you-so chorus.
375
 It was an easy 
target. The major consultant on the project, Parsons Brinckerhoff, previously led 
construction of the Big Dig, the Boston tunnel project that saw its original $2.6 billion 
price tag balloon to $14.6 billion. Critics recalled Bechtel’s earlier complaints that the 
winning bidder had offered a price barely sufficient to cover the cost of the concrete.
376
 
“This is what happens often when you go with the lowest bidder,” Adie Tomer, a senior 
research associate at the Brookings Institution and a member of its Metropolitan 
Infrastructure Initiative, said.
377
 Canal officials, generally prone to braggadocio, called 
the expansion a “humbling project.”
378
 
The Panama Canal Authority vigorously defended its project management, and 
threatened to take over construction from Sacyr.
379
 “Contractors are experts in selling you 
mirror tricks,” the authority’s program manager grumbled to participants at the Panama 
Canal Symposium in 2012.
380
 The authority’s allies pointed out Sacyr’s history of 
underbidding jobs and demanding higher payments.
381
 (Together, Sacyr and Italy’s Salini 
Impregilo control 96 percent of the consortium.
382
) Throughout the imbroglio, analysts 
expressed confidence in the authority. “Completion of the canal expansion is a foregone 
                                                             
375
 Webber, Jude, “Panama Canal Dispute Throws $5.2 billion Expansion Project Into Disarray,” The 
Financial Times, February 5, 2014. 
376
 Sparrow, Thomas, “Panama Canal Expansion Project: Have American Fears Come True?” BBC, 
January 13, 2014. 
377
 Interview by author with Adie Tomer, November 5, 2014. 
378
 Jorge Quijano quoted in “Panama Canal, Post Panamax,” a documentary by the Community Television 
Foundation of South Florida, 2015. 
379
 Kriel, Lomi, “Panama Canal Threatens to Take Over Key Expansion Project,” Reuters,  
January 14, 2014. 
380
 Aileen Cho and C.J. Schexnayder, “Global Talent Converges on Panama Canal,” ENR: Engineering 
News-Record, Vol. 268, No. 13 (2012). 
381
 Jaime Figueroa Navarro, “Has the Dispute Affected the International Community’s Perception of Doing 
Business in the Central American nation?” Latin America Advisor, March 6, 2014. 
382
 Molinski, Dan, “Panama Canal Expansion Slows Sharply as Deal Remains Elusive, European 




conclusion,” a J.P. Morgan report informed investors in January 2014.
383
 “The recent 
noise related to the canal expansion appears unlikely to have long-lasting negative 
consequences.” Even a kitchen remodeling often suffers cost overruns, Uccelli, the J.P. 
Morgan analyst, said. “It is par for the course.” (The cost of the original canal, $326 
million not adjusted for inflation, was twice the initial estimate,
 384
 and that excludes $53 
million in repairs following devastating landslides in 1916 and 1917, shortly after the 
canal opening.
385
) Indeed, construction on the canal expansion ultimately continued 
despite the dispute over the cost overruns. The cost overruns, moreover, were caused at 
least in part by the unanticipated construction boom in Panama City that inflated the costs 
of labor and materials.
386
 In 2007, for example, the construction sector expanded by 25 
percent. That created fierce competition for concrete and steel, which the expansion 
required in mind-blowing quantities. “It’s unusual for a project of that magnitude to ever 
be concluded on the first announced schedule,” Koch, president of the World Shipping 
Council, said.
387
 Nevertheless, the troubles dinged the Panama Canal Authority’s 
otherwise sterling reputation. 
 
The King is Dead, Long Live the King 
In 2012, the canal authority faced yet another defining test: the selection of the 
canal’s chief executive officer, known as its administrator. Legendary canal administrator 
Alberto Alemán had been selected for the first of his two seven-year terms under U.S. 
management in 1996. So choosing his replacement gave Panama its first opportunity to 
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prove it could repress its notorious and destructive patronage instincts. The timing was 
not ideal. Martinelli, the president since 2009, was dogged by allegations of corruption 
and authoritarian tendencies. (He is now a fugitive, avoiding corruption charges.) As his 
power increased, the attorney general and comptroller lost their independence.
388
 The 
founder of the Super 99 supermarket chain, he had continued to use his corporate e-mail 
address while in office and was expected to value loyalty over qualifications in filling the 
canal authority’s top job. He had “sold Panamanians a Bloomberg-type of leadership, 
instead, he became a Berlusconi.”
389
 The maritime industry held its breath.
390
 “Many 
people doubted they would chose someone who was not a friend of the president,” 
Quirós, who served on the authority’s board during the search for Alemán’s successor, 
said. Now the president of the newspapers El Siglo and La Estrella, where the lobby 
wallpaper features historic front pages dominated by canal-related headlines such as “Un 
Solo Territorio” (“A United Land”), “Nuevo Tratado Firman Carter-Torrijos” (“Carter 
and Torrijos Sign New Treaty”) and “Panama Perfecciona Independencia” (“Panama 
Completes its Independence”). Quirós remembers the tense months preceding the board’s 
2012 vote on a new administrator. Canal pilots, engineers and executives regularly 
approached him to express fears of political intervention. Twitter and Facebook lit up 
with protests against the rumored appointment of a politically connected candidate. “We 
were scared to death about what would happen,” the head of the operations division, 
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Miguel F. Rodríguez, said. “We don’t want any politics in the canal. That would be the 
end. It’s like a cancer.”
391
 
Technically, the decision rested entirely with the canal authority’s Board of 
Directors.
392
 But the board was considered malleable, in part because it had no strict 
guidelines to follow in evaluating applicants. Article 23 of the canal’s organic law 
required only that the administrator be a Panamanian citizen; hold a university degree (or 
have sufficient practical experience); boast a clean criminal record; and have no relation 
to board members or the deputy administrator. “Although choosing the new Panama 
Canal Authority administrator is the sole responsibility of the [authority’s] board, 
political and civil society sectors do not rule out the influence that President Ricardo 
Martinelli may have in that election,” Panama’s La Prensa newspaper reported in January 
2012. General concerns about Martinelli persisted throughout his presidency and beyond. 
In 2014, the opposition candidate, Juan Carlos Varela, campaigned successfully against 
Martinelli’s chosen successor (the Panamanian constitution prohibits consecutive 
presidential terms) by railing against public corruption and Martinelli’s “iron fist-style of 
leadership.”
393
 Several of Martinelli’s canal board nominees had questionable credentials. 
Practically the moment Martinelli left office, Panama’s Supreme Court appointed a 
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On Martinelli’s watch, however, an undisputed expert, longtime canal executive 
Jorge L. Quijano, landed the Panama Canal Authority’s top job. Quirós insisted there was 
“zero political influence” in the process. “There is an invisible wall you cannot cross,” he 
said. The chairman of the canal authority board, Georgia Tech graduate Roberto Roy, 
agreed. Roy, who also holds the title of canal minister, is the only board member 
appointed unilaterally by the president. Still, he said, he rarely hears from the president, 
except during his monthly presidential briefings on the canal expansion. “The president 
has a miniscule role in the canal. A lot of people don’t believe that,” he said.
395
 “My 
conversations with the president on the canal are very few.” That separation, Roy said, 
includes issues related to canal personnel and even the canal budget, which the board 
shares with the president on the same day the president’s cabinet members receive their 
official copies. 
On March 9, 2012, a Friday, the Panama Canal Authority board informed 
reporters gathered in Building 710 that it had elected Jorge L. Quijano to succeed 
Alemán. Rómulo de Roux, the canal minister at the time, said the search lasted six 
months.
396
 “Quijano has the canal in his veins,” Roux said. Indeed, Quijano was the 
farthest thing from a Martinelli crony. An industrial engineer, Quijano had 36 years of 
experience at the canal at the time of his appointment, beginning in 1975.
397
 Since 
September 2006, he had supervised the canal expansion. On September 3, 2012, his first 
day as administrator, Quijano simply swapped canal authority offices, carting his 
belongings to the historic canal headquarters building. (The imposing, hilltop structure, 
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commissioned in 1912 by Goethals, the chief engineer of the original canal construction 
project, opened on July 15, 1914, a month before the canal itself began operating. Its 
architect, the New Yorker Austin W. Lord, also designed the three locks control houses, 
the Balboa and Cristóbal train stations, the Gatún hydroelectric plant and several 
houses.
398
) Independent observers applauded Quijano’s selection. “He’s an individual 
that’s hard to find in any country, but particularly in a smaller country like Panama where 
everybody is tied into family and politics,” said Richard Wainio, director and CEO of the 
Tampa Port Authority, who started a long career at the U.S.-run Panama Canal 
Commission in 1975. “Jorge clearly has been a professional and not a politician for his 
entire career.”
399
 Shippers, who had “expressed concerns over political meddling in the 
new administrator’s designation,”
400
 considered Quijano an internationally recognized 
professional. In remarks at his swearing-in ceremony, Quijano seemed to recognize that 
the search for a new administrator had awoken concerns over the canal authority’s 
independence. “We will continue to be strict custodians of this management model,” he 
reassured his staff and the international community, “devised by Panamanians for the 
benefit of world maritime commerce and of Panama.”
401
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Shipping companies are impressed. Questionnaires administered by the canal 
authority show high levels of customer satisfaction. The author’s independent survey of 
senior executives at the world’s largest shipping companies supported that conclusion. 
Asked about their previous expectations for a Panama-run canal, 64 percent of 
respondents from the World Shipping Council and the American Maritime Congress said 
they expected Panama to run the canal either “not that effectively” or “somewhat 
effectively” (Figure 10).
403
 Describing the actual performance of the canal authority, all 
respondents classified it as satisfactory, reporting that Panama runs the canal “somewhat 
effectively” or “very effectively” (Figure 11). “Not much has changed on the base model 
which existed under the U.S., and improvements on that base model have been made, 
though at a higher expense to the user,” one respondent observed. The responses were not 
overly enthusiastic; only a small minority of respondents, for example, consider Panama 
an improvement on the United States when it comes to canal maintenance, safety, speed, 
customer service or over all value. Seventy-two percent consider toll increases as 
“somewhat unreasonable” or “very unreasonable.” Over all, however, the industry’s 
terror at the prospect of Panamanian canal supervision has been replaced by admiration. 
“All the doomsayers,” Lewis said, “have been proven wrong.”
404
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Chapter 4: How did Panama pull it off? Identifying the roots of the Panama Canal 





Panama did not dig the Panama Canal. It did not even try. In 1830, it was the 
Dutch who first attempted to construct a canal in Panama, before a revolution in Holland 
interrupted the project.
405
 Next came a Frenchman, Ferdinand de Lesseps (1805 to 1894). 
Beginning in 1879 in what was then Colombia’s northernmost province, de Lesseps, the 
engineer behind the Suez Canal, sought to recreate a sea-level canal in Central America. 
The French had been enticed by the increased transisthmian traffic generated by the 
California gold rush. By 1884, de Lesseps’s 19,243 workers, mainly Jamaicans, had 
removed 59,747,620 cubic meters of rock and soil, scooped up and transported by dump 
carts, cranes, dredges and steam shovels. But the French efforts foundered, lacking 
adequate machinery and funds and ravaged by tropical disease and landslides. In all, 
20,189 died in de Lesseps’s failed project, felled by malaria, yellow fever, typhoid, 
dysentery, snakebites and accidents. The disaster was so notorious that in modern France, 
the phrase “Quel Panama!” has come to mean, “What a mess!”
406
 
The Panamanian jungle gradually enveloped the rusting, abandoned French 
machinery after de Lesseps decamped in 1889.
407
 But the disappointed Panamanians de 
Lesseps left behind were not entirely passive. Local elites blamed their rulers in Bogotá, 
the faraway Colombian capital, for the French project’s failure, adding to their long list of 
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historical grievances. Panamanian frustration boiled over in August 1903, when the 
Colombian legislature rejected an agreement negotiated by U.S. Secretary of State John 
Hay and signed on January 22, 1903, that would have granted the United States the right 
to build a canal through Panama.
408
 Panamanians feared that the rebuffed United States 
would opt for a Nicaraguan canal instead. It was a reasonable concern. U.S. East Coast 
exporters looking to expand trade with East Asia and South America’s west coast had 
been lobbying hard for a canal, but the location was up for grabs. In fact, in 1876, 
President Ulysses S. Grant’s Interoceanic Canal Commission had endorsed Nicaragua’s 
San Juan River as the ideal canal site.
409
 Starting in 1887, the privately owned Maritime 
Canal Company spent three years and $4 million on an unsuccessful attempt to dig a 
waterway through Nicaragua.
410
 In 1900, Hay signed an agreement to negotiate a U.S. 
government-built canal in Nicaragua. 
Panama had advantages over Nicaragua, including a shorter distance across the 
isthmus, completed French excavations and leftover French equipment, priced to sell. 
Recognizing those conditions, the U.S. Congress, on June 28, 1902, passed the Spooner 
Act, authorizing President Theodore Roosevelt (1901 to 1909) to pay $40 million for the 
French rights and property in Panama. Still, the thwarted U.S. agreement with Colombia 
put the Panama project in doubt, and that animated Panamanian separatists. In 1903, after 
Colombian lawmakers had turned down the United States, the Panamanian Manuel 
Amador Guerrero sailed to New York City to secure support from Roosevelt for 
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Panamanian independence. Roosevelt, infuriated by the Colombian “blackmailers,”
411
 
was receptive. On November 2, 1903, the USS Nashville docked at Colón, on Panama’s 
Atlantic coast, to discourage Colombian troops from quashing the expected Panamanian 
rebellion. At the same time, the U.S. administrator of the Panama railroad, James S. 
Shaler, denied Colombian soldiers access to the transisthmian railway. The following day 
–  November 3, 1903 – the Panamanians revolted. On November 6, 1903, with U.S. 
warships patrolling Panama’s coasts, Roosevelt recognized the new Panamanian republic. 
At last, Panama controlled its destiny. But yet again, it was foreigners who carried 
shovels into the Panamanian jungle. On November 18, 1903, Hay signed the Hay-Bunau-
Varilla Treaty, granting Panama a $10 million lump sum payment and $250,000 in 
annual rent for perpetual U.S. control over a central expanse of Panamanian territory. 
This time, the project’s chief engineer would be a U.S. Army coronel, George W. 
Goethals. Goethals had a better plan than the French – a locks canal, requiring far less 
excavation – and better timing, too. Taking advantage of technological advances, 
Goethals deployed steam shovels, dynamite and locomotives to dig and cart off 232 
million cubic yards of rock and soil. At its peak, the U.S. Isthmian Canal Company 
numbered 44,000 employees, including nearly 20,000 Barbadians who had sailed12 days 
for the job. Goethals had another asset de Lesseps lacked: Col. William Gorgas, the 
Isthmian Canal Company’s chief sanitary officer. Deploying newly developed disease 
management techniques, Gorgas contained yellow fever and malaria by controlling 
Panama’s mosquito population, covering, screening and oiling sitting water and draining 
swamps where mosquitoes bred. Despite a technological and medical edge, U.S. 
construction still lasted a decade – from 1904 to 1914 – and cost $380 million. But this 
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time, the project ended in success. On August 15, 1914, the SS Ancon cargo ship crossed 
the canal. Panama had outsourced the job, but it got its canal. 
 
U.S. Transition: Path Dependency 
 
By the end of the Twentieth Century, the United States would hand over that 
canal. Along with it, the United States would transfer the 364,201-acre Panama Canal 
Zone; 728 buildings; two dredges, Mini and Rialto M. Christensen; floating cranes, such 
as Titan and Goliath; and an armada of tugboats and patrol craft. Importantly, just as 
Panama would inherit the ditch, locks and tugboats, houses and workshops, on December 
31, 1999 Panama also would get its hands on a functioning canal administration. That 
would include a cadre of U.S. workers and thousands of Panamanians trained by the 
United States. Panama would also receive corporate attitudes, practices and regulations 
established over eight decades of U.S. canal management. Yet again, as with its reliance 
upon U.S. canal builders, it could be said that Panama’s biggest achievement would 
simply involve preserving its bequest. 
 In Panama, the historiography of the transition of the canal to Panamanian control 
emphasizes Panamanian gumption in the face of a U.S. government disinterested in a 
waterway it built, but would soon abandon. The notion that Panama has sailed on the fair 
winds of path dependency is given little consideration. That narrative is partially 
accurate, as will be discussed in detail below. But it understandably riles former U.S. 
canal officials who spent two decades preparing Panama for its canal responsibilities. The 
1977 Panama Canal treaties replaced the Panama Canal Company with the U.S.-led, 
binational Panama Canal Commission, and that commission invested mightily in training 
114 
 
Panamanians to take U.S. canal jobs. The treaty mandated the “growing participation of 
Panamanian nationals” in canal administration, “with the objective of preparing, in an 
orderly and efficient fashion, for the assumption by the Republic of Panama of full 
responsibility for the management, operation and maintenance of the canal.” It 
discouraged recruiting non-Panamanians for jobs, prohibited discrimination based on 
nationality and required ramped-up training. By most accounts, the United States 
complied enthusiastically. Panama Canal Commission annual reports, tracking the 
progress of a preferential hiring program, reveal slow but steady progress expanding the 
Panamanian presence in the Panama Canal. In 1986, Panamanians comprised 81 percent 
of the canal workforce.
412
 That crept up to 83 percent in 1987
413
 and to 84 percent in 
1988.
414
 By 1995, Panamanians held 90 percent of canal jobs
415
 and in 1999, the final 
year of U.S. ownership, the 7,073 Panamanian canal workers made up 96 percent of the 
canal workforce.
416
 The same trend was evident in the canal administration’s upper ranks. 
In 1978, at the start of the transition to Panamanian management, Panamanians occupied 
just 7 percent of canal management positions and 2 percent of canal pilot slots. By 1999, 
78 percent of canal managers were Panamanian, as were 81 percent of pilots.
417
 In other 
words, the U.S.-led transition of ownership of the U.S.-built canal was a carefully 
thought-out and executed process. Sure, it had its faults. But contrary to many 
Panamanian accounts, it did not resemble Belgium’s infamous departure from the Congo, 
where colonial authorities deposited a flimsy government known as “le parti congolais” 
                                                             
412
 Panama Canal Commission, “Annual Report,” 1986.  
413
 Panama Canal Commission, “Annual Report,” 1987. 
414
 Panama Canal Commission, “Annual Report,” 1988. 
415
 Panama Canal Commission, “Annual Report,” 1995. 
416
 Panama Canal Commission, “Annual Report,” 1999. 
417
 Omar Jaén Suárez, Diez Años de Administración Panameña del Canal (Panama City, Panama: Panama 
Canal Authority, 2010), p. 37. 
115 
 
in a messy affair that continues to plague the wartorn country. In sharp contrast to U.S. 
training and recruitment efforts in Panama, Belgium left the Congolese with an army 
officer corps that was entirely European at independence – on June 30, 1960 – prompting 
a mutiny followed by the abrupt, total “Africanisation” of the Congolese officer corps. 
Similarly, the senior level of the Congolese bureaucracy was wholly European at 
independence, with zero access for Zaireans until 1959; in 1960, only three Zaireans were 
among the 4,645 holders of senior executive posts. In the chaos and violence of 
independence, most European civil servants fled, resulting in the sudden, mass 
promotions of lower-level officials.
418
 In that context, the Panama Canal transition was a 




As discussed, the Panama Canal’s remarkable personnel transformation did not 
occur by chance. Undoubtedly, abnormally high turnover – 7.2 percent in 1980, for 
example – helped open positions for Panamanians. In the years after the ratification of the 
treaties, droves of U.S. canal workers packed their bags, lured by generous pension 
offers; repulsed by the prospect of life under the jurisdiction of Panama’s repressive 
National Guard; and later intimidated by Panamanian dictator Manual Noriega’s 
henchmen. But the biggest factors in strengthening the Panamanian canal workforce were 
the U.S.-administered Panamanian Preference Program and related efforts to recruit and 
mentor Panamanians. “To ensure that the necessary strengths are available in the critical 
years ahead, training programs continue to receive high priority, with a major emphasis 
on increasing the participation of qualified Panamanians,” Gen. Dennis P. McAuliffe, the 
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canal administrator (1979 to 1989), reported in 1985.
420
 To bring Panamanian pilots 
aboard, for example, the United States jettisoned a requirement that pilot candidates be 
blue water sailors with a master’s license. Instead, the Panama Canal Commission 
enrolled Panamanians in maritime schools, set up apprenticeship programs and provided 
scholarships for Panamanians to study in the United States. Manuel E. Benítez, now the 
deputy canal administrator, studied management at Cornell. So did Enrique E. Sánchez, 
now the head of the canal’s purchasing division. To speed the advancement of 
Panamanian canal officials, the United States established a three-member promotion 
panel and mandated that at least one member be Panamanian.
421
 In all, these training 
efforts cost millions of dollars.
422
 For Panamanians, the pace of hiring and promotions 
was always too slow, a chronic source of tension on the commission’s nine-member, 
binational Board of Directors. But those disagreements were unavoidable, given the canal 
commission’s dual roles: advance the transition while safely operating the critical 
waterway. “We were going to do it right. That means you did not go out willy-nilly hiring 
Panamanians,” recalled Richard Wainio, who served as the commission’s director of 
executive planning and is now CEO of the Tampa Port Authority.
423
 “You had to 
continue to operate the canal successfully and that by itself was a big job. Then you had 
the job of implementing the treaty.” 
Joseph Wood, who directed the commission’s Office of Executive Administration 
from 1980 to 1993, also acknowledged an initial reluctance to flood the canal with 
Panamanian newcomers. Wood, however, said cultural factors also played a role in hiring 
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decisions. Like many U.S. canal employees, Wood’s family had deep roots in Panama. 
His great grandfather, James Moore, was a British sailor whose steam ship transported 
mail and passengers between San Francisco and Panama. Moore settled in Panama in the 
late 19th century, after meeting his future wife on the Panamanian island of Taboga, a 
coaling station at the time. The couple settled in Panama, constructing their home on 
Taboga out of California redwood. Generations later, when U.S. authorities directed U.S. 
canal employees to begin the handover, these historic ties, such as those in Wood’s 
family, proved hard to break. “It took a while for the attitudes to become positive,” Wood 
recalled of the transition to Panamanian canal administration. “Most of us were second or 
third generation; this was our home.” But as canal administrator, McAuliffe 
communicated a clear commitment to the transition and “after three or four years, we got 
over the angst,” Wood said. Ultimately, the United States developed a team of 
Panamanians prepared to run the canal at every level of its administration. Even today, 
nearly all of the canal’s top officials trained as U.S. apprentices.
424
 
 Beyond U.S.-built infrastructure and U.S.-trained personnel, Panama benefited 
from institutional designs and norms fashioned by generations of U.S. canal officials. In 
the final years before the turnover, as Panamanians contemplated the canal’s future 
administrative structures, Panamanian elites recognized the value of the canal’s 
administrative structures. Gilberto Guardia Fabrega, the first permanent Panamanian 
canal administrator (1990 to 1996), spoke admiringly of the U.S.-led Panama Canal 
Commission. His successor, Alberto Alemán Zubieta (1996 to 2012), made a similar 
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observation; he promised global shippers that they would notice no changes following the 
turnover. 
The United States did not merely lead by example as Panama debated the future 
design of its Panama Canal Authority, as Panama called the latest iteration of the canal 
administration. U.S. officials nudged Panama to establish a strongly independent canal 
entity. In 1993, the United States commissioned a report from the consultancy Arthur 
Anderson that scrutinized the U.S.-led transition. Its conclusions, largely accepted by 
U.S. authorities, included a recommendation that the United States encourage “the 
Panamanian government to adopt an apolitical strategy for managing the canal.”
425
 
Arthur Anderson also urged the United State to: 
1. Recognize Panama’s interest in running a “business-oriented canal” and take steps 
so that “U.S. oversight can be adapted to serve those same objectives”;
426
 
2. Participate in Panamanian dialogues regarding “the structure of canal governance 
under Panama, the legislative framework that will apply to the canal and myriad 
operating policies and practices”;
427
 and, 
3. Replace the rigid policies of a U.S. Executive Branch appropriated agency and 
adopt “commercially accepted practices and procedures regarding budgeting, 
procurement, personnel and ethics which reflect the needs of the transitional 




After Panamanian lawmakers, on December 27, 1994, passed a constitutional reform 
establishing the Panama Canal Authority, the U.S.-led Panama Canal Commission 
praised the design and its similarities to U.S. structures. The future canal authority, the 
commission observed, would “allow the preservation of proven policies, regulations and 
procedures” and guarantee “the continuity of its labor force by providing employment 
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conditions and rights similar to those existing at the time of the transfer of the canal.”
429
 
As Panamanian lawmakers began drafting the future canal authority’s basic law, U.S. 
canal officials coordinated with the Panamanian government’s canal transition 
commission, established on January 25, 1995. In the meetings, the United States 
highlighted “key elements which have contributed to the successful operation of the canal 
over the years, including organizational and managerial structure, personnel 
administration programs, labor policies and programs, financial system, tolls policy and 
procurement policies and programs. The importance of continuing these key functions to 
ensure the canal’s future effectiveness and dependability under Panama’s stewardship 
was stressed.”
430
 The U.S.-led Panama Canal Commission assigned U.S. lawyers and 
U.S. planners to help adapt canal regulations – including inventory and supply 
management systems – to Panama’s legal system.
431
 What’s more, 600 U.S. canal 
officials hung around in 2000 to provide continuity following the canal turnover.
432
 
Sixteen years later, there are still 15 U.S. nationals in the canal’s locks division,
433
 and 
the top four canal pilots, by seniority, are Americans.
434435
 Before the turnover, U.S. 
canal officials had even started planning for the canal’s eventual expansion. An internal 
memorandum to the canal administrator, sent October 8, 1997, detailed long-term 
projections of canal traffic and modeled traffic patterns for a hypothetical, widened canal. 
(Later, the expansion would not only rely upon U.S. studies, but also take advantage of 
preliminary U.S. excavations on the canal’s Atlantic side.) Over all, the transition to 
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Panamanian canal control “was not very traumatic,”
436
 Samuel Lewis Navarro, Panama’s 
former vice president and foreign minister, concluded. 
Even the harshest critics of the transition process recognize U.S. fingerprints on 
the Panama Canal Authority’s notable institutional design, including the labor and 
procurement policies that serve as the foundation of the Panamanian-run waterway.
437
 
(There are legitimiate criticisms of the U.S. handling of the transition, which will be 
addressed separately.) The United States had provided office space at the canal’s 
Administration Building
438
 for the executive director of the Panamanian government’s 
canal transition commission, and it used that proximity to influence the drafting of the 
Panama Canal Authority’s basic law. In the final annual report of the U.S.-led Panama 
Canal Commission, Alemán, the Panamanian canal administrator at the time, praised the 
United States for its handling of the transition: “I am proud to report that the 
Governments of the United States and the Republic of Panama have labored in true 
partnership to ensure a smooth and orderly transfer. This noble process has provided a 
solid foundation upon which we pledge to continue building a safer, more efficient and 
competitive Panama Canal under Panamanian administration.”
439
 Charles Morris, the 
U.S.-led Panama Canal Commission’s head of security, remembers a flawless transition. 
“Looking back,” he said, “I wouldn’t have done anything differently.”
440
 By the time the 
Panamanians inherited the canal, he said, its continued operation was child’s play. “The 
canal is a perpetual motion machine,” he said, “it runs itself.” 
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Prone to self-congratulation, Panama sometimes needs reminding that it was born 
on third base and dreamed it hit a triple, as former Texas Governor Ann Richards (1991 
to 1995) famously said of her successor, George W. Bush. “It was a U.S. effort, and 
people lose sight of it,” Wainio complained.
441
 After all, why would the United States set 
the stage for failure at a canal so central to the U.S. economy? True, the canal is a global 
enterprise, with ships from 100 countries among the 14,000 vessels transiting annually. 
But the United States remains the major user. The United States is the origin or 
destination of two thirds of the ships transiting the canal. The canal processes 37 percent 
of the imports at the Savannah port, 28 percent at Miami and 22 percent at New York and 
New Jersey.
442
 Fully one-third of U.S. grain and soybean exports pass through the 
canal.
443
 U.S. companies also use the canal to ship phosphates, petroleum products, 
chemicals, lumber, iron and steel,
444
 routed through Panama to cut distance, time and 
cost. Cargo crosses Panama headed between Europe and the U.S. West Coast; between 
Southeast Asia and the U.S. East Coast; and from coast to coast in the United States. The 
canal was and remains “a lifeline for trade and commerce for the United States,” which 
“connects directly to questions of economic development and job creation.”
445
 
To its credit, most often Panama grudgingly acknowledges its extraordinary 
inheritance.
446
 At the Centro de Capacitación Ascanio Arosemena, a canal training 
complex at the former Balboa High School, the plaza is dominated by a monument to the 
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Panamanians killed in 1964 protesting the U.S. presence in Panama, including Ascanio 
Arosemena, the first to die in the violence.
447
 Inside the building, however, the corridor 
outside the Panama Canal library is lined with portraits of former U.S. canal 
administrators. The Panama Canal Authority regularly celebrates historical milestones 
that highlight the U.S. canal era, including the canal centennial in 2014. At the base of the 
canal Administration Building’s grand staircase, a marble monument to Goethals, the 
Panama Canal builder, still stands, dedicated by “his fellow Americans.” Quijano, the 




U.S. Transition: Obstacles in Panama’s Path 
 
For all that ancestral veneration, however, many in Panama insist the United 
States set up Panama to fail. Though overblown, these critiques do cast doubt on a pure 
path dependency explanation for Panama’s successful canal management. 
Critics of the United States point to deep flaws in the U.S.-led transition to 
Panamanian canal ownership. The signing and ratification of the canal treaties in 1977 
sparked celebrations throughout Panama, and hopes for a brighter future for the long 
suffering country. But the flawed legislation the U.S. Congress produced to implement 
the Panama Canal treaties – the Panama Canal Act of 1979 – hobbled the transition from 
the start. Most damaging was the controversial decision by U.S. lawmakers to convert the 
Panama Canal Company into an appropriated federal agency. That politicized the newly 
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established U.S.-led Panama Canal Commission
449
 and deprived it of both its 
independence and the competitive pressures that strengthen self-funding government 
entities. The Arthur Anderson report put it bluntly: The financial structures of an 
appropriated agency “are a serious handicap to the commission’s need to evolve a set of 
financial management practices and procedures that will facilitate the transition and that 
could be adopted by the post-1999 canal organization.”
450
 The implementing legislation 




On paper at least, the new canal organization was a U.S.-Panama operation. As 
discussed, the Panama Canal Treaty dismantled the U.S. government’s Panama Canal 
Company and replaced it with the binational Panama Canal Commission. In an earlier 
era, a handful of Zonian families had dominated the canal administration, according to 
longtime Panamanian canal official Rodolfo R. Sabonge.
452
 These “guardians of the 
canal” populated the administration’s upper ranks with their fellow graduates of Balboa 
High School and the private St. Mary’s School in the canal zone. (In the early years, 
Panama Canal division chiefs supposedly made hiring decisions based on an applicant’s 
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 and every office was “overstaffed with cast-off mistresses, poor 
relatives and the children of friends.”
454
) By contrast, the Panama Canal Commission was 
designed to share responsibility for canal management with Panama for the first time. Its 
nine-member board comprised five U.S. nationals and four Panamanians. Flags of both 
nations flew side by side at all public buildings in the former canal zone.
455
 For the first 
time, Panamanians walked into the Administration Building as equals. “For 
Panamanians, it was like the White House,” Fernando Cardoze, who served twice on the 
Panama Canal Commission board (1983 to 1985, 1995 to 1999), recalled. The canal 
administrator remained a U.S. national, but he now had a Panamanian deputy. (As 
mandated by the treaties, in 1990, the two would swap positions.) The commission’s 
annual reports now included a section on treaty implementation and highlighted the 
growing percentage of Panamanians in the canal workforce. 
In practice, however, U.S. nationals continued to control the waterway throughout 
the transition to Panamanian control. The U.S. president still stood atop the canal’s 
organizational chart, running the canal through his defense secretary, who in turn 
deputized the secretary of the Army. The four Panamanian board members required a 
U.S. presidential appointment. For the United States, mentoring Panamanians was not 
always a top priority, at least in the early years of the transition.
456
 “The canal, still 
gringo, didn’t think the transition was part of its responsibilities,” Jorge L. Quijano, now 
the Panama Canal Authority administrator, recalled.
457
 Former Panamanian President 
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Ernesto Pérez Balladares (1994 to 1999) made a similar observation. “There was a lot of 
resistance,” he said. “They were seeing that the end of their paradise was coming. Of 
course they tried to stop things, to derail things, to get them slowed down.”
458
 Rebellious 
Zonian graffiti declared the Panama Canal Zone the “51st state forever.”
459
 The day the 
canal treaties entered into force – October 1, 1979 – the United States had handed over 
600 square miles of the Panama Canal Zone, including 14 former U.S. military bases; 
ports; the historic Panama Canal Railroad; 7,000 structures; and thousands of pieces of 
equipment and vehicles. In all, the property was worth $1.7 billion, not adjusting for 
inflation.
460
 Nevertheless, there was so much mistrust that many Panamanians still 
doubted that the United States would ever turn over the actual canal.
461
 
In 2003 and 2004, Panamanian historian Ana Elena Porras interviewed 
Panamanians who had participated in the canal transition. Treaty negotiators had 
designed the two-decade period between the signing of the treaties and the canal turnover 
as an extended apprenticeship for Panama. The official U.S. goal was to meet its 
obligation to turn over the canal “in good running order, free of debt and with a skilled 
workforce capable of operating and maintaining the canal.”
462
 As it turned out, Porras 
found in her interviews, the transition process was marred by U.S. indifference, 
obstructionism and even bigotry. Critics had longed charged the United States with 
marginalizing Panamanians in the Panama Canal Zone. The United States, as the author 
Jean Gilbreath Niemeier noted in 1968, “has alternately played proud papa and heavy 
                                                             
458
 Community Television Foundation of South Florida, “Panama Canal, Prized Possession,” 2015. 
459
 Roberto Emerick quoted in Porras 2007, p. 115. 
460
 Suárez 2010, p. 15. 
461
 Community Television Foundation of South Florida 2015. 
462
 Arthur Anderson 1993), p. 1. 
126 
 
father, but never patient instructor.”
463
 That changed to some degree under U.S. President 
Jimmy Carter, but the momentum that led to Carter’s treaties was exhausted by the time 
the Senate had ratified the treaties.
464
 As a result, little occurred during the initial years of 
the transition. Few Panamanians doubted Carter’s good will, but they regarded his two-
term successor, U.S. President Ronald Reagan (1981 to 1989), as a “mortal enemy” of the 
canal turnover.
465
 Sabonge, who directed the Panama Canal Commission’s transition 
division, had no budget and an isolated office. The “canal establishment,” he said, 
remained “an enormous obstacle.”
466
 The United States boasted of “an exceptional esprit 
de corps”
467
 in the U.S.-led Panama Canal Commission. To Alemán, however, it felt like 
“apartheid.”
468
 In the later phase of the transition, the deputy canal administrator, 
Raymond Laverty, technically served under Alemán. But Sabonge accused Laverty of 
“sabotaging the transition,”
469
 keeping information from his Panamanian boss, whom he 
“treated like the enemy.”
470
 Agustín Alberto Arias, a canal engineer, agreed. During 
Laverty’s tenure,
471
 he said, the canal leadership remained “hermetically sealed to 
Panamanians.”
472
 Ricaurte Vásquez, the canal’s first Panamanian chief financial officer, 
had to fight to occupy the house traditionally reserved for his position. His predecessor 
                                                             
463
 Niemeier, Jean Gilbreath, The Panama Story (Dallas, Texas: Metropolitan Press, 1968), p. 261. 
464
 Carter seemed to believe that the Zonians were not on board with his plan to execute a smooth canal 
turnover. In a visit to the Panama Canal Zone after he signed the treaties, he reminded the Zonians, “I am 
relying on all of you to help make this transition as smooth as possible. That is your duty, your 
responsibility and the people of both nations expect nothing less.” 
465
 Suárez 2010, p. 29. 
466
 Porras 2007, p. 53. 
467
 Panama Canal Commission Administrator Dennis P. McAuliffe, writing in the Panama Canal 
Commission’s 1987 Annual Report. 
468
 Porras 2007, p. 207. 
469
 Ibid., p. 74. 
470
 Ibid., p. 57. 
471
 Wainio defends Laverty’s leadership, but for Panamanians, Laverty’s name is radioactive. Suárez, in his 
official history of the canal’s first decade under Panamanian control, says Laverty had “the same disruptive 
mentality of the establishment Zonians.” Laverty died in 1996. 
472
 McAuliffe 1987, p. 85. 
127 
 
spent just half an hour briefing him for the job.
473
 Gene Bigler, who served as the “canal 
watcher” at the U.S. Embassy in Panama City immediately after the canal’s handover to 
Panama, gives the U.S. government no credit for Panama’s success. “There had been 
neglect on the part of the United States,” he said. “The United States did not make a great 
effort for Panama to succeed.”
474
 
The transition also suffered from the U.S.-led Panama Canal Commission’s 
apparent indifference to the long-term health of canal infrastructure. Panamanians who 
participated in the transition process say the United States planed to hand over a creaking 
and obsolete waterway. Despite intense lobbying by Panamanian officials, U.S. 
authorities resisted increasing tolls to pay for infrastructure upgrades.
475
 “We felt the 




It was in these circumstances that Panamanians, for the first time, played a 
decisive role in canal management. Meeting in secret, they decided to persuade the U.S. 
government to acknowledge the canal’s physical deterioration, and to do something about 
it. These Panamanians, led by Roberto Roy – who would later serve as chairman of the 
Panama Canal Authority Board of Directors – and Moisés Catillo, Alberto Palacios and 
Ernesto Ng – set up a Blue Ribbon Engineering Committee to diagnose the canal’s 
vulnerabilities. “The gringos would have given us the keys to a dilapidated, ancient 
canal,” Sabonge said.
477
 “The best kept secret” of the canal, he said, was “the magnitude 
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 Carlos Ernesto González de la Lastra, of the Asociación Panameña 
de Ejecutivos de Empresa, logged 1,001 problems requiring urgent attention. The United 
States, he said, planned to hand over a “mountain of scrap.”
479
 Some Panamanians saw a 
conspiracy in the canal’s cracks and rust: the United States was setting up Panama to fail 
in order to justify a U.S. invasion retaking the waterway.
480481
 
Following its preliminary investigation, the Blue Ribbon Engineering Committee 
demanded that U.S. canal authorities commission an outside audit.
482
 U.S. authorities 
rejected requests to hire independent French or Swedish inspectors, according to 
Cardoze, the former Panama Canal Commission board member. However, the United 
States did agree to hire the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to take a careful look at the 
canal that Panama stood to inherit. Initially, Panamanians doubted the objectivity of a 
U.S. government review, and the Blue Ribbon Engineering Committee insisted on 
continuing its own inspections. “We visited every nook and cranny,” Roy said.
483
 
Ultimately, however, the Panamanians were pleased by the findings of the Army Corps 
of Engineers. Alemán – the future canal administrator who led the Blue Ribbon 
Engineering Committee – blessed the Army Corps of Engineers study. Following its 
report, the U.S.-led Panama Canal Commission began pouring money into the waterway. 
In 1995, the commission approved a “milestone plan” including 200 transition-related 
tasks; changed the name of the Office of Executive Planning to the Office of Executive 
Planning and Transition Coordination (emphasis added); and added a division focused 
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exclusively on transition affairs.
484
 In 1997, the United States began replacing the 
locomotives that pull ships through the canal locks, upgrading the rails for the 
locomotives and widening the Culebra Cut, the narrowest stretch of the waterway. 
Annual spending on capital improvements rocketed from an average of $30 million in the 
1980s to $100 million.
485
 The commission’s board adopted a long-term transition plan 




Manuel Noriega, the U.S. ‘Pineapple’ Partner 
 
Undoubtedly, Panama was also to blame for disrupting the historic transition to 
Panamanian canal management. Sure, Omar Torrijos had his faults; a military ruler, he 
had little respect for human rights or civil liberties. He silenced opposition voices, banned 
political parties and suffocated Panama’s news media. For the canal, however, Torrijos’s 
constructive relationship with the White House might have helped keep the transition on 
a steady course. As it turned out, however, two years into the transition, Torrijos died 
when his Panamanian Air Force plane crashed in stormy weather on August 1, 1981.
487
 
Noriega, Torrijos’s successor and former intelligence chief, was decidedly less 
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committed to a smooth canal transition. From the start, Noriega, deeply corrupt and 
violent, did not share the U.S. vision of a civilian-run canal. Rather, he preferred to 
replicate the Pentagon’s dominance of the waterway. “For Noriega, the only thing you 
had to change was to install a Panamanian general in place of an American general. That 
was Noriega’s mindset. And that Panamanian general was himself.”
488
 Noriega also 
lacked Torrijos’s capacity to charm U.S. officials, despite Noriega’s long history of ties 




For a time, U.S. officials were able to stomach Noriega because Nicolás Ardito 
Barletta – the country’s figurehead president, who had narrowly won (or perhaps 
narrowly stole) the 1984 election – had the type of resume admired in Washington. A 
University of Chicago-trained economist, Barletta held positions at the World Bank and 
the Organization of American States. But Barletta suddenly resigned just a year into his 
term – on September 28, 1985 – after clashing with his military overseers. His abrupt 
departure – he announced it in a statement at 2:30 a.m.
490
 –elevated to the presidency 
Barletta’s vice president, Eric Arturo Delvalle, a respected industrialist. The United 
States warily accepted the personnel change. But the U.S.-Panama relationship, never 
cordial or cooperative under Noriega, worsened significantly in 1988, after Noriega 
deposed Delvalle.
491
 Like Panama’s civilian leaders under Torrijos, Delvalle had held 
limited authority. But Delvalle, like Barletta, was respected by U.S. officials, and his 
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ouster caused relations between the two governments to deteriorate rapidly. As Panama 
morphed into a narco-state, senior U.S. officials began debating the best way to remove 
Noriega. Members of Reagan’s National Security Council fought bitterly over a proposal 
– ultimately supported by Reagan, over Vice President George H.W. Bush’s strong 
objections – to drop U.S. drug trafficking charges against Noriega in return for his 
retirement from Panamanian politics.
492
 Noriega, however, rejected the offer, and Reagan 
left the Panama dilemma to his successor. It would become one of the “most pressing 
problems” Bush inherited.
493
 As president, Bush (1989 to 1993) continued to oppose 
dropping criminal charges against Noriega. So with the future of the canal hanging in the 
balance, Bush sought other ways to resolve the standoff, including a scheme to arrest 
Noriega should he set foot inside the Panama Canal Zone,
494




Throughout the calamitous Noriega era,
496
 the United States never suspended 
canal transition activities. In some ways, in fact, the process accelerated; an increased 
exodus of U.S. canal workers compelled heightened efforts to recruit and train 
Panamanian replacements.
497
 The U.S. government deprived Noriega of his right, under 
the treaties, to appoint a Panamanian to serve as the canal administrator starting on 
January 1, 1990. But the United States did not keep McAuliffe in place; instead, it 
promoted Fernando Manfredo, the Panamanian deputy canal administrator, to acting 
administrator. At the time, The New York Times reported that a “historic watershed has 
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 The administrative shuffle clearly advertised the U.S. 
commitment to keep the transition advancing,
499
 despite the Panamanian political 
tumult,
500
 and it helped the United States avoid a distracting “regional firestorm”
501
 over 
noncompliance with the treaty.  (The United States had sworn-in Manfredo as deputy 
administrator on October 1, 1979, the day the Panama Canal treaties originally took 
effect. He served as interim administrator until September 20, 1990, when the United 
States swore-in Gilberto Guardia as the first permanent Panamanian administrator.) As 
discussed, even in the years directly before the 1989 U.S. invasion of Panama (which will 
be addressed in depth), U.S. canal authorities continued to invest in the canal, installing 




Undoubtedly, however, Noriega had “dealt a blow” to the process.
503
 U.S. 
investment in the canal declined. Panama made no serious attempt at administrative 
preparations. The U.S. military slowed land transfers. The U.S.-led Panama Canal 
Commission board struggled to function; from 1987 to 1990, the United States denied 
visas to the four Panamanian board members, who could no longer attend board meetings 
in the United States.
504
 When the board convened in Panama, Noriega’s combative 
appointees sapped productivity.
505
 Bilateral cooperation stalled. Due to U.S. economic 
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sanctions on Panama, the Panama Canal Commission withheld the payroll taxes it 
collected from its Panamanian employees. In retribution, Noriega denied license plates to 
these Panamanians, and the canal authority had to lease buses and high-speed launches 
for their commutes to the canal. “It was not the best atmosphere,” Pérez Balladares, the 
former president, said.
506
 For the canal, as in so many areas of Panamanian life, the 
Noriega era was a lost decade. Afterward, canal planners continued to suffer from 
Noriega’s procrastination, forced to run the canal transition “like cramming for an exam 
the night before.”
507
 Noriega’s “most important legacy was one of inaction on vital canal-
transition issues,” Robert R. McMillan, a former chairman of the U.S.-led Panama Canal 
Commission board, recalled. “From ratification of the Carter-Torrijos treaty in 1978, very 




For U.S. nationals in Panama, it was “a tough time to continue to operate the 
canal successfully and move the treaty forward.”
509
 Noriega’s operatives surveilled senior 
canal officials, taking their photographs through car windows.
510
 A strike by anti-Noriega 
port workers in Balboa involved a barricade of shipping containers that trapped U.S. 
canal workers in their homes.
511
 Amid the tension, the United States shipped dependents 
of U.S. canal workers back to the United States.
512
 In 1989, McAuliffe, in his last year as 
canal administrator, pleaded for a resolution to Panama’s domestic chaos and its conflict 
with the United States. 
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“The political crisis in Panama, which has been impinging on relations between 
Panama and the United States for more than two years, continued to intensify. 
This condition had a serious adverse impact on the morale of the canal workforce, 
and provoked broad concern for the safe and efficient operation of the waterway. 
A variety of contingency measures were temporarily invoked to ensure the normal 





On December 20, 1989, the United States invaded Panama to depose Noriega, in 
part because his leadership had endangered the future operation of the canal.
514
 “There 
was this gnawing concern,” James A. Baker III, the U.S. secretary of state at the time, 
recalled.
515
 “We were worried about the transfer of the canal to a Panama ruled by a 
thug.” Clearly, the United States had other motivations for the invasion. U.S. authorities 
had indicted Noriega on charges of drug trafficking, and Bush had publicly called drugs 
“the gravest domestic threat facing our nation.”
516
 There were other law enforcement 
goals, too:
517
 Noriega was involved in arms trafficking and money laundering. The 
United States also described the invasion of Panama as a defense of democracy, 
emphasizing Noriega’s manipulation of the 1989 presidential election. In terms of foreign 
policy considerations, the U.S. government saw Noriega as an impediment to its regional 
counternarcotics efforts,
518
 and accused him of supporting leftist guerrillas in El Salvador 
and Nicaragua;
519
 at the State Department, he was seen as the “Muammar el-Qaddafi of 
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 U.S. authorities, moreover, were deeply disturbed by Panama’s 
treatment of U.S. personnel who circulated outside the canal zone. There were 35,000 
U.S. citizens in Panama in those days and Noriega’s harassment – as well as his ill-
advised declaration of war against the United States – permitted U.S. officials to argue 
that the invasion was in self-defense and therefore permitted under international law. On 
December 16, 1989, Panamanian soldiers shot and killed an unarmed U.S. Marine, 
Lieutenant Robert Paz, and separately, detained a U.S. Navy officer, Lieutenant Adam J. 
Curtis, and his wife, Bonnie, beating Curtis and sexually threatening his wife. “We could 
not sit back and stand for a dictator like that treating our people that way,” Baker said. 
U.S. impatience and disgust with Noriega – “a case of what we in Texas call ‘bad chili,’” 
as Baker wrote in his memoir
521
 – was another factor in the U.S. decision to invade. 
Finally, there was the public image of the president, who was seen as timid, despite his 
service as a Navy pilot, including 58 combat missions during World War Two.
522
 
Still, Panama’s future administration of the canal was a major preoccupation for 
U.S. policymakers.
523
 Noriega steadfastly refused to leave office, and senior U.S. 
officials dreaded the prospect of turning over the canal to his brutish and incompetent 
government.
524
 By then, it was clear Noriega was putting the Panama Defense Force in 
charge of treaty implementation. It was also the Panamanian military that seized reverted 
U.S. properties from the former Panama Canal Zone.
525
 “It was a nagging doubt,” Baker 
said. “We couldn’t trust this guy to comply with his treaty obligations. Who knows how 
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it might have been run if we had not done what we did?” On December 17, 1989, 
following a White House Christmas Party, Bush assembled his senior advisers – 
including Defense Secretary Dick Cheney, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin 
Powell and National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft – and announced his decision to 
go to war.
526
 A short time later, publicly announcing the invasion, Bush said he was 
acting to “protect the integrity of the Panama Canal treaty.” The United States, he said in 
his 7:20 a.m. nationally televised address from the Oval Office, was “fully committed to 
implement the Panama Canal treaties and turn over the canal to Panama in the year 2000. 
The actions we have taken and the cooperation of a new, democratic government in 
Panama will permit us to honor these commitments.” Reflecting on the invasion, Baker 
said Noriega’s dictatorship “threatened the transfer of the canal to Panamanian 
sovereignty.”
527
 “One way or another, Noriega’s rule had to end,” he had concluded. 
The Panama invasion was the first major use of U.S. troops since Vietnam.
528
 
Ultimately, Noriega’s removal proved to be a blessing for Panama and its canal. The U.S. 
had eliminated the bullying Panama Defense Force as a political actor.
529
 (Later, under 
President Guillermo Endara, Panama would disband its armed forces once and for all.) 
The canal itself emerged unharmed; during the fighting, U.S. paratroopers stood guard at 
Madden Dam.
530
 After staying up until 4 a.m. the night of the invasion, Bush held a press 
conference the next morning and reassured his U.S. audience that their Panama Canal 
was safe.
531
 In the short term, however, the invasion did no favors to canal operations or 
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the transition to Panamanian management. During the fighting, much of the violence 
occurred close to the canal in Panama City, where Noriega maintained his urban 
headquarters. Mortar and machine gun fire echoed throughout the Panamanian capital as 
U.S. troops sought Noriega’s capture.
532
 Before the invasion, a Panamanian military 
officer had handed Richard Morgan, who supervised the canal’s land-based activities, a 
list of 20 Panama Canal Commission officials that Panamanian special forces – patrolling 
in Toyota Land Cruisers – planned to kidnap in the event of war with the United States. 
As promised, on the night of the invasion, eight Panamanian soldiers approached 
Morgan’s house on Ancón Hill. “They came to get me,” he said, “they came out of the 
jungle.”
533
 Morgan, who spent 25 years living and working at the canal, transiting the 
waterway 125 times, suddenly found himself a prisoner in his home. That night, he 
watched members of the U.S. 82nd Airborne Division repel the Panamanians attackers. 
In the morning, he saw them collect corpses and shell casings from his backyard. Wainio, 
also on Noriega’s hit list, received a telephone message as the fighting broke out with the 
code word “Hammerblow” and instructions to turn off his lights and close his drapes. 
Like Morgan, he was soon trapped in his house, surrounded by U.S. troops.
534
 For 12 




Panama’s Turn: The Final Decade 
 
Following the U.S. invasion, canal transition efforts ramped up, and even most 
Panamanians admit the U.S. attitude improved. The new Panama Canal Commission 
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board chairman, Joseph Reeder, rapidly won over the canal’s senior Panamanian 
officials. At board meetings, he did away with the tradition of sitting Panamanian and 
U.S. board members on opposite sides of the conference table. To ease the transformation 
to Panamanian governance, he accommodated Panama’s desire for a for-profit 
management style. “You’re passing the baton,” Reeder said.
536
 Reeder had two 
advantages over his predecessors: the canal was now free of Noriega’s meddling,
537
 and a 
skilled Panamanian workforce had emerged from a decade of U.S. tutelage. Still, 
Reeder’s attitude helped a great deal, restoring Panamanian confidence in the U.S. 
commitment to the canal transition and recouping the lost mojo in the bilateral 
relationship. Panamanian canal officials can still recite Reeder’s slogan – “one team, one 
mission”
538
 – and Reeder’s dream of a “seamless transition.” 
So how, then, did Panama pull it off? No single explanation is sufficient. The 
canal transition, as discussed at length, did not exactly give Panama a running start. From 
the beginning, it was marred by mistrust. Later, Noriega’s shenanigans and the disruptive 
U.S. invasion hardly helped advance the process. Since the euphoria of the Carter-
Torrijos treaties, Panama had seen its dashing dictator die in a plane crash, its drug-
running dictator deposed and captured, and foreign troops overrun its capital. Just a 
decade before the turnover would take place, Panamanian society remained deeply 
divided, its economy a shambles and its public institutions beaten down by decades of 
military dictatorship and a war. 




 Old U.S. canal hands regard Noriega’s removal as perhaps the greatest gift the United States ever gave 
Panama. “Jimmy Carter got awfully lucky,” Richard Morgan said in an interview with the author. “I don’t 
think the canal would be open today if it had stayed on that same path.” Carter, who opposed the invasion, 
acknowledged sharing concerns over putting the canal in Noriega’s hands. “I never had any confidence in 
Noriega,” he said in an interview with the author. 
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Even a perfect canal transition would not have guaranteed Panama’s success. The 
canal, after all, is not a foolproof operation, and Panama would have ample opportunity 
to gum up the works. As Panamanians like to say, the canal was passing from a 
superpower to a third world country, from its top user to a non-user. The flawed handover 
further handicapped Panama. Yet to the surprise of practically all observers – not least of 
which the legions of critics of the canal treaties – Panama has avoided the pitfalls that 
bedevil most state-owned enterprises and masterfully managed the Panama Canal. 
There is no consensus on exactly how Panama managed to exceeded all 
expectations. Many analysts, in the United States and Panama, are satisfied with versions 
of the “golden goose” and “too-big-too-fail,” explanations:
539
 the canal was simply too 
valuable an asset to mishandle.
540
 According to this popular hypothesis, Panamanian 
elites protect the canal because the country fears the loss of the canal’s annual dividends; 
relies upon the canal’s economic linkages; and credits the canal’s squeaky clean brand 
with attracting foreign direct investment to Panama. Indeed, from the start of Panamanian 
canal management, Panamanians feared that failure would lead to economic calamity and 
the potential return of U.S. troops to the Panama Canal or Panamanian troops to 
Panama’s presidential palace. Cardoze, the three-time  
Panama Canal board member, said the canal succeeds because it is “paramount” to 
Panama’s economy.
541
 Christopher L. Koch, president of the World Shipping Council, 
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summed up Panama’s attitude this way: “Don’t screw up a good thing.”
542
 Robert A. 
Pastor, Carter’s top Latin America adviser, said Panamanians “understood from the very 
beginning that their future depended on the Panama Canal.”
543
 “Nobody,” he said, 
“wanted to do anything that could kill the golden goose.” The canal was so important to 
Panama, explained Peter F. Romero, the U.S. assistant secretary of state for Western 
Hemisphere affairs at the time of the canal turnover, that Panama did not dare destroy it. 
“This was way too important for too many Panamanians,” he said.
544
 “There was a strong 
sense that this was their chance, this was their moment, and that was stronger than their 
historic venality.” Michael Klein, an expert on infrastructure policy and regulation at 
Johns Hopkins University, said he had seen other “Little Engine that Could” stories. 
“Pretty terrible governments are capable of pulling themselves together if it’s a lifeline,” 
he said. 
Other canal observers cite a corollary to the “golden goose” argument: the if-it-
ain’t-broke-don’t-fix-it hypothesis. The canal’s strong performance, they argue, creates a 
virtuous circle that permanently protects the canal operation. “Its success protects the 
model,” Arias, Panama’s former foreign minister, said. In a country where tax revenue is 
just 19 percent of GDP
545
 – compared to an average of 34 percent in the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development,
546
 and 21 percent in Latin America – the 
canal’s $1 billion annual dividend to Panama’s national treasury is hardly a rounding 
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error. “You just don’t want to mess with that,” J.P. Morgan’s Franco A. Uccelli said, 
“that is pretty much the consensus there.”
547
 
Others attribute Panama’s success to the symbolic importance of the canal. It is 
the glue of Panamanian society, as the argument goes, and the fuel for Panamanian 
nationalism and pride.
548
 As with the “golden goose,” “too-big-too-fail” and “if-it-ain’t-
broke-don’t-fix-it” hypotheses, it is not clear what causal mechanism is operating here. 
Still, the Panamanians with the most intimate knowledge of the canal constantly 
emphasize the canal’s historical and cultural importance to explain its extraordinary 
performance in Panamanian hands. “There was 100 years of fighting for this,” former 
Panamanian President Martín Torrijos, Omar Torrijos’s son, said.
549
 “There were deaths,” 
he added, alluding to Panamanian protestors killed by U.S. troops. “It’s an emotional 
issue for Panama. It is part of the patrimony, more than just infrastructure.”  
Panamanians regard the canal turnover as a milestone equivalent to the territory’s 
independence from Spain (1821) and later from Colombia (1903).
550
 On Ancón Hill, one 
plaque commemorates the signing of the Carter-Torrijos canal treaties, while another 
features a 1954 poem by Demetrio Karsi that begs to know when Panama’s servitude will 
end. Only two Panamanian holidays can be moved to a Monday to give a three-day 
weekend, the anniversary of Panama’s independence from Spain and the anniversary of 
the January 9, 1964 shooting of Panamanian students protesting the U.S. canal 
administration, known as Martyrs Day. Panama also memorializes those deaths outside 
its legislative assembly, where a life-sized statue of a lamppost shows three Panamanian 
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students climbing to raise the Panamanian flag inside the former Panama Canal Zone. 
The former Fourth of July Avenue in Panama City is now known as the Avenue of the 
Martyrs. A major highway along the canal is named for Omar Torrijos, whose image 
dominates a prominent billboard in Panama City that features the slogan, “Thanks to you, 
the country realized its dream of freedom.” In downtown Panama City, under the 
principal viaduct, graffiti commemorates January 9, 1964 with images of students facing 
a firing squad. On the Avenue of the Martyrs, a wall is painted colorfully with the slogan 
“un solo territorio.” Cardoze, the former canal board member, called the canal “the 
religion that united Panamanians of all social strata and political parties.” (U.S. canal 
negotiator Sol M. Linowitz described the canal as “a bone in the throat of Panamanians, 
rich or poor, educated or illiterate, across the political spectrum.”
551
) Eduardo Antonio 
Quirós, the president of two leading Panamanian newspapers, El Siglo and La Estrella, 
and a former canal board member, also credits the canal’s symbolic importance for its 
successful management. “The fight to recover the canal lasted 100 years; it was the major 
theme of our history,” he said, sitting in his conference room overlooking Ancón Hill, 
where a gigantic Panamanian flag flies over the treetops in the heart of the once off-limits 
Panama Canal Zone. The canal, he said, “is like our flag, our national symbol.” Barletta, 
the former president, said all Panamanians “feel a national responsibility not to fail”
552
 in 
the canal’s administration. 
“As Panamanians, we feel at last we have settled our debt to the martyrs, to 
generations of patriots who fought bravely, patiently and with determination to 
achieve a grandiose goal – a specific objective, but one that was almost mythical. 
This secular religion, the nationalism that united us for nearly a century, came to a 
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According to this explanation, a shared sense of mission inspires excellence from 
within the Panama Canal Authority and prevents meddling from without. “In Panama, 
you can mess with a lot of things politically, but not the canal,” Lewis, the former vice 
president and foreign minister, said. “There’s a line in the sand.”
554
 Here, Panamanian 
civil society is said to play a central role, ever vigilant to the potential politicization of the 
canal or the improper influence of a president or lawmaker.
555
 “Tampering with the 
Panama Canal (or even seeming to tamper with the Panama Canal for political gain) 
rapidly became the quickest way to lose support among the electorate. As a result, 
competitive politics led to a new Panama Canal administration that ran the canal much 
more efficiently and commercially than the United States ever did.”
556
 In post-Noriega 
Panama, “politicians soon discovered that they had to be able to refute charges that they 
would interfere with canal operations if they were to retain popular support.”
557
 
“The canal for us was not only an economic asset to be incorporated to our 
economy, but something far more deeply rooted in our identity as a nation. From 
the beginning of the 20th century, many generations fought, and even sacrificed 
their lives, to make the canal Panama’s patrimony and to correct a historical 
injustice that gave the United States the right to manage it perpetually. And now 





Outsiders consistently make a similar observation when explaining how Panama 
has avoided the widely predicted patronage and corruption at the canal. Observers 
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describe the canal as the “third rail” of Panamanian politics.
559
 Moody’s Investors 
Service noted the “evident pride of the average citizen in the operations.”
560
 Christopher 
C. McIsaac, who advised the lenders who are paying for the canal expansion, also 
pointed to the pride factor in justifying the confidence lenders exhibited in backing the 
complex and costly expansion. “There is a tremendous amount of national pride in the 
asset,” he said. “They would not want to see the asset besmirched by over-
politicization.”
561
 Bigler, the former U.S. Foreign Service Officer in Panama, said 
Panamanians were determined to outshine the United States. There was a “superhuman 
effort of the Panamanians to demonstrate their capacity to meet and exceed the U.S. 
achievement,” he said. “They kept looking for outside standards they could live up to.”
562
 
There is no doubt that national pride plays a part in the success of the Panama 
Canal. Panamanians are aware that great powers rarely give away territory willingly, 
particularly land as large and strategic as the Panama Canal Zone. The British 
relinquished Hong Kong to China on July 1, 1997, but steadfastly reject Spain’s claims 
on Gibraltar and hang on to the remote Falkland Islands despite a war in 1982 and 
ceaseless protests from Argentina. In the United States, many oppose the repatriation of 
artifacts to foreign governments, let alone the transfer of territory. (Carter learned that 
lesson after he followed up on the Panama Canal treaties by returning the Crown of St. 
Stephen to Hungary on January 6, 1978.
563
) For Panama, the long and bloody struggle to 
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capture the canal was as significant as the canal’s original construction. The power of that 
idea has helped Panamanian civil society build ramparts around the canal. The canal’s 
defenders say a president or lawmaker who meddles in canal business will have hell to 
pay. That canal profits are a vital budget ballast for Panama also motivates policymakers 
to tread carefully when addressing canal business. The impression that the canal mints 
money, and that it is virtually incorruptible, makes it easier to repel barbarians at the 
gates. 
But if national pride, historical importance and dollars-and-cents are enough to 
safeguard a state-owned enterprise, then why has Venezuela immolated its national oil 
company, PDVSA? Why is Brazil’s Petrobras, once a case study in state-owned 
enterprise management, now the poster boy for corruption? Why is Mexico’s Pemex 
desperately searching for a private sector lifeline to reverse chronically declining 
reserves? After all, like the Panama Canal, these companies are essentially natural 
monopolies that face no local competition. Wouldn’t rational choice theory predict that 
Panamanian elites, like their counterparts throughout the region, would scramble for 
canal spoils without regard for lofty notions such as national pride? 
In the case of the Panama Canal, there are clearly other factors at play. As always, 
context matters. The Panama Canal Authority was born out of a crisis: the 1989 U.S. 
invasion of Panama. It was Panama’s thoughtful response to that crisis that offers the 
most persuasive insight into the country’s unexpected canal success: (1) Panamanian 
elites developed an enduring, deep and detailed consensus about the management of the 
canal; (2) two Panamanian presidents, of different political parties, and Panamanian 
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lawmakers built upon that consensus to develop a robust constitutional and legislative 
framework for the Panama Canal Authority that guaranteed extraordinary autonomy, at 
least on paper; and (3) canal leaders and Panamanian civil society have jealously 
defended that framework ever since. 
 
From ‘Just Cuz,’ a National Cause 
 
By any definition, the 1989 U.S. invasion of Panama, known as “Operation Just 
Cause,”
564
 was a critical juncture for Panama’s modern political development. Noriega’s 
ouster could easily have unleashed a spasm of political violence, not to mention political 
paralysis. Torrijos and Noriega had tried to suffocate civil society. Government ministries 
were in ruins, their windows shattered and their archives raided.
565
 The war prompted 
extensive looting.
566
 The economy was reeling. Freed of Noriega’s repression, personal 
and political rivalries were free to resume. Today, Panamanians have above average trust 
in their neighbors,
567
 but in the aftermath of the U.S. invasion, common crime increased 
and grudges and grievances ran deep. Crises, however, do not always bring chaos. 
Indeed, Kurt Weyland has observed that severe policy challenges, coupled with the 
arrival of new political leaders, are often a prerequisite for bold policy reforms. In these 
cases, fears of a deepening crisis motivate “drastic, daring” action.
568
 In Panama, this 
appears to have occurred. Panamanian elites exhibited exceptional political learning from 
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 The U.S. invasion provoked howls of protest from Latin 
American leaders, who fetishize territorial sovereignty and anti-colonialism. On 
December 21, 1989, the Organization of American States held an emergency meeting on 
Panama, where regional representatives denounced the United States. In Panama, 
however, the population largely accepted their new president, Guillermo Endara (1989 to 
1994), though he had been sworn-in at Howard Air Force Base after midnight as the U.S. 
invasion began, alongside his two vice presidents, Guillermo “Billy” Ford and Ricardo 
Arias Calderón. Instead, the protestors in Panama were concentrated in front of Apostolic 
Nunciature, where Noriega had sought asylum
570
 on Christmas Eve, arriving hidden 
under a blanket in the back seat of a car, his military fatigues replaced by shorts, a t-shirt 
and a baseball cap.
571
 Rapidly, feuds and finger pointing gave way to rebuilding 
institutions and damaged and neglected infrastructure. Panamanians decided they had hit 
rock bottom, and that alone helped stop the fall. “Panama was a defeated and humiliated 
country,” Cardoze, the former canal board member, said.
572
 
Post-invasion Panama faced a dizzying array of challenges. But a consensus 
quickly emerged on the most pressing national priority: keep the Panama Canal from 
crumbling after the U.S. exit. Suddenly, and for the first time, Panama got serious about 
its preparations to take over the canal. Endara began attending Panama Canal 
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Commission board meetings focused on the transition. On May 1, 1991, he established a 
nine-member commission, led by Joaquin J. Vallarino, one of Panama’s richest men, to 
draft a formal canal transition plan.
573
 The commission was multipartisan and included 
representatives of diverse professions.
574
 It was that commission – buoyed by public 
disgust with Panama’s political class – that in January 1994 introduced the most 
important element of Panama’s future canal management strategy: an independent canal 
administration
575
 with its mandate enshrined in the constitution. That concept endured 
throughout the final phase of the canal transition period, and it continues to serve as the 
bedrock of the Panama Canal Authority. The harmony should not be exaggerated. The 
Panama Canal Authority’s founding fathers wrangled over the proposed constitutional 
amendment, originally drafting 40 potential articles. But they all agreed on the need for 
autonomy, without which “the canal would become a piñata.”
576
 In addition to a general 
mistrust of government institutions, there was widespread uncertainty about Panama’s 
technical capability to manage the canal. That skepticism further strengthened the 
Vallarino Commission’s argument for radical independence. At the canal itself, workers 
were nervous, union leader Felipe Joseph recalled. “We did not trust our people,” he said. 
“We didn’t have the word ‘maintenance’ in our culture.”
577
 That sense of insecurity lent 
the post-Noriega canal transition efforts an urgency unseen in Panama since the 1977 
treaty signings. “The Panamanians themselves have doubts,” Vallarino conceded in 1994, 
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 Thanks to the commission’s leadership, Panama’s Legislative 
Assembly – on December 25, 1993 – gave initial approval to the constitutional 
amendment establishing the Panama Canal Authority. It was a tremendous feat for 
Panama’s newly democratic government. The commission, however, had not 
independently conjured up the canal administration’s unique structure, or the social 
consensus that provided its legitimacy and sustainability. Acting alone, the commission’s 
recommendations might never have been implemented, given the dramatic changes in the 
presidential palace and legislature that occurred in the middle of the canal policy debate. 
Today’s effective canal governance was not the product of any elite pact. Nor was it 
imposed by the United States, notwithstanding the valuable technical assistance and 
nudging from U.S. canal authorities. Rather, Panama’s canal success is best explained by 





The U.S. invasion rid Panama of Manuel Noriega, destroyed Noriega’s repressive 
armed forces and reintroduced democratic government. But it did nothing to diminish 
social and political polarization. As mentioned, those tensions threatened to convulse 
postwar Panama in 1990, raising basic questions about governability. Panamanians feared 
that the next presidential election, scheduled for May 1994, would provoke a repeat of the 
civil unrest that marred the May 7, 1989 vote, a democratic experiment that ended with 
Noriega’s security forces pummeling opposition candidates in the street, after electoral 
authorities deprived Endara of his victory. Following the U.S. invasion, Panama found 





itself in a state of “decomposition, separation and antagonism,” as Stanley Mushett, 
president of the Universidad Interamericana de Panamá, put it.
579
 Freed of Noriega, 
Panama was still “suffering every type of instability, political, legal, civil liberties,” Ford, 
Endara’s former vice president, recalled.
 
“There was no mechanism for the warring 
parties to sit together respectfully in a dialogue designed to establish guidelines for 
bringing about a grand reunification of the Panamanian family.”
580
 To prevent renewed 
violence, Panama’s Catholic church set up the Commission for Justice and Peace, calling 
together all political parties in pursuit of national reconciliation.
581
 Every major party 
participated, including the Partido Revolucionario Democrático, the former civilian arm 
of the Noriega dictatorship. On May 18, 1993, on the campus of Santa María La Antigua 
University in Panama City, representatives of the political parties signed the Declaration 
of Santa María La Antigua. It committed all Panamanian political actors to support a 
transparent election in 1994; to strengthen Panama’s distrusted Electoral Tribunal; and to 
permit a peaceful transfer of power following the vote, regardless of the winner.
582
 
Signatories included two future presidents, Pérez Balladares and Mireya Moscoso (1999 
to 2004). 
The church dialogue – following a smaller effort led by women’s organizations in 
November 1992 that was later known as “Taboga I,” after the Pacific Ocean island where 
the 50 women leaders gathered – lowered tensions considerably. Following the church 
dialogue, Panamanian political representatives continued to meet every Monday to 
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discuss the upcoming elections.
583
 “The phenomenon of a political dialogue that would 
bring together all the parties was unheard of in Panama’s history.”
584
 Nevertheless, 
Panamanians still regarded free, fair and peaceful elections in 1994 as a long shot. In 
stepped the United Nations. From August 2-3 of 1993, the United Nations Development 
Program’s Panama office brought together political and civil society leaders for further 
discussions – the first formal, multiparty dialogue in the country’s history.
585
 “It pained 
me deeply,” said Victoria Figge, who represented the private sector at the United Nations 
dialogue, “to see how atomized Panama had become.”
586
 In getting involved, the United 
Nations took its inspiration from the 1978 Moncloa Pact, a broad-based political 
agreement in Spain that had advanced that country’s post-Franco democratization.
587
 This 
time, the agenda in Panama focused not only on the upcoming elections, but also sought 
consensus on public policy goals for the next government.
588
 (The United Nations would 
later characterize the dialogue as seeking nothing less than the “re-founding” of 
Panama.
589
) Business leaders, labor activists, clergy and university administrators joined 
the dialogue. To avoid media scrutiny, the United Nations hosted the closed-door 
meetings at the Hotel Bambito, corralling Panamanian elites into a remote mountain hotel 
in Chiriquí province, six hours from Panama City, next to the Barú volcano. The 
gathering’s final declaration listed former Colombian President Belisario Betancur (1982 
to 1986) and former Uruguayan President Julio María Sanguinetti (1985 to 1990, 1995 to 
2000) as official witnesses and noted that the original, signed document would be 
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archived at the United Nations. Signatories included, inter alia, a future president, Pérez 
Balladares, and senior Panamanian canal officials including Manfredo, the future interim 
canal administrator. The agreement had various audiences, designed in part to “offer 
Panamanians and the international community evidence that Panamanians had fully 
assumed their historic responsibilities.” Later known as “Bambito I,” the historic 
dialogue concluded with a broad agreement to: 
 Strengthen Panamanian democracy; 
 Design effective legal and administrative structures for running the 
Panama Canal; 
 Promote economic and social development; 
 Modernize educational and health services; 
 Build consensus regarding the use of reverted land in the former Panama 
Canal Zone; and, 
 Improve government efficiency and judicial independence. 
 
Participants emerged with renewed confidence in Panama’s future. “One of the 
benefits is that we could not kill one another,” Roberto Brenes, who represented the 
Renovación Civilista Party at Bambito I, said.
590
 The following year, a month before the 
May 1994 election, the United Nations convened Bambito II. This time around, 
organizers had a single objective: Persuade presidential candidates to endorse the 
Bambito I declaration. On April 4, 1994, five presidential candidates gathered
591
 – 
including the eventual winner, Pérez Balladares, of the Partido Revolucionario 
Democrático – and signed the Bambito I declaration. Critically, the meeting helped 
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The election went smoothly.
593
 In his final report, U.S. President Jimmy Carter, 
who observed the vote alongside a former Belizean prime minister and a former Costa 
Rican president, called the process an “extraordinary expression of civic participation.” 
Panamanians regarded the free, fair and transparent vote as a major step in the 
reestablishment of Panama’s democracy. But at first sight, the election results seemed to 
imperil the national reconciliation process and Endara’s efforts, led by the Vallarino 
Commission, to plan for the canal transfer. Pérez Balladares’s narrow victory had thrust 
into power a party closely tied to the odious Noriega dictatorship.
594
 There was reason to 
fear not only for Panama’s democracy, but also the future of the proposed constitutional 
reforms regarding the future canal administration. As noted, the previous legislature had 
approved the canal constitutional amendment, but the reforms now needed a second vote 
by lawmakers. Without the new president’s backing, legislative success was doubtful. 
Concerned about the transition process, McMillan, the chairman of the U.S.-led Panama 




From December 4-6, 1994, the United Nations once again called together 
Panamanian elites. The successful election and transfer of power to the political 
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opposition had greatly reduced tensions. The election winners, in office 100 days,
596
 felt 
they had a mandate to pursue their platform without externally imposed compromises or 
obligatory consultations. Still, United Nations organizers hoped a post-election 
conference would institutionalize Panama’s new dialogue process. Pérez Balladares 
reluctantly agreed to address the Bambito III meeting. In his remarks, he expressed 
skepticism about the continued need for a dialogue mechanism. But he mentioned the 
canal among the “major issues on which consensus is needed.”
597
 Reassuringly, he spoke 
of the symbolic value of having a constitutional amendment regarding the canal approved 
by two politically diverse congresses. For the purposes of the United Nations dialogue, 
however, consensus eluded the group. No party leaders signed on to the United Nations 
pledge to make the dialogue a permanent feature of Panamanian public life.
598
 
Nevertheless, on canal matters, Pérez Balladares kept his promise to prioritize 
canal planning and avoid a partisan or unilateral approach. On January 25, 1995, he set 
up his own canal Transition Commission, filling the role of Endara’s Vallarino 
Commission. He also formally endorsed Endara’s constitutional amendment, and 
lawmakers gave it a second and final approval on May 26, 1995. “The approval of the 
constitutional amendment by two congresses whose compositions were diametrically 
opposed, and accepted by two presidents from rival parties, demonstrates the existence of 
the will and determination to put the nation’s interest ahead of electoral rivalries.”
599
 
The United Nations acknowledged the failure of Bambito III. For a time, it 
appeared that Panama had moved on. There remained at least one issue, however, that 
                                                             
596
 Pérez Balladares was sworn-in on September 1, 1994. 
597
 Castillo 2004, p. 21. 
598





called out for collective action: Pérez Balladares’s preparations for running the Panama 
Canal. So despite the onset of political normalcy, on May 8, 1996, the United Nations, 
aided by the Carter Center, again convoked Panama’s leading political and civil society 
actors, this time at the Hotel Coronado. Moscoso, the former candidate and future 
president, declined to participate.
600
 In general, however, the “Encuentros Panamá 2000” 
dialogues – also known as Coronado I, II, III and IV – found participants in an agreeable 
mood. Endara had taken steps to insulate the canal from party politics and enshrine its 
autonomy in Panama’s constitution.
601
 His political rivals and successors embraced that 
effort. In fact, everyone involved in the United Nations dialogues shared the goal of 
establishing an effective canal administration that would inspire confidence in canal 
customers and throughout the international community.
602
 
The United Nations had set up a support group to legitimize the new dialogue, 
and it oversaw three months of discussions on a proposed agenda.
603
 Representatives 
from political parties, labor organizations, women’s and indigenous groups, religious 
sects and others entered into a solemn pact to protect the canal from Panama’s 
dysfunctional domestic politics. Ramón Morales Quijana of the Molirena Party 
(Nationalist Republican Liberal Movement) delivered the plenary address at the opening 
of the Coronado dialogues, arguing that the two essential ingredients of a successful canal 
were “democratic stability” and “the ability to reach, and comply with, a national 
agreement that prevents the politicization of the Panama Canal.”
604
 The Coronado 
dialogues, he said, should work toward the “separation of the canal, its operation and 
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administration from partisan quarrels.”
605
 Representing Panamanian civil society, Mariela 
Arce argued for transparency, saying “the canal is for all Panamanians, too vital to be run 
outside the view of the general population.”
606
 
Pérez Balladares’s continued enthusiasm bolstered the Coronado dialogues. The 
president assigned trusted advisers to participate, including Foreign Minister Ricardo 
Arias; Labor Minister Mitchell Doens; and Adolfo Ahumado, a member of the new 
president’s canal Transition Commission.
607
 Pérez Balladares personally joined the 
discussion, and his “presence left little doubt about the importance that the government 
placed in the event.”
608
 In his remarks, Pérez Balladares said Panama had only 1,315 days 
left to prepare to receive the canal; emphasized the next steps to advance the proposed 
constitutional reform; highlighted the legislative efforts to design the Panama Canal 
Authority; and pledged to submit the draft legislation to all political parties and civil 
society organizations for their input.
609
 He told the gathering:  
“However abysmal are our distances in other areas, I will always be willing to 
freeze those debates to sit together and discuss the future of the canal…. The 
canal does not belong to any political party, and its success is vital for all. No 
Panamanian, much less those who hope to have an important influence on the 




To prove that the canal would not be a partisan prize, Pérez Balladares appointed  
Aléman, the respected engineer who had led the Blue Ribbon Engineering Committee, to 
serve as the Panama Canal administrator starting in 1996.
611
 In contrast to his response to 
the Bambito III gathering, Pérez Balladares publicly celebrated the Coronado dialogue as 
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a “milestone of transcendental importance.”
612
 His vice president, Ricardo Arias 
Calderón, published an op-ed lauding Panama’s “national spirit” to master canal 
administration and oversee an inclusive transition process.
613
 Pérez Balladares committed 
to continued participation in the United Nations Coronado dialogues, and he made sure 
his advisers did the same. When Coronado dialogue participants split into working 
groups, it was Jorge Ritter, chairman of Pérez Balladares’s canal Transition 
Commission,
614
 who lectured an audience of 23 about the Transition Commission’s 
progress.
615
 (Alemán addressed a second working group, in which 19 participants 
discussed the future of the canal. Morales, the opposition leader, led the third working 
group, leading 21 participants in a conversation about governability and Panama’s 1999 
presidential elections.) By the end of the sessions, the Coronado I participants committed 
to: 
1. Exclude party politics from the Panama Canal Authority; 
2. Guarantee merit-based hiring for canal jobs; 
3. Advance public discussions regarding legislation governing canal operations; and, 
4. Provide a joint declaration to the Organization of American States secretary 
general at the Organization of American States General Assembly in Panama June 
5-7, 1996. 
 
After the Coronado participants signed the final declaration, everyone stood to sing 
Panama’s national anthem, many in tears.
616
 The newspaper La Estrella de Panamá, in a 
May 30, 1996 editorial, praised the Coronado process, calling “the return of the canal the 
common denominator” for all Panamanians. The communal canal planning, the 
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newspaper wrote, “managed to dispel suspicions, distrust and doubts that have so often 




The United Nations dialogues continued August 25-27, 1996 (Coronado II), this 
time dedicated to detailed discussions of the proposed canal legislation. Four workshops 
addressed the draft canal law: one on administration, organization and finances; a second 
on operational issues, including tolls; a third on environmental protection in the canal 
watershed; and a fourth on labor relations at the canal.
618
 From September 22-24, 1996 
(Coronado III), the United Nations discussions moved on to the future uses of the vast 
real estate in the former Panama Canal Zone that was gradually falling into Panama’s 
hands. Through all these lengthy philosophical conversations and technical debates, 
Panamanian elites “overcame the anguish of the past and trauma from an immense 
assault on its sovereignty”
619
 and demonstrated a political maturity the country lacked for 
decades, if not its entire history, and that most countries never achieve. For certain, the 
relatively small size of Panama’s elite, and the racial and religious homogeneity of its 
elite,
620
 helped bring about agreement on canal issues. Still, the accomplishment was 
remarkable, particularly in Latin America, a region where political and social consensus 
is rare and distrust is an inescapable cultural attribute. In a demonstration of the profound 
impact of the United Nations dialogues, Panamanian lawmakers on May 14, 1997 passed 
the canal’s basic law. On June 11, 1997, Pérez Balladares signed it into law. Remarkably, 
neither that legislation nor the canal’s constitutional amendment have been touched since 
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their passage. The closest Panama has come to tweaking either foundational document 
was near the end of Alemán’s tenure as canal administrator, when his supporters 
clamored for a relaxation of term limits. He resisted, in a sort of George Washington 
gesture. “We’re just passengers,” he said. The canal needs a “strong system.”
621
 Others 
have followed Alemán’s lead. “Credible accusations of corruption, politicizing or even 
failing to invest sufficiently in the Panama Canal became an electoral kiss of death.”
622
 
The United Nations Development Program takes great pride in its contribution to 
Panama’s preparations for assuming its canal duties. It has repeatedly analyzed and 
memorialized the Bambito and Coronado dialogues. Sadly, in contemporary Panama, the 
dialogues are mostly forgotten, according to Harry Brown, a governability specialist for 
the United Nations Development Program’s Panama program and its unofficial historian. 
However, those who participated in the canal transition process give tremendous credit to 
the dialogues. More than national pride in the canal; or an appreciation of its monetary 
value (“golden goose”); or the fear of losing its budget support (“too-big-too-fail”); or 
admiration for its performance (“if-it-ain’t-broke-don’t-fix-it”), it was these dialogues 
that brought about the Panama Canal’s winning legal and administrative structure and 
created an atmosphere in which Panama could realize its dream of an independent, 
nonpartisan, moneymaking canal. “The political class had the maturity to act correctly,” 
Cardoze, the former canal board member, said.
623
 “It was a triumph for all Panamanians.” 
For that reason, it is difficult, and ultimately misleading, to identify the 
intellectual authors of the canal reforms. The pursuit of the origins of the canal’s 
governing philosophies is an interesting academic challenge. These critical ideas are 
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variously traceable to U.S. canal officials, Panamanian thinkers and foreign state-owned 
enterprises that inspired Panama’s early canal leadership. Ultimately, however, Panama’s 
canal “has no father,” as Aléman put it. “It was the entire Panamanian society.”
624
 I. 
Roberto Eisenmann Jr., who returned from political exile during Torrijos’s rule to 
establish the influential newspaper La Prensa, also credits a virtually simultaneous, 
countrywide agreement on the canal’s future. “Panamanians formed a national consensus 
that telegraphed to all politicians: ‘Don’t fuck around with our canal.’ That’s basically 
what it is. That was something felt throughout the society,” Eisenmann said.
625
 
“Suddenly, the enemy disappeared. Suddenly, we couldn’t blame anyone for our 
failures,” he said. “It’s very easy to blame the gringos for everything wrong with the 
country, but suddenly, the gringos were gone.” 
On July 7, 1997, Ritter, who had led Pérez Balladares’s canal Transition 
Commission, became Panama’s first minister of canal affairs. On December 27, 1997, 
Panama formally established the Panama Canal Authority (to succeed the U.S.-led 
Panama Canal Commission following the canal turnover) and set up its governing board. 
It was still two years before Panama would actually supervise the waterway, but the 
Panamanian board began holding meetings on February 12, 1998. On July 17, 1998, it 
started organizing joint sessions with the binational board of the U.S.-led Panama Canal 
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Commission. By the end of the canal transition process, Panama was no longer cramming 
for an exam the night before. It had reached a national consensus on canal governance, 
institutionalized the transition process and built the constitutional and legislative 
architecture for its future canal administration. To symbolize the seriousness and urgency 
of its preparations, Panama erected a giant digital billboard that counted down the hours, 
minutes and seconds until the December 31, 1999 canal turnover. 
 
Hands Off the Canal 
 
 The result of the post-war United Nations dialogues in Panama is a state-owned 
enterprise with a highly unusual degree of independence, both on paper and in practice. 
The Panama Canal Authority’s constitutional charter describes it as an autonomous legal 
entity with exclusive authority to operate the canal and manage its finances.
626
 It is free of 
most taxes. It is also largely free of Panama’s powerful president; the constitution gives 
the president the power to appoint unilaterally only one member of the Panama Canal 
Authority’s 11-member Board of Directors,
627
 with legislative approval required for the 
president’s nine other board appointees.
628
 (Panama’s unicameral legislature unilaterally 
appoints the eleventh board member.) Board members serve staggered, nine-year terms, 
with three members up for replacement every three years. That limits the influence of any 
particular president, given Panama’s prohibition on reelection following a single, five-
year term. For Vallarino, who led the original canal transition commission under Endara, 
these clever leadership guidelines are almost beside the point. Panama Canal Authority 
board members, he said, “forget who named them as soon as they arrive, where they 
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came from and their political party, and begin to work for the canal.”
629
 That’s important, 
considering the powers of the Board of Directors. The board is invested with quasi-
legislative authority, and the right to set tolls and fees. In addition, the constitution grants 
the canal administration a special, merit-based labor regime that guarantees workers, at 
minimum, the preservation of the perquisites and prerogatives they enjoyed under U.S. 
control.
630
 The canal’s special labor regime even bans strikes, a controversial element in a 
country and region notorious for labor activism. Critically, the canal has complete 
financial independence, insulating it from “the back and forth of the political winds.”
631
 
Its budget is subject to legislative approval, but only by an up-or-down vote that by 
tradition is always up. Consequently, Panamanian lawmakers “have no whip to punish 
the authority,”
632
 Barletta, the former president, said. 
To preserve this operational independence, the canal generates its own electricity, 
pumps its own drinking water and bans its employees from seeking political office.
633
 Its 
leadership is aware that the Panama Canal Authority’s freedoms are not only uncommon 
globally, but also within Panama itself. “They gave the canal authority an autonomy that 
no other institution has,” Benítez, the deputy canal administrator, said.
634
 Outsiders agree. 
“If there is anything that Panamanians got right,” said Uccelli, of J.P. Morgan, it was how 
they “structured management so no government could use this as a cash cow, as the 
current regime in Venezuela does with oil.”
635
 Klein, the Johns Hopkins professor, 
compares the Panama Canal Authority to the charter city model, a radical experiment 
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through which a government promotes economic development by establishing an 
independent city state within its borders, subject to its own or foreign law and free to 
control immigration and other core public policies. Though the Panama Canal Authority 
remains a public entity, Klein said, its structure resembles a concession to a non-profit 
infrastructure operator. It is this robust structure – coupled with a vigilant civil society 
that emerged from the United Nations dialogues – that best explains the canal’s apparent 
incorruptibility. 
 
Show Me The Money 
 
The Panama Canal’s administrative structures are impressive. But any formalistic 
explanation for the canal’s performance – in other words, an excessive focus on its legal 
character – tells only part of the story. The extraordinary political learning expressed in 
the United Nations Bambito and Coronado dialogues gave the canal the breathing room it 
needed to set up its governance model. However, its long-term success also required 
dramatic cultural transformations at the canal administration. Here, as in most cases, 
leadership played a major role. Under the United States, the canal had operated as a 
break-even, hierarchal enterprise, with a quasi-religious dedication to low tolls.
636
 
Panamanians whose careers spanned the canal transfer recalled a “a cult of rank and an 
aversion to change.”
637
 Firings were unheard of. The payroll was bloated. Engineers were 
far more common than business school graduates. 
In a single sentence, the constitutional amendment establishing the Panama Canal 
Authority – Title 13 – demanded a radical rethinking of the canal’s role: “An autonomous 
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legal entity by the name of Panama Canal Authority is hereby established under public 
law, which shall be exclusively in charge of the administration, operation, conservation, 
maintenance and modernization of the Panama Canal and its related activities, pursuant 
to current constitutional and legal provisions in force, in order that it may operate the 
canal in a manner that is safe, continuous, efficient and profitable” (emphasis added).
638
 
The canal’s basic law – No. 19, passed June 11, 1997 – reiterated the canal’s new 
moneymaking character. The purpose of this law “is to furnish the Panama Canal 
Authority with legislation for its organization, operation and modernization to make the 
canal a safe and profitable enterprise, a pillar in the human, social and economic 
development of the country” (emphasis added), Panamanian lawmakers noted in the 
preamble.
639
 In Article 4, lawmakers again hit upon this theme: “The authority shall have 
the exclusive charge of the operation, administration, management, preservation, 
maintenance, improvement and modernization of the canal, as well as its activities and 
related services, pursuant to legal and constitutional regulations in force, so that the canal 
may operate in a safe, uninterrupted, efficient and profitable manner” (emphasis added). 
The canal law cannot be superseded by another law, only directly amended. (As 
mentioned, it also authorizes the canal board, rather than the legislature, to set additional 
canal regulations.) 
Opting for an independent, for-profit business – rather than a traditional state-
owned enterprise that serves as a blunt instrument of industrial policy, charged with 
creating jobs, reducing inflation and subsidizing other state-owned enterprises – was hard 
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enough. Executing that transformation was an even greater challenge. Here, too, the 
Panamanians were not starting from scratch. As mentioned, the U.S.-led Panama Canal 
Commission had made preliminary efforts to ease the transition to a for-profit business 
model. Before the turnover, for example, the Panama Canal Commission established an 
economic research and market planning division.
640
 Late in the U.S. canal era, 
Panamanian canal officials began studying other models, learning from the successes and 
failures of the Tennessee Valley Authority, the Suez Canal, Pemex and other state-owned 
enterprises. Still, the cultural changes, inside and outside the Panama Canal Authority, 
were “of immense magnitude,” according to Vásquez, the canal’s first Panamanian chief 
financial officer.
641
 Prior to the canal turnover, U.S. employees resisted the reforms 
Aléman was implementing in anticipation of the coming Panamanian management. 
“They did not embrace change,” he said, “they wanted everything to stay the same.”
642
 
Outside the canal operations, Panamanians doubted the future Panama Canal Authority 
would maintain the professionalism of the U.S. personnel system. Canal jobs are 
attractive, so the pressure would be significant. In 2002 alone, the authority logged 
67,568 job applicants.
643
 After the U.S. exit, politically connected job seekers deluged 
Aléman. In response, he would send a form letter – to “legislators, presidents, ministers, 
everyone” – coldly detailing the canal’s merit-based hiring process. “There was no 
difference between the person who approached me on the street and the president of the 
republic,” he said.
644
 (In his office in the historic Administration Building, Aléman 
lacked the authority to hire his own secretary or driver.) “There is no political pressure 
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for appointments,” Aléman said, despite a comically large waiting list. Jobseekers who 
asked Lewis, the former vice president and foreign minister, for a leg up also came up 
empty-handed. “I’d say, ‘I’ll do you a big favor. I won’t call, because that would hurt 
your chances.’”
645
 Benítez, the canal’s deputy administrator, is also proud of the 
personnel system. “I don’t have a child working here,” he boasted.
646647
 Similarly, the 
Panama Canal Authority takes great pride in its procurement system. Benítez calls it “a 
pillar” of the waterway. For Sánchez, the head of the canal’s purchasing division, it is a 
model operation. For example, the authority pays contractors within 30 days or it begins 
charging itself interest. That means “no one has to come bribe anyone to get their check,” 
eliminating a common source of corruption.
648
 “We have a no tolerance policy for any 
type of corruption. Zero. If you step out of line and you’re caught, you’re going to get hit 
with a hammer,” Sánchez said. 
 As discussed, the Panama Canal Authority’s personnel and procurement policies 
were largely holdovers from the U.S. era, though their adaptation to Panama’s legal 
system and their dogged preservation are monumental achievements. Meanwhile, 
Panama’s reforms to the U.S. canal operation have been multitudinous, big and small, 
practical and symbolic. Alemán discontinued the free lawn mowing of canal residences, 
encouraged risk-taking and diminished the hierarchical, bureaucratic culture of a onetime 
U.S. military operation.
649
 Early in his tenure, he sought out the opinions of canal 
                                                             
645
 Lewis 2013. 
646
 Benítez August 5, 2013. 
647
 Domínguez, the inspector general, told the author that the canal struggles to avoid the appearance of 
nepotism, given that it has 10,000 employees in a country with only 3 million people and only a small 
percentage of the population is educated enough to handle canal leadership positions. For that reason, 
Domínguez makes a special effort to make sure no one has a no-show job, and enforces rules prohibiting 
relatives from supervising one another. 
648
 Interview by author with Enrique E. Sánchez, Panama City, Panama, August 5, 2013. 
649
 Eisenmann 2013. 
167 
 
employees of all ranks; at one point, he visited cable handlers at 3 a.m. After learning that 
low wage canal workers received toilet paper as part of their compensation because some 
shipowners failed to provide it, he chided union leaders and threatened to charge 
shipowners $10,000 a roll for toilet paper the Panama Canal Authority provided to its 
workers who served aboard transiting vessels. To emphasize the canal’s new business 
approach, he insisted that on the first day of the canal’s revised reservation system, ships 
arriving on time for their reserved crossings be granted expedited access, even though a 
recently sunken tugboat had caused massive delays.
650
 A reservation permits ships to 
avoid the unpredictability of the first-come-first-served system that leaves some ships 
waylaid for days on end waiting to cross. Today, vessels reserve a slot up to a year in 
advance, a popular option for cruise ships, car transporters and container ships. The 
system is also popular with the canal’s bean counters. On August 24, 2006, for example, 




Alemán also instituted an array of new training programs that touched every part 
of the canal’s vast workforce, compensating for the lack of comparable professional 
experiences in a country with little other heavy industry.
652
 On average, canal employees 
are more educated today than at any time in the canal’s history.
653
 From 2000 to 2009, the 
percentage of canal employees lacking a high school diploma fell by 39 percent, and the 
percentage of canal employees with a postgraduate degree tripled.
654
 As part of his 
                                                             
650
 The reservation system, a major source of revenue, permits ship owners to pick a transit time slot up to 
one year in advance, or 18 months in advance for a passenger ship. 
651
 Suárez 2010, p. 165. 
652
 Speech by Gilberto Guardia Fábrega, July 26, 1995, Panama City, Panama. 
653
 Suárez 2010, p. 86. 
654





 Alemán demanded his managers identify quantifiable goals 
and objective measuring tools,
656
 an obsession that has outlived his tenure. Importantly, 
he not only raised tolls – repeatedly and significantly – but he made the canal a price 
discriminator starting in 2002. Under the United States, the amount of cargo determined 
the toll. (In 1928, for example, a swimmer paid just $0.36 to cross the isthmus.) Panama, 
by contrast, began charging different tolls for different types of ships, and started billing 
for all support services, such as for the trains that pull ships through the locks and even 
for each cable that attaches the train to the ship. The result: the Panama Canal has 
become one of the most profitable transportation operations on earth.
657
 
 Alemán’s confidence inspired Panama Canal Authority officials. He “shattered 
the myth that we were incompetent,”
 658
 said Rogelio Gordón, who runs the dredging 
division in Gamboa from an office overlooking the canal, where giant iguanas sunbathe 
on shore and giant container ships lumber by. Alemán’s demanding leadership style 
helped, too. In the dredging division, despite 900 workers and a storied history, managers 
must constantly compete against the prospect of outsourcing. As a result, the division 
focuses relentlessly on its costs, speed and the condition of its machinery. Managers 
assemble every Friday to go over the metrics and scrutinize “dung time” (when 
equipment is out of service). Dredging is a costly and high-stakes function. Following a 
1986 landslide in the Culebra Cut, the canal established an international advisory board 
of geologists to provide guidance, and it has installed sensitive monitors to detect 
potential landslides. The division operates the Titan floating crane, which can lift 350 
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tons and is used to move the lock doors for maintenance; the Goliath crane, with a 
capacity of 100 tons; and a $50 million backhoe dredge, purchased in 2013 and given the 
name “Alemán.” Under Alemán’s leadership, the operations division became similarly 
data-driven. Its managers meet Wednesdays at 7:15 a.m. to evaluate their recent 
performance. There are consequences for employees too. The pilots contract, for 
example, provides bonuses for on-time performance. 
 Many Panamanian institutions trumpet accountability, but the canal authority has 
actually invested deeply in its anti-corruption efforts. The canal’s inspector general, 
Antonio Domínguez,  supervises 55 employees and a $3.5 million budget. To monitor the 
canal expansion, the Panama Canal Authority established a special anti-corruption office, 
opened 18 months before it solicited the first bids for the expansion and populated by 13 
employees who are advised by the consultancies Talson Solutions and Hill International. 
The inspector general’s office is independent of the canal administration, and the 
inspector general himself is appointed by the canal board, not by the canal administrator. 
“Here, no one is safe,” Domínguez said. “If there is any doubt, I investigate.”
659
 
 This all-business approach is supported by the countless U.S. consultancies the 
Panama Canal Authority hires for market analysis and planning, and through close 
contact with the international maritime industry.
660
 An international advisory board also 
helps maintain the canal’s high standards and independence. For all the talk of recovering 
its sovereignty, Panama prudently retained a direct role for foreign experts. Article 19 of 
the canal’s basic law established an advisory board to be appointed by the canal’s Board 
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 The law provided few details about the advisory board’s role, and it is 
mandated to meet just once a year. In practice, the advisory board has turned out to be 
active and influential since the outside advisers first convened on December 13, 1999. 
The members are scholars and recognized experts in transportation, trade, business, 
telecommunications, construction and banking. Their meetings are held in London, 
Miami, Copenhagen, Santiago and Shanghai, and their advice is sought and considered 
by the canal’s Board of Directors. The advisory board chairman, since 1999, is William 
A. O’Neil, the former secretary general of the International Maritime Organization. Other 
members include retired Admiral William J. Flanagan, the former commander of the U.S. 
Atlantic Fleet; Ernst Frankel, a professor at MIT; and Joseph Reeder, the popular former 
chairman of the U.S.-led Panama Canal Commission board, whose presence provides, 
symbolizes and broadcasts both the continuity and change that have been so central to the 
Panama Canal’s recent success. 
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Chapter 5: Off the mark: Examining the historical context, conditions and biases 




How did everyone get everything so wrong? For as long as the U.S. government 
contemplated a canal turnover, critics forecast an aquatic apocalypse. Dire predictions 
coming out of the Panama Canal Zone and the U.S. Congress changed little over the 
decades of debate. As late as 1998 – two years before the turnover – the conservative 
American Enterprise Institute published a 168-page book questioning whether Panama 
could handle independence, let alone the canal.
662
 There were bold warnings from 
boldfaced names like Ronald Reagan, Bob Dole, Jesse Helms and Strom Thurmond. The 
unknown tried to get known by their opposition, among them the U.S. lawmakers Dennis 
DeConcini, Philip Crane and John M. Murphy. For legions of naysayers, handing the 
canal to Panama was as good as dynamiting it. Panamanian neglect would let canal 
infrastructure crumble. Panamanian attention would invite patronage and corruption. 
Communists would infiltrate. Tolls would skyrocket. Terrorists would sabotage. 
None of this occurred, of course, except perhaps the toll increases. That does not 
mean, however, that the critics were wrongheaded or biased, ignorant or imperialists. At 
least not all of them. On the one hand, by the late 1990s, it was far-fetched to expect 
canal operations to go completely off track after the U.S. exit. The transition to 
Panamanian control, as discussed, had churned out a skilled Panamanian workforce. 
Panama had stood up the Panama Canal Authority, with its independence constitutionally 
enshrined and fleshed out in legislation. The United States, egged on by Panama, had 
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poured tens of millions of dollars to upgrade the canal. On the other hand, Panama’s 
history, both before and after independence, understandably fueled skepticism. After all, 
state-owned enterprises had struggled in far larger and richer nations, and Panama’s 
record showed little evidence that it could sustain a complicated, multibillion dollar 
business. 
 
Mettle or Meddled? 
 
 Before Panama stood up to the United States over the Panama Canal, the 
ministate had largely accepted foreign political and economic influences; external factors, 
both positive and negative, seem to act upon the isthmus as naturally, and inevitably, as 
earthquakes.
663
 A Spanish conquistador, Vasco Núñez de Balboa,
664
 discovered Panama 
in 1513. Subsequently, Panama’s economic fortunes were based largely on Spanish trade 
patterns. The Panamanian economy thrived while Spanish goods, toted by mules, passed 
through Panama to South America’s west coast, while New World minerals, like 
Peruvian silver,
665
 passed through Panama headed across the Atlantic to Spain. As global 
trade thrived, boomtown Panama imported 1,000 mules annually to make the four-day 
journey from sea to sea.
666
 Beginning in the 1700s, however, several largely external 
factors left Panama’s economy sputtering: (1) Panama’s overland shortcut faced 
increasing competition, as shippers began plying the sea route around Cape Horn, at the 
southern tip of South America; (2) Spain struggled to defend its overseas territories (such 
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as in 1667, when the Welsh buccaneer Henry Morgan, backed by England, stormed 
Portobelo, Panama’s fortified Caribbean stronghold, and four years later, in 1671, led a 
36-ship armada and 2,000 freebooters in the capture of Panama City, on the Pacific coast, 
which he looted and burned to the ground); (3) Panama’s poor infrastructure and 
expensive mules hurt its competitiveness; and, (4) Peru’s gold production gradually 
declined. Before long, Panama had devolved into a fledgling, abandoned colonial 
outpost.
667
 Even so, Panamanians were reluctant to join the independence movement 
materializing in the region. It was not until November 28, 1821 that Panama seceded 
from Spain. Even then, Panama did not emerge as an independent state. Rather, 
Panamanians joined Simón Bolívar’s Gran Colombia (1819 to 1830), comprising 
Panama, Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela.
668
 Upon Gran Colombia’s dissolution, in 
1830, Panama ended up a Colombian province, not a sovereign state. 
Panamanians chafe at their portrayal as perennial pawns of outside powers, near 
and far. Indeed, following Bolívar’s failed Gran Colombia experiment, Panama 
repeatedly sought to separate from Bogota during the nineteenth century. On its own, 
however, the province was no match for the Colombian forces. Nor was Colombia the 
only distant power influencing Panamanian affairs; in the era of Colombian control, 
Colombian authorities regularly asked the United States to protect their Panamanian 
province from foreign intervention while the Colombian government in Bogota focused 
on internal conflicts. Once Spain was out of the picture, the United States debated 
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Panama’s future internally and with British authorities, with no interest in the opinions of 
Panamanians and the occasional consultations with Colombia resulting in extraordinary 
concessions. On June 3, 1848, the U.S. Senate approved the Bidlack Treaty,
669
 with 
Colombia giving the United States a right-of-way across Panama and naming the United 
States as the guarantor of Panamanian neutrality in the face of British territorial interests. 
Two years later, on April 19, 1850, the United States addressed British ambitions in 
Panama directly; the two countries signed the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty,
670
 forswearing any 
occupations in Central America and pledging joint control over any future canal across 
Panama. Later, the United States persuaded the British to revise that agreement, opening 
the door for unilateral U.S. actions in Panama. 
Panama has also showed signs of economic dependency throughout its history. Its 
first post-colonial economic boom began in 1848, thanks to the Gold Rush in the United 
States and the heightened demand from prospectors commuting between the U.S. East 
and West coasts. In 1850, U.S. investors began construction of a railroad across Panama 
that forever changed Panama’s economy and population demographics. The $9 million 
project had employed 5,000 Caribbeans, mostly from Jamaica, by the time construction 
finished on February 17, 1855.
671
 Between 1856 and 1869, the foreign-owned, 47-mile 
long railroad carried 400,000 passengers,
672
 and helped put Panama back on the map. As 
usual, however, Panama’s economic dependency cut both ways. On May 10, 1869, in the 
United States, the Union Pacific Railroad Company joined the Central Pacific at 
Promontory, Utah, providing an alternative to the Panama railroad. Once again, however, 
                                                             
669
 The treaty is named after the U.S. chargé d’affaires in Colombia, Benjamin Alden Bidlack. 
670
 The treaty is named after Sir Henry Lytton Bulwer, the British minister to Washington, and U.S. 
Secretary of State John M. Clayton. 
671
 Maurer, p. 43. 
672
 Leonard 1993, p. 11. 
175 
 
Panama attracted a foreign economic lifeline. The $260 million French canal-building 
efforts (1879 to 1884) buoyed Panama’s economy. The French effort ultimately failed. 
But fortunately for Panamanians, the United States never lost interest. During the 
Spanish-American War, in 1898, the difficulties faced by Caribbean-bound U.S. ships 
leaving the U.S. West Coast hit home. The American battleship Oregon’s closely 
watched, 68-day journey from San Francisco, Calif. to Key West, Fla. convinced U.S. 
authorities of the urgent need for a water route across Panama. 
Of course, Panama eventually earned its independence, on November 6, 1903. 
However, as discussed, its national liberation was a gift from the U.S. government. Or 
perhaps more accurately, a trade for the famously one-sided Hay-Bunau-Varrila Treaty of 
1904. All in all, it was an inauspicious start for the political independence of independent 
Panama. Panama had appointed a French engineer, Philippe-Jean Bunau-Varilla, as its 
envoy to the United States. Bunau-Varilla owned shares in a firm that controlled the 
remaining assets of the Compagnie Universelle, the French company that had attempted 
unsuccessfully to build a canal in Panama. In his eagerness to unload those assets, Bunau-
Varilla negotiated a treaty that not only gave away the rights to the Panama Canal Zone, 
but turned the whole of Panama into a U.S. protectorate.
673
 To make matters worse, he 
signed the agreement before the Panamanian negotiators had arrived in the United States. 
It showed. Article 1 bluntly declares: “The United States guarantees and will maintain the 
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independence of the Republic of Panama.”
674
 Panama, offered $10 million and a 
$250,000 annual rent,
675
 ratified the treaty without even a Spanish translation.
676
 Next, for 
independent Panama’s first constitution, Panama’s 32-member constituent assembly in 
1904 codified the U.S. right of intervention (Article 136), bowing to U.S. demands.
677
 
Panama also granted the United States primary responsibility for Panama’s defense. “The 
consequence of Panama’s emancipation from Bogota was, therefore, its vassalage to 
Washington.”
678
 In some ways, the situation was even worse than Panama’s subservience 
to Spain and later Colombia; Panama, it turned out, had “traded a weak, inefficient 
oppressor for a large and effective one.”
679
 
Had independent Panama flourished outside the Panama Canal Zone, it might 
have avoided a reputation as a Caribbean basket case. Instead, Panamanian politics were 
chaotic from the start. That instability invited frequent U.S. intervention under the 1904 
Panama Canal treaty, cementing Panama’s international image as incapable of self-
governance. The U.S. military intervened in Panama in 1908, 1912, 1918 and 1925. The 
United States – often invited by one or another group of Panamanian elites – guided 
Panama through countless economic, political and security dramas. To exert further 
influence, U.S. canal authorities reserved 60 middle management positions for 
Panamanian elites.
680
 The United States, which favored Panama’s conservative political 
movement, did not only intervene during crises; U.S. diplomats and U.S. canal authorities 
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supervised Panamanian elections and lobbied lawmakers. In 1916, the U.S. Navy 
confiscated high-powered rifles belonging to Panama’s national police, determining 
locals could not be trusted with that firepower. On another occasion, the United States 
directed Panamanian police to break up meetings of non-U.S. canal employees who were 
organizing to demand higher wages. Not only did the United States guide Panamanian 
politics, but it also kept Panama’s economy afloat through canal wages and the local 
procurement of coffee, cattle, sugar, rum and other products.
681
 (Canal income always 
helped, though it was inconsistent; for example, the end of canal construction and World 
War One bludgeoned Panama’s economy, with the United States laying off thousands of 
canal workers and cutting salaries.) Remarking upon the U.S. role in Panama, a British 
diplomat once observed, “It is really farcical to talk of Panama as an independent state. It 
is really simply an annex of the Canal Zone.” 
 
Arnulfo Arias’s Revolving Door 
 
For better or worse, the United States did not micromanage Panamanian politics. 
Panama’s homegrown political activities also contributed to its image – not uncommon in 
a region that suffered from warlordism and civil conflict after independence – as a 
careless, unsophisticated, hopelessly corrupt society that could not be trusted to manage 
the canal. In Sen. Thurmond’s estimate, Panama recorded  59 president in 70 years,
682
 “a 
game of musical chairs among the nation’s most prestigious families.”
683
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The most symbolic, and notorious, example was Panama’s on-again, off-again 
romance with Arnulfo Arias. In 1940, Panamanians selected as their president Arias, a 
University of Chicago and Harvard Medical School graduate with diplomatic experience 
in Germany and Italy. His leadership style took inspiration from Hitler and Mussolini, as 
did his foreign policy. Critics mocked him as the “Creole Führer.” His constitutional 
reforms curtailed the rights of non-white Panamanians, and his policy platform included 
uniforms for teachers and students; fines for bars where the playlist leaned too heavily on 
foreign musicians; and the forced sale of foreign-owned companies to Panamanian 
investors. Arias’s first term as president lasted just a year; in 1941, while he was in Cuba 
visiting his mistress, opponents forced him from office and briefly jailed him, before 
permitting him to leave Panama for Managua, Nicaragua, and later settle in Buenos 
Aires, Argentina. In 1949, Arias regained the presidency. This time around, it was Arias’s 
corruption and nepotism, more than his nationalism and racism, that raised eyebrows. 
Arias liberally appointed relatives to public jobs;
684
 forced banks to approve personal 
loans; bullied political opponents to sell assets cheaply; and seized Panama’s largest 
coffee plantation. Soon, Panamanian elites once again tired of Arias’s rule. On May 10, 
1951, the Panamanian legislature impeached Arias. After he refused to step down, 
Panamanian police, in a bloody raid, forcibly evicted him and 500 of his supporters from 
the presidential palace and jailed him for a year. Remarkably, impeachment and 
imprisonment did not end Arias’s political career. In 1968, he won the Panamanian 
presidency for the third time. His third term, however, lasted just 11 days; on October 11, 
1968, Panama’s National Guard deposed Arias and installed a military dictatorship. In 
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Arias’s three terms as president,
685
 he had only managed to spend two and a half years in 
office, while logging two years in jail and 15 years in exile. 
 
Too Close for Comfort 
 
 Panama’s unhappy relationship with the United States also contributed to the 
jaundiced view in the United States of the Panamanian government and people, and the 
lack of confidence in Panama’s capacity to replace the United States as the canal’s 
caretaker. In many ways, the U.S.-Panamanian relationship was doomed from the start. 
The U.S. government sought credit for delivering Panamanian independence, building the 
canal that put the new republic on the map, and providing an economic lifeline. So 
Panama’s constant griping and chronic underdevelopment did not endear Panamanians to 
the U.S. public. Panamanians, not surprisingly, saw things differently. In their view, the 
United States had strong-armed a tiny country into trading away 500 square miles of its 
most valuable land, and then ignored its pleas for justice for generations. 
 It is doubtful that most Americans ever reflected on the U.S. relationship with 
Panama, at least not until President Jimmy Carter came along. Now and again, however, 
Panama found its way into U.S. newspapers, and it was rarely a friendly headline. 
Panama began protesting the 1904 canal treaty almost immediately, particularly the broad 
rights granted to the United States. Article III of the agreement, for example, promised 
the United States all rights in the Panama Canal Zone that it would have enjoyed “if it 
were the sovereign of the territory within which said lands and waters are located, to the 
entire exclusion of the exercise by the Republic of Panama of any such sovereign rights, 
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 As buyer’s remorse set in, President Theodore Roosevelt (1901 to 
1909) sought to reassure Panama that the United States had no intention of establishing a 
colony in Panama.
687
 In a letter to Secretary of War William Howard Taft instructing Taft 
to visit Panama to ease tensions, Roosevelt said Panamanians had become “unduly 
alarmed” by the institutionalization of the U.S. presence in the Panama Canal Zone.
688
 
Despite the admittedly generous terms of the treaty, Roosevelt assured Taft, “it is our full 
intention that the rights which we exercise shall be exercised with all proper care for the 
honor and interests of the people of Panama.”
689
 
 It is hard to find a Panamanian who believes the United States lived up to 
Roosevelt’s promise. Rather, Panamanians generally saw the U.S. presence in Panama, 
for all the economic advantages, as deeply irritating. Now and again, U.S. authorities 
acknowledged Panamanian discontent, usually following a public outburst against the 
U.S. canal authorities. On March 2, 1936, Franklin D. Roosevelt (1933 to 1945), 
Theodore Roosevelt’s cousin, applied his “Good Neighbor” policy to Panama and agreed 
to modify the 1904 canal treaty. Satisfied with the results of 110 negotiating sessions,
690
 
Roosevelt, in the Hull-Alfaro Treaty, relinquished the controversial U.S. right to 
intervene in Panamanian affairs. To support Panamanian merchants, Roosevelt also 
agreed to reduce sales from the Panama Canal Zone’s duty free commissaries to 
Panamanian citizens. The agreement, signed by U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull and 
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Panama’s foreign minister, Ricardo Alfaro, also increased the Panama Canal Zone annual 
rent from $250,000 to $430,000. 
However, in a pattern that would persist for decades, U.S. officials did not trust 
their Panamanian counterparts, and so U.S. concessions did little to repair the bilateral 
relationship. For example, in 1945, at the Potsdam conference,
691
 President Harry S. 
Truman (1945 to 1953) mused about transferring the Panama Canal to UN control, but he 
dismissed any plan to let Panama take charge. “The United States did not trust 
Panamanian governments. If a future Panamanian government was likely to have malign 
intent – or be unable to operate the canal efficiently, which was very close to the same 
thing – thereby forcing the United States to intervene again, why leave in the first place 
and risk the collateral damage?”
692
 U.S. officials continued to show some flexibility. On 
January 25, 1955, the United States, under President Dwight D. Eisenhower (1953 to 
1961), once again agreed to modify the canal relationship. This time, the United States 
increased the Panama Canal Zone annual rent from $430,000 to $1.9 million; completely 
restricted commissary sales to U.S. personnel; permitted Panama to tax Panamanians 
employed by the U.S. canal administration; and ended a policy that linked canal 
employee salaries to nationality. Eisenhower was no doubt spooked by Egypt’s 
nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956, and statements by Egyptian President Gamal 
Abdel Nasser (1956 to 1970) calling on the UN to take over the Panama Canal.
693
 
Following anti-American riots in Panama in 1959, Eisenhower succumbed to 
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Panamanian demands to fly the Panamanian flag in the Panama Canal Zone in 
recognition of Panama’s “titular sovereignty” over the U.S.-controlled territory. 
Still, tensions remained high. For one, Panama continued to complain about the 
paltry Panama Canal Zone annual rent, insisting the United States could afford to be 
more generous if only it would reconsider its rigid canal toll policy. After all, the canal 
had dramatically reduced the cost of freight – the rate between Liverpool, England and 
the U.S. West Coast had fallen by 27 percent by 1920,
694
 for example – but the United 
States refused to raise tolls for 60 years. For Panama, it was clear that the United States 
was subsidizing U.S. companies, such as southern California oil drillers and Pacific 
Northwest lumber mills, at Panama’s expense.
695
 (Other canal users also benefited, 
including Japanese importers of U.S. cotton and Chile’s nitrate and copper exporters.) 
Ships sailing between the East and West Coasts of the United States saved 8,000 nautical 
miles by avoiding the trip around Cape Horn. Meanwhile, Panama settled for the crumbs 
of the canal industrial complex. The United States prohibited Panama from taxing non-
Panamanian canal employees,
696
 or the wide array of goods and services sold at Panama 
Canal Zone commissaries, including a wholesale dry goods store; cigar shops; a tailor; an 
ice cream factory; hotels; coaling stations; fruit and produce farms; a coffee roaster; 
stables; a printer; a milk bottling plant; a sausage factory; a pickling department; and 
even a cattle ranch and slaughterhouse.
697
 Before Eisenhower, these Panama Canal Zone 
businesses had served not only canal employees, but also contractors and even transiting 
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 That unpopular practice not only deprived Panama of tax revenue, but it 
also diverted business from Panamanian competitors outside the Panama Canal Zone, 
who had to pay taxes and did not enjoy subsidized fares on the Panama Canal Railroad.
700
 
(For the United States, by contrast, the commercial enterprises had the benefit of 
employing the growing number of offspring of canal employees.
701
) There were other 
economic sources of tension. Canal zone housing competed with Panamanian-owned 
apartments. U.S. canal workers enjoyed a 25 percent wage differential and received 
payment in gold, rather than the silver coins distributed to Panamanian and Caribbean 
canal workers. The canal zone geography also frustrated Panama, limiting the expansion 
of the terminal cities, Colón and Panama City. The economic inequality was awkward; an 
archbishop of Panama, Marcos McGrath, once observed that Panama’s “teeming 
tenements face across the street a fence and open fields or virgin jungles, space unused, 
space reserved, space denied.” As the United States developed the Panama Canal Zone 
territory, Panama itself remained “a jungle and farm area athwart the U.S. canal zone.”
702
 
Panamanians also chafed at the presence of so many U.S. troops. The 1904 canal 
treaty had assured U.S. rights to deploy U.S. troops to defend the canal and even to 
establish fortifications for that purpose.
703
 Still, it was clear the United States was 
liberally interpreting that mandate: During World War Two, for example, the U.S. armed 
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forces established the U.S. Southern Command
704
 in the Panama Canal Zone, with an 
explicit responsibility for all of Latin America. In 1946, the United States opened the 
School of the Americas in the canal zone, offering training to security forces from across 
the hemisphere.
705
 Panama considered these and other U.S. military facilities illegal.
706
 
U.S. military construction in the zone peaked during World War Two, when the United 
States built 134 defense installations.
707
 By the late 1970s, however, the United States 
still had seven bases in the Panama Canal Zone,
708
 housing 9,300 personnel. The canal, 
meanwhile, has never come under attack, by Panamanians or foreigners (though during 
World War Two, the Japanese planned a submarine assault on the waterway that would 
have involved the 400-feet long, I-400 megasub).
709
 
In 1958, the president’s brother, Milton Eisenhower, traveled to Panama to 
evaluate the situation. One hundred angry high school students protested his visit at the 
U.S. Embassy, one holding a sign demanding, “Milton, Go Back to U.S.A.”
710
 He 
returned warning his brother of an “impending disaster.”
711
 Indeed, Panamanians were 
soon registering their grievances on the street yet again; on November 3, 1959, 
Panamanian independence day, a group of protestors marched toward the canal zone, 
while others torched cars, tore down the U.S. flag at the U.S. Embassy,
712
 and shattered 
embassy windows with stones. The U.S. Congress was not amused. Predisposed to 
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oppose Panamanian demands, bolstered by public opinion and unmoved by Panamanian 
attempts at intimidation, the House of Representatives voted 380 to 12 for a resolution 
opposing the Panamanian demand for Panama’s flag to fly in the canal zone.
713
 
Once again, however, the United States sought to address Panamanian frustration, 
though still without satisfying Panama’s core demands or building trust between the two 
countries: On September 21, 1960, the United States raised the Panamanian flag at Shaler 
Triangle,
714
 on Fourth of July Avenue, by Panama’s Legislative Palace.
715
 The goodwill 
gesture left Panama’s new president, Roberto Chiari (1960 to 1964), with plenty of 
unresolved grievances, which he expressed in a lengthy letter to President John F. 
Kennedy (1961 to 1963) in September 1961. That letter prompted Kennedy to order the 
State Department to review U.S. canal policy.
716
 Kennedy never called for a new canal 
treaty, but in a classified memorandum to his secretary of state, Dean Rusk, Kennedy said 
the United States “must recognize, however, that this question cannot be postponed 
indefinitely.”
717
 Later, Kennedy invited Chiari to Washington, and the two leaders met in 
June 1962. Following their conversation, Kennedy replaced the canal governor and set up 
a task force to study the issue and advise a binational commission that had been 
established to improve relations. In a classified memorandum, he told Rusk, Defense 
Secretary Robert S. McNamara and Secretary of the Army Elvis Jacob Stahr Jr. that he 
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expected “concrete results” from the policy review.
718
 Kennedy’s interest in the subject 
reflected not only Chiari’s persistence, but also the constant threat of unrest in Panama.  
On February 22, 1963, Chiari had warned Kennedy that the slow pace of negotiations 
“makes me fear that at any moment, given the favorable circumstances, it might lead to 
dangerous poplar demonstrations.”
719
 Around the same time, a National Security Council 
aide, James S. Lay Jr., distributed a memorandum warning his White House colleagues of 
the threat of sabotage at the Panama Canal amid rising nationalism in Panama and a 
desire among Panamanian leaders to use the United States as a “whipping boy.” A senior 
State Department official, Executive Secretary William H. Brubeck, expressed a similar 
concern to National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy in a classified July 17, 1963 
memorandum: “There are signs that the Government of Panama may soon feel itself 
obliged to engage in precipitous action which might disrupt the calm which now prevails 
in our relationship.” However, despite his exchanges with Chiari and the specter of 
violence, Kennedy did not agree to revise the 1903 canal treaty. In a letter to Chiari dated 
April 30, 1962, Kennedy promised only “interim measures” to improve the diplomatic 
relationship.
720
 For example, he agreed to build a bridge over the canal, a longtime 
Panamanian demand, and increased the locations in the Panama Canal Zone where 
Panama could fly its flag. After his death on November 22, 1963, it became clear that 
Kennedy’s approach had only raised Panamanian expectations and worsened the 
relationship. 
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Panamanian Powder Keg 
 
Not long after the Kennedy assassination, on December 30, 1963, the canal zone 
governor, Robert J. Fleming Jr., announced new flag regulations. This time, it was poor 
enforcement that led to the next clash. Fleming’s policy prohibited any flags at the 1,851-
student Balboa High School. But on January 7, 1964, U.S. students raised the stars and 
stripes and soon afterward, other U.S. flags were flying in undesignated areas throughout 
the zone.
721
 Panamanian students at the Instituto Nacional bristled at the loss of the hard-
fought flag concessions. On January 9, 1964, they marched on the zone. At 4:45 p.m., 
after class let out, 200 Panamanian students poured onto Gorgas Road and headed toward 
Fleming’s residence, where they shouted slogans and sang the Panamanian national 
anthem.
722
 That group met no resistance, but other students who headed for Balboa High 
School encountered Panama Canal Zone police and U.S. students who belted out the U.S. 
national anthem and prevented the raising of the Panamanian flag. The young 
Panamanians retreated; as they marched off, they pelted the nearby Panama Canal 
Administration Building with stones, shouting, “You will live to regret this.”
723
 That 
night, as news of the altercation spread, thousands of Panamanian protestors again headed 
down Fourth of July Avenue toward the canal zone. Never was heard a discouraging 
word from Panama’s National Guard, despite pleas from U.S. authorities, and soon the 
mob was attacking a U.S. judge’s residence with rocks and Molotov cocktails; setting fire 
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 Overwhelmed, the Panama Canal Zone police asked for help from the Southern 
Command. The U.S. armed forces eventually restored calm inside the zone, and 
Panama’s National Guard finally stopped the rioting outside the zone, on January 13, 
1964. But by then, the damage was catastrophic: (1) U.S. security forces had killed 22 
Panamanians, including 20-year-old Ascanio Arosemena, the captain of the soccer team 
at the Escuela Profesional and an instant martyr for Panamanian activists; (2) looters in 
Panama City had ransacked a U.S.-run library, burning 12,000 books, destroyed buildings 
belonging to U.S. companies, such as Pan American Airways, and set upon cars with 
Panama Canal Zone license plates, in some cases beating their occupants; (3) 
Panamanian snipers on the Atlantic side of the canal had fatally shot Pvt. David Haupt, 
Staff Sgt. Luis Jimenez Cruz and Sgt. Gerald Aubin;
725
 (4) and the 1,000 bullets 
Panamanians had fired into the zone,
726
 coupled with the protestors’ rocks, bottles and 
clubs, had injured many other U.S. nationals. On January 17, 1964, Chiari broke 
diplomatic relations with the United States. Predictably, the United States did not react 
well to the riots, or to Panama’s hard line approach in the aftermath. The Senate minority 
leader, Everett Dirksen, warned on the Senate floor that “we are in the amazing position 
of having a country with one-third the population of Chicago kick us around. If we 
crumble in Panama, the reverberations of our actions will be felt around the world.”
727
 
Kennedy’s successor, Lyndon B. Johnson (1963 to 1969), had a similar reaction to the 
riots and Chiari’s aggressive posture. “Having failed through diplomacy with President 
Kennedy, Chiari was going to try to exact a new treaty from me by force,” Johnson 
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recalled in his memoirs.
728
 To observers outside the U.S. government, the prospects for a 
new canal treaty also appeared remote. “No one can expect the United States to walk 
away and leave millions of dollars in military, naval and air force installations in the 




LBJ, Nixon, Ford 
 
Despite the growing disdain for Panama in the United States, layered atop the 
general mistrust of the Panamanian people, Johnson quickly sent a delegation to address 
the diplomatic impasse. By April 3, 1964, he had persuaded Chiari to restore diplomatic 
relations. In a statement that day, Johnson said, “Panama can be confident, as we are 
confident, that we each desire an agreement which protects the interests and recognizes 
the needs of both our nations.” For the first time, the U.S. government began serious 
negotiations over replacing the 1903 Panama Canal treaty. In a televised address in 
December 1964, Johnson publicly committed to a new treaty.
730
 He appointed Robert B. 
Anderson, Eisenhower’s former treasury secretary, as his special representative to the 
Panama talks, and he made sure negotiations continued after Panamanian President 
Marco Robles (1964 to 1968), a Chairi ally, took office. A classified summary of a U.S. 
government Panama working group meeting, dated July 29, 1963, noted continued U.S. 
opposition to a major revision of the canal treaty. Nevertheless, on December 18, 1964, 
Johnson once again publicly committed to a “new treaty.”
731
 Johnson’s politically risky 
approach opened the door to three tentative agreements with Panama, reached in 1967, 
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that promised U.S. supervision of canal operations would cease in 1999; in the interim, 
according to the agreements, a binational commission would run the waterway. The 
progress was promising; indeed, in broad terms, President Jimmy Carter’s canal treaties, 
a decade later, would mirror the terms of Johnson’s tentative 1967 agreements. Johnson 
was so interested in the canal issue that he personally lobbied members of Congress for 
support.
732
 Ultimately, however, the U.S. Senate never considered the agreements, as 
Johnson was replaced by Nixon in the United States and in Panama, Arnulfo Arias 
returned to power for his short-lived final term. 
Despite the progress under Johnson and Robles, the stage was set for a return to 
the traditional tension and dysfunction of the U.S.-Panamanian relationship. Panamanian 
hardliners had immediately criticized the Johnson agreements. Then, Panamanians in 
1968 yet again elected the controversial Arnulfo Arias. His election destabilized 
Panamanian politics, leaving no opportunity for serious negotiations over the canal to 
resume. In the United States, where Johnson had opted out of the 1968 election, U.S. 
officials had no love for Arias. Yet Arias’s removal, in the October 11, 1968 National 
Guard coup, did not improve the bilateral relationship. For one, the United States 
objected to Arias’s undemocratic removal; Secretary of State Dean Rusk called the coup 
“disturbing,”
733
 and the United States granted Arias and his cabinet asylum in the Panama 
Canal Zone and later settled him in Florida, after no Latin American governments offered 
to take him in.
734
 In the middle of all this, Panama’s new leader, Omar Torrijos, came to 
power with little warmth or trust for the United States. Torrijos had never held the United 
States in high regard; as a boy, he witnessed U.S. police officers bullying his mother as 
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they crossed the Panama Canal Zone. U.S. support for the ousted Arias put Torrijos 
immediately at odds with the United States. If the U.S. government attempted to reinstate 
Arias, Torrijos warned, he would “burn the canal zone”
735
 – the first in a steady stream of 
threats he would send northward. In December 1969, while Torrijos vacationed in 
Mexico, three officers attempted a coup, and Torrijos later blamed the United States after 
the failed coup plotters escaped to Miami.
736
 
 Torrijos, a ruggedly handsome soldier and populist leader, managed to win fans in 
the United States and abroad. His grandiosity felt somehow too large for diminutive 
Panama, so he obsessively wooed international figures. The leftist novelist Gabriel 
García Márquez was a fan, but so was the conservative U.S. intellectual William F. 
Buckley Jr., who visited Panama in 1976 and became a surprisingly vocal backer of a 
canal turnover.
737
 John Wayne, a frequent traveler to Panama for fishing trips – his first 
wife was Panamanian – also endorsed the canal turnover. At one point, the legendary 
actor issued a three-page statement about the canal that he sent to every U.S. senator,
738
 
provoking the first hate mail of his career. Wayne was apparently embarrassed by the 
relentless mockery of Panama by U.S. elites.
739
 On at least one occasion, he traveled to 
Panama to help Torrijos entertain visiting U.S. senators,
740
 and he drafted letters and op-
eds defending the canal turnover. In a letter to Reagan, dated November 11, 1977 and 
addressed to “Ronnie,” Wayne accused the former California governor of “misinforming 
people” and demanded that he “take a look at the difference between point of view and 
                                                             
735
 Jorden 1984, Introduction. 
736
 Ibid., p. 146. 
737
 Ibid., p. 459. 
738
 Ibid., p. 490. 
739
 William Furlong and Margaret Scranton, The Dynamics of Foreign Policymaking: The President, the 
Congress and the Panama Canal Treaties (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984), p. 153. 
740





 Starting in 1976, the British novelist Graham Greene also began visiting 
Torrijos in Panama, invited by Torrijos, who furnished first class tickets.
742
 After several 
trips, Greene had “grown to love” the general whom he called “Omar” and whose 
friendship he described in a flattering memoir, “Getting to Know the General: The Story 
of an Involvement.”
743
 Greene admired Torrijos’s modest lifestyle; the general dressed in 
military fatigues, lived in an “insignificant suburban house,”
744
 and settled for Johnnie 
Walker Black label.
745
 He was also impressed by Torrijos’s optimism – Greene called it a 
“charisma of near despair” – throughout Panama’s David and Goliath struggle. Most 
often, Greene spent his visits downing cups of rum punch and palling around with 
Torrijos’s entourage in Panama City. But he also traveled to the countryside, observing 
Torrijos in dialogue with yucca farmers and concluding that Panama’s dictatorship was a 
superior brand of democracy. For Greene, Torrijos’s attention seemed to have the same 
effect as the candy Torrijos handed out to village children: Torrijos, Green gushed in his 
memoir, “grasped at friendship as greedily as he grasped at books, as though there were 
too little time left for him to catch up on either.”
746
 Later, for the signing of the Carter-
Torrijos Panama Canal treaties in Washington, Greene and Márquez both accompanied 
Torrijos, where Torrijos read a speech Greene helped write.
747
 
Torrijos also had fans in the White House. Kissinger admired Torrijos’s 
brinkmanship, how he “tended to play with fire, but knew at every step exactly where the 
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fire brigade could be found.”
748
 Following Carter’s election, Torrijos forecast a “great 
and profound friendship” with the new U.S. president,
749
 who shared his rural 
upbringing.
750
 Indeed, the unlikely pair developed a trusting relationship. (Carter also 
drew close to Torrijos’s ambassador to the United States, Gabriel Lewis Galindo, a paper 
box magnate and the developer of Contadora Island.
751
 Lewis was a constant presence in 
the Oval Office and the halls of Congress. He and his wife were also the pit crew for 
Panama’s canal negotiators, whom they fueled on Saturdays with platters of liver with 
onions, and scrambled eggs with tomatoes.
752
) “Panama without Torrijos most likely 
would have been an impossible negotiating partner,” Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter’s 
national security adviser, said.
753
 Carter called Torrijos “the most effective salesman” for 
the canal treaties.
754
 “The more my colleagues and I learned about this man, the greater 
the respect and affection we had for him,” he said.
755
 “No one could have handled the 
affairs of Panama and its people more effectively than had this quiet and courageous 
leader.”
756
 At a White House meeting on September 6, 1977, Vice President Walter 
Mondale presented Torrijos a baseball bat signed by Rod Carew, the famed Panamanian 
infielder on the Minnesota Twins.
757
 Carter’s canal negotiator, Sol M. Linowitz, also 
showered praise on Torrijos, an “intuitive politician of great native intelligence, in his 
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own way a philosopher.”
758
 Torrijos’s meetings with U.S. officials often involved bear 
hugs. 
Torrijos was not, however, an unblemished spokesman for Panama’s cause. He 
could be “callous and dictatorial,”
 759
 exiling opponents in the business community, 
quashing free speech and sanctioning arbitrary imprisonment and torture by his feared G-
2 intelligence agency. He abolished political parties and stripped the congress and 
presidency of real authority. William Jorden, a U.S. ambassador to Panama who worked 
closely with Torrijos, called the general “tough, shrewd, egotistical, ill-educated, 
charismatic, incredibly patient, yet often volatile.”
760
 Torrijos was “not highly organized, 
hated meetings, despised detail,” Jorden observed, and he “loved to drink and 
carouse.”
761




 took meetings in a 
hammock
764
 and enjoyed holding court in his bedroom, a Cuban cigar and Scotch and 
soda in hand.
765
 Outsiders who knew him best remembered him as a “moody, 
introspective, emotional man,”
766
 a “complicated mix of good and bad, of openness and 
mystery, sophistication and naiveté,”
767
 an “unusual, erratic, sensitive, ill-educated, 
brilliant man.”
768
 He was a spendthrift whose populist policies indebted Panama. He was 
highly emotional. Before the Carter-Torrijos treaty signing, standing backstage with the 
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U.S. president, Torrijos sobbed in his wife’s arms.
769
 To Reagan, Torrijos was always a 
“tinhorn dictator.”
770
 Regarded at home as a patriot, outsiders saw a power grab in 
Torrijos’s canal obsession. “Torrijos and those entrenched in power in Panama covet the 
well drained and manicured real estate across the divisory line, which they hope will 
become their personal property when a new protocol is signed,” one historian, Gustave 
Anguizola, wrote. Anguizola borrowed a line from a scout for Bolívar, who had said of 
Panama in 1826: “Here one lives in constant turmoil.”
771
 Some even questioned whether 
Torrijos truly wanted a treaty with the United States, as opposed to a politically useful, 
permanent conflict. Nor could supporters of the canal turnover try to minimize Torrijos’s 
influence over Panamanian affairs: A portrait of Panama’s “maximum leader” hung in 
every restaurant, bar, airport, hotel and store in the country.
772
 Though focused on solving 
minor problems for isolated Indians in remote regions, Torrijos was clearly impatient for 
a grand achievement; “I don’t want to enter into history, only the Panama Canal Zone,” 
he was fond of saying. 
Torrijos’s eccentricities and peccadilloes were hardly Panama’s only public 
relations headaches. Torrijos was also a loose cannon in his foreign policy. In 1974, for 
example, he recognized Cuba’s communist government, antagonizing U.S. policymakers 
who had hoped to isolate the Castro regime. Next, Torrijos joined the Non-Aligned 
Movement
773
 and also traveled to Cuba, arriving on January 10, 1976 and hugging Castro 
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at the airport. (In appreciation, Castro kept Torrijos supplied with Cuban cigars with 
Torrijos’s name printed on the band.
774
) In April 1977, Torrijos added Libya to his travel 
agenda, meeting with Muammar el-Qaddafi
775
 and inviting charges of anti-Semitism. 
Torrijos’s entourage made the situation worse. He kept his controversial intelligence 
chief, Manuel Noriega, by his side. Torrijos’s confidante and chief canal negotiator, 
Rómulo Escobar Bethancourt, the rector of the University of Panama, was a communist, 
and a rabidly anti-American sycophant.
776
 In his memoirs, he called the Panama Canal 
Zone “unparalleled in the history of the iniquities of colonialism,”
777
 and accused the 
United States of depriving Panama of the canal’s economic advantages, though Panama 
had “lent her womb for the construction of this passage.”
778
 Torrijos’s legal adviser for 
the canal negotiations, Adolfo Ahumada, was also a communist.
779
 Sen. Helms summed 
up Torrijos’s inner circle as “mercurial, Marxist, anti-American.” 
“Working with Torrijos required fancy footwork by the United States. His vanity 
and machismo had to be fed, his spending spree financed, his forays into 
international organizations parried and his constantly shifting image filtered for 
U.S. consumption. In the early 1970s, these tasks were simple enough, but by 




Torrijos’s goal was to constantly pressure the United States to focus on the canal 
negotiations. But he was clearly wary of provoking too strong a response from 
Washington. For example, for his controversial Cuba trip, Torrijos sent Nicolás Ardito 
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Barletta, his U.S.-educated minister of economic planning, to Havana as part of the 
delegation, and also dispatched representatives of the Panamanian private sector. Still, 
Torrijos’s bombastic and confrontational style, not to mention his heavy drinking, eroded 
confidence in Panama’s ability to manage the canal. Despite Panama’s size, Torrijos was 
oddly (or perhaps brilliantly) convinced he could intimidate the United States through the 
combination of threatened violence and international opprobrium.
781
 Through the years, 





1. On April 15, 1974, in a meeting with Vice President Gerald Ford at the Old 
Executive Office Building, the Panamanian foreign minister said, “I believe that 




2. To motivate Lewis, Panama’s ambassador to the United States, to take a hard line 
in the canal negotiations, Torrijos once said, “the Panamanian people are a great 
ocean and the canal is a fish. The ocean can live without the fish, but the fish can’t 
live without the ocean” (emphasis added).
786
 
3. When negotiations with Panama floundered, U.S. Ambassador to Panama 
William Jorden warned that the U.S. Embassy would have to “batten down the 
hatches, fasten the seatbelts and stay away from outside windows”
787
; indeed, in 
September 1975, Panamanian protestors hurled rocks, bricks, bottles and Molotov 
cocktails at the embassy.
788
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4. “Patience has its limits,” Torrijos once said. “We are now following the peaceful 




5. Later, bombs exploded in the Panama Canal Zone, including three in a 48-hour 
period. 
 
Torrijos’s international allies tried a similar approach. Referencing the Panama Canal 
Zone, the Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev (1953 to 1964), warned the United States to 
“get out before you are tossed out.”
790
 
 Amid all of Torrijos’s tough talk and amateurish behavior, the U.S. government 
got serious about the canal negotiations again. It was not, however, out of any newfound 
confidence in Panama’s managerial knowhow or a belief that Panama could eventually 
master canal administration. Rather, several factors had collectively reduced the 
perceived importance of the canal to the United States: 
 
1. Following World War Two – when more than 10,000 U.S. military vessels 
had crossed the canal, including 17 battleships and 29 aircraft carriers
791
 – 
the United States abandoned its plan for a one ocean Navy, investing in 
separate Atlantic and Pacific fleets that would not rely upon the canal. The 
United States also began and constructing ships, beginning with the 




2. The United States did not want its nuclear submarines to transit the locks, 
which requires surfacing; 
3. The U.S. interstate highway system made transatlantic ground 
transportation cheaper; 
4. Economic and population growth on the West Coast increased demand for 
West Coast products, reducing coast-to-coast commerce;
793
 
5. Successive increases in U.S. foreign aid to Panama, designed to placate 
the restive Panamanian public, had made operating the canal increasingly 
costly, and justifiable only on the grounds that Panama could not be 
trusted to take the reins; 
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7. Post-Panamax ships – commercial vessels too large for the canal locks – 
were emerging from shipyards. 
 
 In this context, President Richard Nixon (1969 to 1974), a Republican, decided to 
address the canal issue, a “time bomb” he had inherited from Johnson. Nixon, who feared 
potential sabotage of the canal by terrorists, appointed a respected, retired diplomat, 
Ellsworth Bunker, as his canal negotiator, following Bunker’s six-year assignment as the 
U.S. ambassador to South Vietnam. (Bunker was familiar with Panama from his 
participation in the diplomatic negotiations following the 1964 flag riots,
795
 when he 
served as the U.S. ambassador to the Organization of American States.) In October 1970, 
Nixon met Panamanian President Demeterio Lakas – a friend of Torrijos who was known 
as “Jimmy” and kept a Thomson submachine gun at his bedside
796
 – in the Rose Garden 
and echoed Johnson’s commitment to a new canal arrangement. At Nixon’s urging, 
negotiations resumed in earnest. At the time, Panama shared U.S. concerns over 
Panama’s ability to run the canal; the country lacked specialists qualified for an array of 
technical tasks, including pilots, hydraulic engineers and dredging experts. In the talks, 
Panama quickly accepted a phased ownership transition designed to prevent “chaos,” in 
the words of Carlos López Guevara, a Panamanian negotiator whose sister, Flor, was 
married to Torrijos’s older brother, Moises.
797
 The Bunker-led negotiations were 
generally cordial; the U.S. diplomat brought maple syrup from his Vermont farm for his 
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 Still, the two sides were far apart on the length of the 
ownership transition, with the United States pushing for five more decades in charge, 
more than double the period Panama would accept.
799
 As a result, Torrijos again turned to 
intimidation and international pressure. Inspired by the growing influence of the 
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries,
800
 Torrijos, in January 1972, sent 
Panamanian Foreign Minister Juan Antonio Tack and U.N. Ambassador Aquilino Boyd 
to Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to condemn the United States before the UN Security Council. 
In his remarks, Boyd compared the U.S. presence in Panama to colonialism in Africa, and 
he warned that “the danger of a violent confrontation between Panamanians and North 
Americans grows every day.”
801
 Boyd’s U.S. counterpart, George H. W. Bush, chided 
Panama for deviating from the meeting agenda, but Boyd was unbowed. “To condemn 
colonialism, any rostrum at any time is appropriate,” he said. Buoyed by Boyd’s star turn 
in Ethiopia, and a temporary seat on the UN Security Council, Panama convinced the UN 
Security Council to hold a meeting in Panama City the next year. The meeting lasted five 
days, beginning on March 15, 1973. Panama hosted it in its legislative palace, a block 
from the Panama Canal Zone, and across from an enormous banner that asked, “What 
country of the world can bear the humiliation of a foreign flag piercing its heart?”
802
 This 
time around, it was Torrijos himself who addressed the UN Security Council on 
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Panama’s behalf. Earlier, hoping to make the United States “feel a sense of shame,”
803
 
Torrijos had traveled to Bogotá, Colombia and San José, Costa Rica seeking support 
from fellow heads of state.
804
 Now, he turned to a broader audience, delivering half an 
hour of anti-American broadsides about the U.S. “colony in the heart of my country.”
805
 
(On other occasions, he compared the Panama Canal Zone to apartheid.
806
) Panama, he 
said, refused to be “another star on the flag of the United States,”
807
 and he urged the 
United States to make concessions or face “violent changes” to the status quo. He 
emphasized the unfairness of having a foreign power control Panama’s most prized 
resource, which he compared to Chile’s copper and Cuba’s sugarcane.
808
 Like Torrijos’s 
speech, Panama’s one-sided canal resolution offered little to appeal to U.S. sensibilities. 
Following fruitless negotiations, the United States vetoed the resolution,
809
 despite a 
threat from Noriega, who had warned the U.S. UN ambassador, John A. Scali, “If you are 
going to veto the resolution, you better do it at the airport.”
810
 Diplomatically, it was still 
a win for Panama; its resolution attracted 13 votes in favor, and even the British elected 
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to abstain rather than support the U.S. opposition.
811
 It was only the third U.S. veto in UN 
history.
812
 Nixon was not amused. 
 The diplomatic dispute left the two countries at loggerheads. Torrijos’s strategy, 
however, was succeeding.
813
 In the Cold War battle for the hearts and minds of the 
developing world – where poverty and inequality heightened the appeal of the Soviet 
Union – the U.S. Department of State saw the Panama Canal Zone as a liability. Thanks 
to Torrijos, it appeared that the United States was not a benefactor bringing modernity 
and wealth to a small, poor country, but instead a colonial bully abusing Panama’s 
sovereignty and stifling its development. In September 1973, after the U.S. Senate 
confirmed Henry Kissinger as secretary of state, Kissinger instructed Nixon’s new canal 
envoy, Bunker, aged 79, to move aggressively. Kissinger’s push was bolstered by an 
increasing perception in the United States that the canal’s strategic value had become a 
“myth, the product of nostalgia.”
814
 As discussed, the United States had long ago bit the 
bullet and invested in a two ocean navy.
815816
 Moreover, the canal itself was considered 
indefensible, vulnerable to both military assault and insurgent sabotage.
817
 In addition to 
the drumbeat of threats from Panamanian officials, Kissinger himself warned of a 
                                                             
811
 “The United States has vetoed Panama, but the world has vetoed the United States,” Panamanian 
Foreign Minister Juan Antonio Tack said following the UN Security Council vote. 
812
 Conniff 1992, p. 130. 
813
 Adolfo Ahumada, Omar Torrijos (Panama City, Panama: Fundación Omar Torrijos, 2000), p. 32. 
814
 Ibid., p. 209. 
815
 That investment, authorized by Congress in 1940, erased the benefit that had originally motivated 
Captain Alfred Mahan, and his admirer, Theodore Roosevelt, to support the canal’s construction, as well as 
the related argument that the waterway provided the essential link between East Coast-based U.S. naval 
vessels and the new U.S. Pacific colonies of Hawaii and the Philippines. 
816
 This was not a universally accepted position. After all, in the 1970s, most U.S. military vessels could 
still fit through the canal, and the waterway served as a key supply route during the Vietnam and Korean 
Wars. 
817
 By one estimate, a guerrilla attack that breached the dam holding back Gatun Lake could shutter the 
canal for two years. 
203 
 
potential “Vietnam-type situation in Panama”
818
 Presumably, Nixon thought those 
conditions had improved the political climate for a canal agreement. In Panama, too, 
there was impatience for renewed negotiations. The UN Security Council meeting, 
though a public relations coup, “also brought home to Torrijos the difference between a 
UN resolution and actual diplomatic progress.” Soon, Bunker was shuttling between 
Washington and Contadora Island, off of Panama’s Pacific coast, where he and Tack, the 
Panamanian foreign minister, hammered out the principles for a new canal treaty. On 
February 7, 1974, Kissinger and a handful of U.S. lawmakers flew from Andrews Air 
Force Base to Panama’s Tocumen International Airport to sign the agreement. The terms 
mirrored the stillborn proposals negotiated under the Johnson administration, but Torrijos 
still considered the agreement an historic achievement, and he personally greeted the U.S. 
delegation at Tocumen. Along the route to the legislative palace in Panama City, crowds 
of men, women and children gathered in front of tinroofed shacks to stare silently at 
Kissinger’s motorcade.
819
 At the ceremony with Torrijos and Lakas, the audience gave 
Kissinger a standing ovation after he and Tack had initialed each page of the eight 
principles and listened as the agreements were read aloud. In his remarks, Kissinger 
explicitly noted that the agreement had initiated a process of “replacing an old treaty” – 
an effort the secretary of state had undertaken “in the president’s name” and with the 
intention “to complete the negotiation successfully and as quickly as possible.”
820
 
 Kissinger told Panamanians that the agreement on principles marked the start “of 
a new adventure.” He probably meant that optimistically. But Kissinger’s principles did 
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little to smooth negotiations. For one, elements in the United States – including the 
Pentagon, Congress and the public – continued to have deep misgivings about entrusting 
the canal to Panama. Rep. Murphy, a Pennsylvania Democrat and Marine Corps 
veteran,
821
 reprimanded Kissinger for negotiating with Panama’s “unstable government.” 
Sen. Thurmond, a South Carolina Republican who participated in the invasion of 
Normandy, cautioned that Kissinger’s principles would “cause grave harm to the United 
States.”
822
 Not only did opposition to the turnover persist in the United States, but 
Kissinger’s principles also failed to resolve differences between pro-treaty forces in 
Washington and Panama City. On Contadora Island, negotiators wrangled over the 
duration of the transition to Panamanian control; who would be responsible for defending 
the canal’s neutrality (the United States, say, or perhaps the United Nations); whether the 
U.S. government, in addition to increasing annual payments to Panama during the 
transition, would provide a lump sum, goodwill payment to Panama’s cash-strapped 
government
823
 (at one meeting, at the Mayflower Hotel in Washington, Escobar 
demanded a $1 billion payout,
824
 an “an almost fatal blow” to the negotiations
825
 that 
prompted a panicked call from Carter to Torrijos
826
); and whether the United States 
would maintain a permanent military presence in the canal zone, and be permanently 
guaranteed expeditious passage through the canal for U.S. Navy vessels. 
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Despite these significant disagreements, the negotiations continued, uninterrupted 
even by Nixon’s resignation on August 9, 1974 and his replacement by Vice President 
Ford (1974 to 1977).
827
 Following Nixon’s departure, Kissinger wrote to Tack, the 
Panamanian foreign minister, to assure him that Kissinger would remain in Foggy 
Bottom and that canal negotiations would continue.
828
 He kept his word. In March 1975, 
in remarks in Houston, Texas, Kissinger began by acknowledging the concerns of treaty 
opponents: “We will expect Panama to understand our perspective that the efficient, fair 
and secure operation of the canal is a vital economic and security interest of the United 
States,” he said. But Kissinger did not back down from the treaty negotiations, insisting 
that “a treaty negotiated in 1903 does not meet the requirements of 1975.”
829
 Later, in 
May 1975, Kissinger again spoke publicly about the canal negotiations, telling fellow 
foreign ministers at the Organization of American States that “the need for a new treaty is 
clear.” Kissinger’s treaty advocacy was remarkable, given the climate on Capitol Hill. A 
month after Kissinger’s remarks to the Organization of American States, for example, 
Rep. Gene Snyder, a Republican from Louisville, Ky., argued unsuccessfully for a ban on 
any federal spending on canal negotiations – a concept supported by Sen. Harry Byrd, a 
Virginia independent. After all, the Panama Canal Zone, Snyder insisted, was “as 
legitimate as our owning New York City.”
830
 Torrijos did not help matters when he 
replaced Tack, his foreign minister, with Boyd, the firebrand who had relished berating 
the United States as Panama’s UN ambassador. 
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Carter’s Sprint to a Deal 
 
It would be naïve to argue that anyone could have bridged the divide over the 
proposed canal turnover. However, President Jimmy Carter (1977 to 1981) might have 
reassured nonpartisan treaty opponents had his negotiators focused far more on the 
governance issues that a Panamanian state-owned enterprise would face if Panama 
inherited the canal. True, as discussed, Carter’s final canal treaties addressed the need to 
hire and train Panamanians during the transition to Panamanian canal ownership. Those 
requirements, and the multi-decade length of the transition, allayed some concerns about 
the turnover.
831
 (“If you gave me 20 years, I could learn to be a pilot, and I’m not even a 
sailor,” Rep. Yvonne Burke, a California Democrat and lawyer from Los Angeles, Calif., 
once said.
832
) Early on, Panamanian elites also recognized canal quality control as a 
“fundamental mission of the operation.”
833
 But in U.S. Ambassador William Jorden’s 
painstaking account of the canal negotiations,
834
 “Panama Odyssey,” Carter’s negotiators 
did not appear to address the future structure of Panama’s canal authority; its 
independence from Panama’s central government; and its means for warding off 
corruption and patronage. In fact, it appears that negotiators spent much more time 
designing the binational entity that would run the canal during the transition period than 
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in shaping the Panamanian organization that would be in charge indefinitely as of 
December 31, 1999. Meanwhile, what talk there was regarding state-owned enterprise 
management was “a political exercise far more than a discussion of administrative 
techniques and organization.”
835
 Aristides Royo, a Panamanian canal negotiator and later 
Panama’s president (1978 to 1982), said U.S. negotiators never raised questions about 
Panama’s ability to manage the canal. “The U.S. negotiators were very respectful in that 
sense,” he said.
836
 After U.S. Senator John Melcher, a Montana Democrat, worried aloud 
about Panama’s canal managerial skills, Linowitz, the U.S. canal negotiator, provided 




This important shortcoming was not for lack of focus on the canal issue. Carter, 
elected on November 2, 1976, had immediately identified Panama as a top foreign policy 
priority. The month after the election, the Commission on U.S.–Latin American Relations 
released a report recommending a new canal treaty, and Carter and his advisers embraced 
its conclusions. Torrijos’s threats to attack the canal had not endeared him to successive 
U.S. presidents, but the threats spooked U.S. officials, including at the Carter White 
House. Promoting the treaties in a speech on February 1, 1978, Carter said negotiations 
with Torrijos were a better idea than “sending our sons and grandsons to fight in the 
jungles of Panama.”
838
 Senior officials feared mortars and sniper fire aimed at ships 
transiting the canal. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter’s national security adviser, even worried 
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that violence in the Panama Canal Zone could spread throughout Central America.
839840
 
By contrast, Carter hoped new Panama Canal treaties would reduce anti-American 
sentiment regionally; stand globally “as a symbol of our understanding of the change in 
the Third World”
841
; deprive Panamanian communists of a rallying cry
842
; and help in the 
Cold War global public opinion battle by demonstrating that “America would no longer 
be seen as defending the status quo, nor could the Soviet Union continue to pose as the 
champion of greater equity.”
843
 Carter later said he was also motivated by his belief that 
the 1904 canal treaty was an historical wrong that mortally damaged the United States-
Panama relationship
844
: “I was convinced that we needed to correct an injustice. Our 
failure to take action after years of promises under five previous presidents had created 
something of a diplomatic cancer, which was poising our relationship with Panama.”
845
 
Carter dismissed Reagan’s anti-treaty arguments as simplistic and wrongheaded. The 
United States, Carter reasoned, had never really owned the canal anyway, as evidenced 
by the rent payments it had forked over all those years. 
Carter’s secretary of state, Cyrus Vance, publicly committed to honoring past 
agreements with Panama. For his part, Carter, even before his swearing-in, insisted that 
the canal issue “ought to be resolved quite rapidly”
846
 He wasted no time. 
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1. Carter’s first foreign policy order, Presidential Review Memorandum 1, 
issued January 21, 1977, the day after his inauguration, requested an 
interagency analysis of the Panama Canal question. 
2. To speed the canal negotiations, Carter hired Linowitz, who had authored 
the Commission on U.S.–Latin American Relations report, as Bunker’s 
co-negotiator in the treaty talks.
847
 
3. On January 31, 1977, Vance invited Boyd and Escobar to Washington to 
discuss the path forward
848
 and afterward, Vance announced continued 
U.S. support for the Kissinger-Tact Agreement.
849
 




5. On April 14, 1977, Carter addressed the Organization of American States, 
where he echoed Kissinger’s reassurances regarding the canal negotiations 
and said he recognized “Panama’s legitimate needs as a sovereign 
nation;”
851
 the 1903 treaty, he said, was “no longer appropriate or 
effective.” 
 
Even under Carter, the negotiations were no cake walk. In his memoir, Linowitz 
describes the disappointments of his first trip to Panama. Torrijos had housed Linowitz 
on Contadora Island in Gabriel Lewis’s beachfront hotel, with its ground floor casino and 
tennis courts, and set aside the first day of negotiations for “relaxation and recreation.” In 
the initial discussions, Linowitz found the Panamanians mostly interested in arguing. 
Torrijos then suspended negotiations for the weekend; after the chief Panamanian 
negotiator, Rómulo Escobar Bethancourt, accompanied Torrijos to a carnival celebration 
in Colombia, Escobar missed the Monday negotiating session. “Rarely have I had such a 
discouraging experience,” Linowitz wrote.
852
 
Still, Carter’s persistence got him his treaties, their final details hammered out in 
marathon sessions at the Holiday Inn in Punta Paitilla, a wealthy section of Panama City, 
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and in Washington, just hours before the signing ceremony at the Organization of 
American States. At the ceremony, attended by 18 heads of state from the region, “Carter 
literally glowed.”
853
 The deal, Carter argued, had converted Panama from an embittered 
bystander into the canal’s most important stakeholder. Following the successful Holiday 
Inn negotiations, the U.S. negotiators had flown home on an Air Force plane, and 
Carter’s helicopter picked them up at Andrews Air Force Base and transported them to 
the White House, where Carter greeted them alongside 100 reporters and 
photographers.
854
 Following the Organization of American States ceremony, Carter 
hosted a state dinner at the White House, where he included Muhammad Ali and Ted 
Turner among his guests. 
However, as discussed, the terms of Carter’s final deal did not impress the anti-
treaty crowd. While Torrijos celebrated the agreement by declaring a national holiday in 
Panama, Carter confronted a deeply suspicious U.S. Congress and public, whose unease 
over the canal’s future never fully subsided. On his way to the Organization of American 
States treaty signing, Linowitz passed protestors using a makeshift gallows to hang him 
in effigy.
855
 The subsequent Senate debate over the treaties, Linowitz said, was “among 




Panama’s Political Hot Potato 
 
These tensions over the canal are more than an historical footnote. Congressional 
angst over the turnover was arguably the number-one reason the widespread belief that 
Panama would mismanage the canal crystallized in the United States. Opposition on 
                                                             
853
 Brzezinski 1983, p. 137. 
854
 Linowitz 1985, p. 176. 
855





Capitol Hill legitimized the vague unease of American voters and provided cover to 
nationalists, conspiracy theorists and jingoists who bemoaned any concessions to 
Panama. The symbolism of the canal as a monument to U.S. power and ingenuity
857
 also 
helped Carter’s opponents stoke public anger and insecurity. 
 Congressional opposition, as discussed, did not originate with Carter’s treaties. 
Not at all. U.S. Rep. Daniel Flood, for example, had once demanded that Eisenhower be 
impeached for flying the Panamanian flag in the Panama Canal Zone.
858
 True, anger over 
the treaties reached its zenith in 1977, with unprecedented, bipartisan fury directed at the 
Carter White House, fueling and fueled by the public uproar. But anti-treaty momentum 
on Capitol Hill had gained serious force years before, as Ford competed in the 
Republican presidential primary for a full term. In that race, Ford’s fiercely anti-treaty 
challenger, Ronald Reagan, transformed the proposed canal turnover into “a symbol of 
American retreat and weakness.”
859
 Reagan portrayed the canal negotiations as secretive 
and irresponsible. Torrijos’s government, he said in a fundraising letter, was 
“antagonistic and unstable.”
860
 For Reagan, the canal issue proved to be a dependable 
applause line, particularly in Florida and throughout the South, including during the 
North Carolina primary,
861
 when crowds roared at Reagan’s canal references.
862
 The 
canal was even the subject of a Reagan TV advertisement. Reagan’s attack on Ford’s pro-
negotiations position was sharp-edged: Ford was rewarding a “military dictator, Fidel 
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 and succumbing to Panamanian blackmail.
864865
 The canal, 
Reagan insisted, was “sovereign United States territory just as much as Alaska is, as well 
as the states carved from the Louisiana Purchase.”
866867868
 As Reagan put it, repeatedly, in 
his favorite formulation: “We built it, we paid for it, it’s ours and we’re going to keep it.” 
Ford regarded Reagan’s canal commentary as “inflammatory and irresponsible,” 
and unlikely to sway Republican primary voters. “I felt the voters were smart enough to 
realize that his verbal swipes were the final lunges of a desperate man,” Ford wrote in his 
memoirs.
869870
 Indeed, Reagan’s canal rhetoric was not only overheated, but also 
misleading. For example, the U.S. government had long acknowledged Panama’s titular 
sovereignty over the Panama Canal Zone; it acted like it, too, paying annual rent to 
Panama, for example, and denying automatic U.S. citizenship to babies born in the zone 
unless they had a U.S. citizen parent. As a result, not everyone bought Reagan’s canal 
arguments, including some members of his own party. U.S. Sen. Barry Goldwater, an 
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Arizona Republican, cautioned that Reagan’s rhetoric risked provoking a war with 
Panama. Goldwater said he supported the canal turnover, “and I think Reagan would too 
if he knew more about it.”
871
 Ultimately, Reagan’s strategy was unsuccessful in the 
Republican primary. Nevertheless, Reagan’s further politicization of the canal issue 
helped set the stage for a later mobilization of voters against the turnover, with public 
anger channeled into a blizzard of angry letters and postcards addressed to senators. In 
Congress and on the campaign trail, denigrating the canal treaties – and often the entirety 
of Panama – was a winning formula. U.S. Sen. Bob Dole, a Kansas Republican and 
Ford’s running mate in 1976, attacked the treaties as he eyed his own presidential run,
872
 
reveling in allegations that Torrijos’s brother, Moises, Panama’s ambassador to Spain, 
was a drugrunner. Even Carter, in a presidential debate with Ford on October 6, 1976, 
said he would “not relinquish practical control of the Panama Canal Zone anytime in the 
foreseeable future,”
873
 contradicting promises made by U.S. negotiators since the days of 
Nixon. 
 The canal treaties were also an ideological battleground. That colored the U.S. 
view of Panama and the expectations of Panama’s management of the canal enterprise. 
The geographic terms of the canal debate in the United States strayed from Central 
America to broad discussions of the U.S. role in the world.
874
 The writer Isaac Don 
Levine, for example, argued that U.S. canal policy should reflect the aggressive Brezhnev 
Doctrine and the threat of a “communist tide lapping the shores of the Caribbean.”
875
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New Hampshire Governor Meldrum Thompson also framed the issue in Cold War terms: 
Carter faced a choice to either “stand brave and firm for freedom in this real world of 
spreading Communism,” or “crawl into historical obscurity in the face of the hysterical 
howling of world opinion.”
876
 Many critics of the turnover spoke of U.S. canal 
construction as a pharaonic project, the moonshot of the early 20th century, that had 
become an “emblem of American glory.”
877
 In that framing, the proposed U.S. exit from 
Panama would inevitably signal American decline and retreat. 
Chafing at the ideological undertones of the canal debate, Carter complained of a 
smear campaign by “archconservative groups.”
878
 Chief among those groups was the 
American Conservative Union, led by Rep. Crane, who mixed passion with academic 
gravitas. (He taught history at Indiana University, where he had earned his PhD in 1963.) 
Crane not only published a full-length book opposing the turnover – “Surrender in 
Panama: The Case Against the Treaty” – but also aired the first political infomercial in 
U.S. history, a half-hour program on the canal shown 209 times around the country.
879
 
His organization – backed by other Tea Party precursors
880
 in what was then known as 
the “New Right” – had help from an estimated 100,000 supporters
881
 and instigated one 
of the heaviest letter writing campaigns in congressional history.
882
 A fellow traveler, 
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conservative activist Richard Viguerie, compiled voluminous mailing lists of contributors 
to the anti-treaty cause, lists that later helped Reagan raise millions of dollars for his 1980 
presidential campaign.
883
 In all, 20 anti-treaty organizations joined together in two 
umbrella groups, the Committee to Save the Panama Canal and the Emergency Coalition 
to Save the Panama Canal.
884
 
For his part, Carter mobilized a National Citizens Committee to support the 
treaties, and he deployed a “truth squad” that toured the country, sent millions of pro-
treaty letters and raised millions of dollars.
885
 Carter also sent his cabinet on a pro-treaty 
road show, gave dozens of speeches and interviews on the treaties, and held six town 
hall-style meetings on the issue.
886
 By February 1978, the Carter Administration 
“blitzkrieg” had logged more than 800 speeches and interviews on the proposed canal 
turnover.
887
 Carter even asked Bunker, the octogenarian treaty negotiator, to join the pro-
treaty campaign, and sent him on trips to New Hampshire and Vermont, sometimes in the 
middle of New England blizzards.
888
 At the White House, Carter aides briefed hundreds 
of opinion leaders they had flown in from around the country.
889
 The challenge, as 
Kissinger told it, was that “most Americans don’t give a damn, a small minority is 
violently opposed to the agreement and no group is really for it.”
890
 But that was not 
entirely true; Carter had support from the Committee of Americans for the Canal Treaties 
and from the religious and business communities. In general, however, the pro-treaty 
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crowd had smaller numbers and scant funding. In the business community, opinion was 
too mixed for an effective lobbying push. 
 Public and Congressional interest had been growing and growing, and rightly or 
wrongly, Panama did not stand up well under the scrutiny. By the time Carter had 
defeated Ford and took office, fears of Panamanian incompetence were widespread.
891
 
Opponents of the treaties, Carter said, “alleged that Torrijos was a drug lord and that the 
Panamanian people themselves could not be trusted to manage their own governmental 
affairs.” Senators, Carter complained, depicted Panamanians as “idlers, didn’t work hard, 
were not fit to be trusted.” One anti-treaty pamphlet  
warned the United States against relying upon “the pathetic rabble” of Panama’s National 
Guard to protect the canal, and described Torrijos’s military as loyal to whomever 
provided its “salaries and graft.”
892
 Carter knew better, having known Panamanians at the 
Georgia Institute of Technology, where he studied engineering. “I never doubted the fact 
that Panamanians could operate the canal, from the top down,” he said. But three decades 
after the treaties, he acknowledges he failed to persuade most U.S. voters. “It’s still a 
very unpopular action in the United States,” he said. That enduring unpopularity stems in 
part from the exaggerated political importance the canal debate attained. “At the 
beginning of 1976, no more than a handful of citizens in any American community could 
have located the Panama Canal on a map. By the end of the summer, one would have 
thought that reaching a new relationship with the tiny country of Panama threatened the 
emasculation of the United States and the end of its position as a great power.”
893
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February 1977 to January 1978, half the Senate visited Panama.
894895
 The visits were 
nominally intended to increase the familiarity of lawmakers with the canal issue. But in 
many cases, the congressional delegations simply sought evidence to reinforce their 
biases and to antagonize Panamanians. In one notorious encounter, in August 1977, three 
influential senators – Thurmond, Helms and Orrin Hatch, a Utah Republican elected to 
the Senate the year before – traveled to Panama, met with President Lakas, secretly taped 
their conversation and promptly leaked the recording to the media.
896
 Other congressional 
visits ended better for Carter and Panama. On November 9, 1977, Byrd, the Senate 
majority leader, arrived in Panama and tuned in to the Torrijos show; at the time, Torrijos 
was performing on the San Blas islands, where Byrd saw him get an earful from angry 
Kuna Indians.
897
 Byrd later supported the treaties, as did the minority leader, U.S. Sen. 
Howard Baker, a Tennessee Republican (and later Reagan’s chief of staff), a position that 
imperiled Baker’s presidential aspirations. Baker visited Panama on January 3, 1978 for a 
four-day tour that included, as in Byrd’s adventure, a Torrijos field trip, this time to 
Colón.
898
 Byrd left confident Panama was up to the job of running the canal. Torrijos, 
Carter said, “impressed the visitors with his calm strength, his eagerness to give 
unadorned facts, his limitless patience in the face of vituperative attacks leveled at him by 
some members of Congress, his promises to democratize Panama’s government and to 
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correct any violations of human rights and his obvious determination to have Panama and 
the United States work in harmony during the decades ahead.”
899
 
 Like Torrijos, Carter found that defending the treaties was a full-time job. For 
Carter, too, it involved a lot of congressional hand-holding. In all, Carter briefed 
hundreds of elected officials, as well as newspaper editors, college presidents, campaign 
contributors and other influential actors.
900
 The president’s allies made more than 1,500 
public appearances promoting the treaties.
901
 Lewis, the Panamanian ambassador, was a 
regular in the Oval Office, and Carter and Torrijos exchanged “a constant stream of 
messages.”
902
 At one point, Carter kept a notebook in his desk with details on how 
senators were leaning on the canal treaties.
903
 In all his logrolling, he spoke to every 
senator about the canal at least once,
904
 promising so many favors that one administration 
official told The New York Times, “I hope the Panamanians get as much out of these 
treaties as some senators.”
905
 On March 13, 1978, Carter wrote in his diary, “It’s hard to 
concentrate on anything except Panama.”
906
 The Panama issue, he said, “had almost 
everything else bogged down.”
907
 Every night, Carter practiced Spanish by reading a 
Spanish-language bible with the first lady.
908
 The president was so consumed by Panama 
that his White House reportedly deferred efforts to complete the normalization of U.S. 
relations with China, a process begun under Nixon. The negotiation with Congress, 
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Carter wrote in his memoirs, was “the most difficult political battle I had ever faced.”
909
 
In one briefing for senators, Brzezinski even assured skeptics that if the Panamanians 




 On September 26, 1977, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee at last began the 
formal canal treaty hearings. In all, the committee hearings lasted three weeks and 
involved 79 witnesses.
911
 The committee concluded on January 25, 1978 that the 
proposed treaties were in the U.S. interest. The full Senate remained to be convinced, 
however, so Carter pleaded with Torrijos to improve Panama’s image in the United 
States. Dutifully, Torrijos traveled to Washington, on October 13, 1977, and signed a 
three-paragraph joint statement that interpreted key aspects of the treaties (such as the 
meaning of the “expeditious passage” offered to U.S. Navy vessels transiting the canal). 
The two leaders issued the statement on October 14, 1977, and the Senate later added it to 
the treaties.
912
 On February 8, 1978, the full Senate debate began, a drawn-out, ugly affair 
carried live on radio, including a Spanish broadcast in Panama. In all, four Senate 
committees and one subcommittee held hearings on the canal turnover (as did three 
House committees and a House subcommittee).
913
 The debate lasted 38 days, a 
congressional marathon that “practically excluded consideration of any other policy 
problems or issues.”
914
 Whereas the Carter canal negotiations had not dwelled on 
Panama’s management capabilities, senators latched on to that issue to torpedo the canal 
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treaties. U.S. Sen. Paul Laxalt, a Nevada Republican, warned that “Panama does not now 
have, and cannot have within the short period of time required, the skilled personnel to 
fill adequately the jobs”
915
 at the canal. The Democratic U.S. Sen. Quentin Burdick, of 




 Carter was losing his patience. The Senate, which typically does not amend 
treaties, had opted for an article-by-article consideration this time around. On March 1, 
1978, Carter wrote in his diary that the Senate debate was going on “ad infinitum.”
918
 
Public opinion was also uncooperative; a classified account of Carter’s October 14, 1977 
meeting with Torrijos notes that White House mail was running 10 to 1 against the 
treaties.
919
 The Senate, however, eventually approved the first of the two canal treaties – 
the Neutrality Treaty, addressing canal security – by a vote of 68 to 32. The White House 
staff toasted the narrow victory with white wine and beer. Next, the Senate approved the 
Panama Canal Treaty – detailing the timeline and transition process for the canal transfer 
– by the same vote, 68 to 32,  seven months after the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee had begun its canal hearings. In all, senators had filed 105 amendments, 40 
reservations
920
 and 30 understandings.
921
 It was arguably the most intense treaty debate 
since President Woodrow Wilson (1913 to 1921) unsuccessfully sought ratification of the 
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 The canal votes were so close – and unpredictable – that Brzezinski 
asked Robert A. Pastor, Carter’s top Latin America adviser, to draft a contingency 
statement demanding that the Senate reconsider the treaties, and ordered military 
contingency plans for a possible violent response by Panamanians.
923
 For the same 
reason, the United States sent F-16s to Panama.
924
 Carter listened to the Senate vote 
unfold with clenched fists;
925
 “I had never been more tense in my life as we listened to 
each vote shouted out on the radio,” Carter recalled.
926
 To say feelings were hurt by the 
vituperative canal debate does not do justice to the fallout from the treaty confirmation 
process. In Panama, Torrijos, who had been overjoyed by the treaty signings, told 
Panamanians in a speech that “never in our republic’s life has a Panamanian been more 
insulted than me.”
927
 During the Senate debates, he became so infuriated he would smash 
his radio against the walls of his house.
928
 Never before, he said, “has a country been 
subject to so much disrespect.” Torrijos still threw a party at his house after the final 
Senate vote, and fireworks lit up the Panama City sky. But in his official remarks, 
Torrijos spoke of his back-up plans for the evening. “Today,” he said, “the canal was 
placed within two votes of being destroyed.”
929
 
 Panamanians did not blame Carter for the invective of the Senate ratification 
debates. He was, and remains, a popular figure throughout Latin America. The memoir 
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by Escobar, Torrijos’s confidante, lauds the former U.S. president in a chapter titled, 
“Carter Takes the Bull by the Horns.” The canal turnover “was a major success for the 
United States and for Panama,” remarked I. Roberto Eisenmann Jr., the founder of La 
Prensa, a leading Panamanian newspaper, “a world power negotiating with a chicken shit 
country.”
930
 By contrast, in the United States, the hard-fought battle had damaged Carter 
politically, draining enormous political capital from the new president. Still, Carter opted 
for a victory lap. The U.S. Embassy in Panama City reserved the entire Holiday Inn to 
accommodate the foreign press corps for Carter’s visit for the exchange of the 
instruments of ratification of the canal treaties.
931
 Carter arrived on June 16, 1978, 
accompanied by Brzezinski, and sat on stage with Barletta and Escobar at the outdoor 
ceremony, where 50,000 Panamanians lined the streets to cheer.
932
 Later, Carter and 
Torrijos shared a helicopter tour of the canal. In his journal, Brzezinski proudly mused, 




Off the Rails 
 
 The signing and ratification of the treaties removed Panama as a dinner table topic 
in the United States. That gave Panama breathing room to dive into the canal transition 
and gradually calm fears about the canal’s still-distant future in Panamanian hands. In his 
inaugural address, on October 11, 1978, Panama’s new president, former canal negotiator 
Aristides Royo, celebrated the canal treaties as Panama’s “second independence.” Later, 
in remarks to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Royo insisted Panama was up to 
the task of taking over the canal: “We recognize that with the fulfillment of those 
                                                             
930
 Interview by author with I. Roberto Eisenmann Jr., Panama City, Panama, August 22, 2013. 
931
 Jorden 1984, p. 638. 
932
 Ibid., p. 647. 
933
 Brzezinski 1983, p. 139. 
223 
 
aspirations will come important responsibilities. We will now join the United States as a 
kind of trustee to the world.” Carter sent hand-written thank-you notes to all senators who 
had voted in favor of the canal treaties.
934
 Vance, his secretary of state, cabled Royo to 
say he looked forward “to a close and creative relationship with your administration in 
the critical period that lies before us.”
935
 
As discussed, however, Panama stumbled out of the gate. Though the United 
States still controlled the canal, it handed over much of the Panama Canal Zone on 
October 1, 1979, the day the treaties entered into force. Suffice it to say, U.S. observers 
were unimpressed with the new management. “The properties turned over to the 
Panamanian government declined precipitously.”
936
 Panamanians looted furniture from 
reverted buildings, neglected the ports and let mosquitoes breed.
937
 Car thefts 
skyrocketed. Squatters infiltrated U.S. military housing.
938
 In other canal properties, palm 
trees grew inside buildings and poked out through shattered windows. The national port 
director stole a canal backhoe and brought it to his personal farm.
939
 Soon, the former 
Panama Canal Zone streets were potholed and the airport runways covered in grass. 
Accidents became common at the ports.
940
 At one port, all 102 forklifts turned over to 
Panama were inoperable 12 months later. Most tellingly, the historic Panama Canal 
Railroad stopped functioning entirely. Noriega had doubled its payroll to more than 300 
employees, but the railroad had no schedule and nature had taken hold in its freight 
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 Wooden ties burned after Panamanian landscapers could not control a fire set to 
control the grass. Rails disappeared as Panamanians stole the metal to build beach 
houses.
942
 Eventually, the U.S. government prohibited U.S. personnel from riding the 
railroad, out of safety concerns.
943
 “Within a matter of a few years, it was total junk. The 
Panamanians let it just fall apart completely,” Richard Wainio, who served as the director 
of executive planning for the U.S.-led Panama Canal Commission during the transition, 
said. “It sent a message to both sides,” Wainio added. “There was a huge concern on the 
part of the Americans when we saw everything fall apart.” That failure, he said, 
contributed to the belief that “maintenance is not in the Panamanian vocabulary.”
944
 U.S. 
lawmakers also took note. In a hearing in 1988, Billy Tauzin, a Louisiana Democrat, 
expressed his concern “that having turned over the railroad and watched its lack of 
maintenance and operation, are we seeing or could we expect a similar occurrence in the 
canal?” 
Panamanians were similarly appalled. Their government’s performance had 
confirmed their worst fears about the country’s weaknesses and inability to manage the 
canal. “It was a disaster,” Barletta, the former president, said.
945
 Panamanians had 
gradually been gaining confidence since the early days of the canal negotiations, when 
even the U.S. Department of State warned against any changes to canal governance, and 
insisted “there was no mention of Panama taking on any operating responsibility, since 
nobody in Panama was thought to be suggesting that Panamanians were capable of 
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handling the complex canal mechanism.”
946
 Under Noriega, however, all optimism was 
evaporating. It did not help that Panamanians, in the early years after the initial Panama 
Canal Zone land transfers, saw little development in the 364,000 acres of prime real 
estate, valued at $5 billion.
947
 “The administration of the railroad was a fiasco,” Felipe 
Joseph, a union leader, said. “We said, ‘Is that what we’re going to get’” when Panama 
takes over the canal?
948
 Panamanians were also ashamed by the reverted areas, which 
were unkempt and decaying. “It was a mess,” Joseph said. “It was something tangible.” 
Tangible and foreboding. “The world doubted we’d succeed,” Elizardo Morales, a former 
president of canal employees association, said. “We even doubted it.”
949
 Panamanians 
reacted with a renewed conviction to prepare for inheriting the canal. In other words, the 
collapse of the railroad made Panamanians raise their game. “The whole country saw the 
railroad go down the tubes, and saw the docks mismanaged,” Enrique E. Sánchez, the 
head of the canal’s purchasing division, said, provoking fear that “if we do to the canal 
what we did with those enterprises, we will never live that down.”
950
 As Panamanians 
hatched a plan for their own canal authority, Sánchez said, the railroad and ports 
experience was fresh in their minds. “Everyone was really saddened by what happened 
with those two enterprises,” he said. “We failed so miserably,” he added, because “they 
made it part of the political spoils system.”  
The railroad parallel was imperfect. The U.S. government, for example, had done 
little to prepare Panama to run the railroad, in contrast to its steadfast efforts to smooth 
the transfer of the canal. The railroad “was merely turned over to them lock, stock and 
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barrel,” William R. Gianelli, chairman of the Panama Canal Commission, noted in 
congressional testimony at the time. Still, the decline of the railroad was a godsend for 
skeptics of Panama; the railroad was an historic, iconic operation, and its mismanagement 
no doubt drew attention to Panama’s future canal management responsibilities, including 
the job of operating the electric towing locomotives that run on cog tracks on the canal 




In the United States, Panama’s stumbles in the former Panama Canal Zone were 
catnip to critics of the canal treaties. Zonians, in particular, trumpeted each and every 
misstep. The deterioration of former U.S. government properties in Panama provided 
limitless ammunition for Zonian fear mongering. 
It is useful to pause a moment to consider the Zonians. The easily caricatured, 
often vilified, always ridiculed, Zonians. After all, their influence goes a long way toward 
explaining why so many observers in the United States were convinced Panama could not 
be trusted with the Panama Canal. Were the Zonians intrepid Americans serving their 
country in the wilds of primordial Panama? Or were they coddled, racist Americans 
addicted to government largess? Ultimately, what matters most are two indisputable 
Zonian qualities: in the debate over the Panama Canal’s future, the Zonians were deeply 
biased and uniquely influential. For a decade, the U.S. community in the Panama Canal 
Zone had been crusading against an end to the U.S. presence in Panama. Ford called 
Zonians “the most highly organized group of American employees I know.”
951
 The 
appropriately named Rep. Flood, a mustachioed Pennsylvania Democrat who bitterly 
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opposed the canal turnover, was known to House colleagues as “the congressman from 
the Canal Zone.”
952
 By most accounts, Zonians were predisposed to harshly judge 
Panama’s performance. After all, the canal transfer threatened their livelihoods and their 
way of life. Their skepticism about Panamanians, however, was also generalized, long-
held and deep-seated. In the canal’s early era, the Zonians had compared Colón and 
Panama City to Sodom and Gomorrah. Critics blamed them their attitude – “150 percent 
American and 50 percent whiskey”
953
 – for provoking frequent clashes with Panamanian 
protestors. Decades later, during the canal treaty debate, the Zonians were still arguing 
that “the Panamanians were too backward to run the canal.
954
” 
Relations between the U.S. Embassy in Panama City and the U.S. citizens in the 
Panama Canal Zone were always tense. To many U.S. nationals outside the Panama 
Canal Zone, the zone was an embarrassing outpost of backward “rednecks.” U.S. 
diplomats had even less patience for their fellow Americans during the delicate 
negotiations over the canal turnover. “There was a hard core of emotional, sometimes 
irrational, fanatics in the zone for whom any change would be for the worse,” 
Ambassador Jorden wrote in his memoir. “They did not know Panama, but they did not 
like Panama. They did not know Panamanians, but they were willing to write them off as 
incompetent and inefficient at best, if not violent Marxists. Many spoke no Spanish, 
rarely visited Panama, took their vacations in the United States and in general were about 
as parochial as a farmer from Montana or Mississippi who never went to the county 
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 (Zonians called the second set of locks on the canal’s Pacific side “Peter 
McGill,” instead of its Spanish name, Pedro Miguel.
956
) For Zonians, contact with 
Panamanians was not difficult; there were no physical barriers separating Panama from 
the Panama Canal Zone. Jorden suggested that Zonian mistrust of Panamanians reflected 
racist sentiments, and he compared a September 16, 1975 town hall-style meeting 
between Zonians in Balboa and the political counselor at the U.S. Embassy to a Ku Klux 
Klan rally.
957
 Panamanians, as discussed, had even stronger feelings about their U.S. 
neighbors, whom Fernando Cardoze, a former member of the Panama Canal Commission 
board, likened to the French Pieds-Noirs in Algeria.
958959
 Greene described the Panama 
Canal Zone as a “world away from Panama,” where “you felt the jungle had been thrown 
back by a battalion of lawnmowers.”
960
 Historians say Zonian social relations with 
Panamanians were limited – though that is in dispute – inhibited in part by limited 
interest among zonians for the Spanish language.
961
 For Panamanians, the Zonian 
attitude, “an air of undisguised superiority,”
962
 did not convey a warm welcome to Zonian 
life. 
“The Americans who lived in the Panama Canal Zone… liked the status and 
privileges that came with residence in an area governed by the U.S. military and 
essentially barred to all Panamanians except those working for the United States. 
They had friends and relatives back home who were happy to help them protect 
their perquisites. And they had further help from millions of ordinary Americans 
whose history courses had proudly presented the construction of the Panama 
Canal as a great American accomplishment, in which Panama had merely 
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provided the place where the ditch could be dug…. “The Americans who lived 
and worked in the Panama Canal Zone enjoyed, as the Panamanians said, all the 
benefits of colonialism. They had their own police and courts that applied 
American rather than Panamanian law, their own schools and hospitals, their own 
post office, subsidized shopping at military [commissaries], subsidized housing 
that was not especially lavish but was kept neat and clean and pleasantly 
landscaped by low-wage labor from across ‘the frontier.’ They were paid better 
than Panamanian workers who performed similar jobs, and they had the job 
security of American military employees….. Like most people with special 
privileges, they insisted that they were indispensable, that the Panamanians could 
never run ‘our’ canal…. They had come from all over the United States, and the 
rumors and suspicions they spread in their letters home helped rouse a domestic 




Not surprisingly, the Zonians saw themselves as patriots. Or at least, as normal 
public servants. Interested in their own self-interest? Sure. But also convinced they knew 
better than Washington policymakers about what was best for their Panama Canal. 
During the Carter years, there were 40,000 residents of the Panama Canal Zone: 25,000 
military personnel and their dependents; 10,000 U.S. citizens employed by the Panama 
Canal Company and the Canal Zone government, and their dependents; and 5,000 
Panamanian employees of the Panama Canal Company and the Canal Zone government, 
and their dependents. In the most detailed account of their lives, “Red, White and Blue 
Paradise: The American Canal Zone in Panama,” Mary and Herbert Knapp write warmly 
about their former friends and neighbors, and a utopian society that had vanished like 
Pompeii.
964
 For the Knapps, the Panama Canal might have been a gift to global 
commerce, but the Panama Canal Zone was a workers’ paradise, “a star spangled, red, 
white and blue, post-capitalist society.”
965
 That coziness helped attract U.S. workers to 
Panama. However, U.S. officials had other motivations for their Shangri-La striving in 
Panama. George Goethals, the legendary U.S. canal engineer, considered the zone 
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evidence that “popular government, administered honestly and intelligently, is an agency 
for human welfare and happiness.”
966
 The United States had a blank canvas for designing 
a model town: after signing the 1904 treaty with Panama, the U.S. government acquired 
all privately owned land in the Panama Canal Zone. The local newspaper – The Spillway 
– was a company newsletter, and the U.S. military operated the Panama Canal Zone radio 
and TV stations. In the early years, life in the zone was mostly a fight for survival, waged 
by adventurers in a daily “battle for bread”
967
 and against fear. “There are three diseases 
on the isthmus: yellow fever, malaria and cold feet,” John Stevens, Goethals’s 
predecessor as chief canal engineer, once said.
968
 The laborers digging the canal were no 
more spoiled than the mules and horses pulling the wagons, ambulances and fire trucks at 
the canal construction site. In the early years, half of all American canal workers returned 
home every year.
969
 Granted, that was before the U.S. government set up bakeries with 
automatic pie, cake and bread machines; opened coffee roasting plants and ice cream 
factories; and produced its own mouthwash and shaving cream. Gradually, the engineers 
who controlled the Panama Canal Zone adopted a “spirit of paternalism, of modern 
socialism, of governmental parenthood.”
970
 The government support including 
comfortable, though hardly extravagant, housing, typically in structures with a reinforced 
concrete exterior, clay tile roof and screened-in porch. Cradle-to-grave government 
services
971
 were offered in an idyllic setting, the kind of verdant landscape that the John 
D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation dreams of. There was “green jungle, green 
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lawns, green birds, green lizards,” and also “green mangos, green limes, green 
papayas.”
972
 But it was still a jungle, always vaguely threatening. For neighbors, Zonians 
had mosquitoes carrying yellow fever, dengue fever and malaria, as well as snakes and 
tarantulas, iguanas, ñequi and ants. “Everything was faintly ominous,” the Knapps 
recalled. “Periodically, a platoon of grass-cutters appeared and fought back the jungle 
with mowers and machetes, but it was always there, just beyond the cleared area.”
973
 
Though often lumped together, the Knapps portray the inhabitants of this isolated U.S. 
terrain as a diverse bunch: bureaucrats on Ancón Hill, workers on the flats, the Atlantic 
siders, the Pacific siders, the dredgers in Gamboa, the Cuna Indians selling molas, their 
arms wrapped in tiny beads, the Chinese salesmen at roadside stands, and the Bajan-
speaking Barbadians, who called an umbrella a “shower-stick,” “keep-dry” or a “house-
in-hand.”
974
 The Americans living in the zone – or “on the zone,” as they preferred to say 
– held different jobs and different world views. They were pilots, lockmasters, mull 
drivers, line handlers, cable splicers, translators, admeasures, marine traffic controllers, 
transit accounting technicians, divers, doctors, lawyers, merchant chiefs, butchers and 
bakers.
975
 They were isolationists and nationalists, but also cross cultural and globalist. 
They had a Rotary Club and Lions Club, but welcomed Panamanian members. They had 
their own bowling ally, but invited Panama’s national symphony to perform in the Balboa 
High School gymnasium. They valued U.S. government hospitality, but also bought into 
the zone’s civil religion and its solemn rites, like moving a ship through the locks.
976
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Carter’s threat to the Zonian way of life was existential and not imaginary; the 
proposed treaties would turn their homeland into a “geographic ghost.”
977
 That lit a fire 
under Zonian activists. The Zonians, however, were not merely passionate, but also 
highly mobilized, creative, media savvy and well networked into the U.S. political 
system. To derail the canal negotiations, for example, one Zonian, a police officer named 
William Drummond, filed an unsuccessful federal lawsuit to enjoin the U.S. president 
from even speaking to Panama about a canal turnover. Zonians won support from the 
American Legion, the Veterans of Foreign Wars and the Daughters of the American 
Revolution.
978
 In the Senate, Zonian ally Thurmond decried “the abandonment of U.S. 
citizens and employees in the Panama Canal area.”
979
 Later, after Carter completed the 
new canal treaties, 500 Zonians held a funeral procession, placing candles on the 
Goethals memorial.
980
 In case Carter missed the point, Zonians prepared posters for the 
president’s June 7, 1978 visit to the Panama Canal Zone that carried the slogan, “Re-elect 
Carter, the best president Panama ever had.”
981
 
So not surprisingly, during the political debate in the United States over the canal 
treaties, Zonians jumped on Panama’s poor management of the reverted areas. After all, 
Panama’s tomfoolery and administrative clumsiness not only reinforced their arguments, 
but also hurt their quality of life. Their evidence was compelling. “They were handed a 
gem” and destroyed much of their inherited infrastructure, Peter F. Romero, the U.S. 
assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere affairs at the time of the canal 
turnover, said. “It was a legitimate concern,” he said, and instilled in U.S. lawmakers, 
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especially Republicans, “this incredible fear that the end of the world was coming.”
982
 
The mismanagement of the former Panama Canal Zone properties, Romero said, exposed 
a worrisome vulnerability. “The Panamanians were notorious. It could have gone either 
way,” he said of the canal turnover. “The concern was the ineptitude of Panamanians.” 
 
Banana Republic, Gone Bananas 
 
In the United States, the post-Torrijos political drama in Panama also reinforced 
the image of Panama as a basket case and laughingstock. It would be an understatement 
to say succession did not proceed smoothly following Torrijos’s 1981 plane crash. His 
successor atop the National Guard, Colonel Florenico Flores, was quickly pushed aside 
by General Rubén D. Paredes, who also forced out President Arístedes Royo (1978 to 
1982) in favor of Vice President Ricardo de la Espriella (1982 to 1984). (Royo said a sore 
throat had compelled his resignation.
983
) Soon afterward, in July 1983, Noriega seized 
control of the National Guard – later renamed the Panama Defense Forces – and forced 
out de la Espriella before the year’s end. The political tumult was embarrassing for 
Panama, but the United States put up with Noriega at first, in part because Noriega was 
supporting the U.S. fight against Nicaragua’s Sandinista government.
984
 Starting in the 
mid-1980s, however, Noriega’s bullying and clumsy leadership truly became a black eye 
– and a troubling signpost for the future of the Panama Canal. In Panama’s 1984 
presidential election, Noriega engineered a victory for Nicolás Ardito Barletta, a 
University of Chicago graduate and former World Bank vice president, in Barletta’s 
election against Arnulfo Arias. The election damaged Noriega’s international standing, 
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though admiration in the United States for Barletta, and distaste for Arias, limited the 
diplomatic fallout. (In addition to his impressive credentials, Barletta had played a helpful 
role in the negotiations of the new canal treaties.) 
Panama’s international profile, however, changed dramatically after Noriega 
ordered Bartletta’s removal after only a year in office. Noriega was reacting to Barletta’s 
call for an investigation by Attorney General Manuel José Calvo of Noriega’s role in the 
assassination of Hugo Spadafora, a former Torrijos cabinet member turned government 
critic whose decapitated body was discovered on September 14, 1985, stuffed in a U.S. 
government mailbag in Costa Rica, by the Panamanian border. By then, it was easy to 
turn against Noriega, the illegitimate son of his father’s maid and a longtime employee of 
Colombia’s Medillín drug cartel.
985
 U.S. officials found him arrogant and obnoxious.
986
 
In his memoir, former U.S. Secretary of State George P. Shultz recalled Noriega as a hard 
drinker who would disappear unexpectedly at critical moments.
987
 As smalltime villains 
go, Noriega was straight out of central casting. Senior U.S. diplomat Lawrence 
Eagleburger once mocked Noriega’s attitude and avarice by cataloging Noriega’s private 
boats: “Macho 1,” “Macho 2” and “Macho 3.” “That’s mucho macho,” Eagleburger 
said.
988
 The U.S. position on Panama began to harden in 1988, after Miami and Tampa 
grand juries indicted Noriega on drug charges. Noriega was so mistrusted that Reagan’s 
national security adviser, Colin Powell, warned that the United States might not comply 
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with the Panama Canal treaties if Noriega remained in power.
989
 A CBS News/New York 
Times poll in May 1989 found that 26 percent of Americans agreed with Powell. 
 After Panamanian Vice President Eric Arturo Delvalle replaced Barletta, Noriega 
gradually lost the support of most U.S. and Panamanian elites.
990
 Soon after Barletta had 
turned against Noriega, Torrijos’s cousin, Roberto Díaz Herrera, also abandoned the 
regime, publicly accusing Noriega of involvement in the Spadafora murder and in drug 
trafficking.
991
 On February 25, 1988, Delvalle attempted to fire Noriega, who in turn had 
Delvalle removed. Protests by the opposition National Civic Crusade, whose members 
waved white handkerchiefs at rallies, proliferated and anti-Noriega graffiti appeared 
throughout Panama City.
992
 Noriega responded by deploying his “Dobermans,” security 
forces wielding clubs, tear gas and guns who confronted protestors. At one point, Noriega 
ordered a raid on the University of Panama to repress students supporting a general 
strike.
993
 At this point, the United States was supposed to be working hand-in-glove with 
Panama to prepare the ground for the canal turnover. Instead, the U.S. government began 
seizing Panamanian assets, adding an economic crisis to the country’s political chaos. In 
1988, Panama’s economy contracted by 20 percent. In the May 7, 1989 presidential 
election, Noriega again intervened on behalf of his candidate, Carlos Duque, who was 
running against Arias ally Guillermo Endara. Pre-election polls gave Endara a two-to-one 
lead, and the Catholic Church’s exit polls showed Endara with a three-to-one margin. 
Noriega’s official tally, however, declared Duque the winner. In response to post-election 
unrest, Noriega’s forces set upon protestors, beating Endara’s running mate, Guillermo 
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“Billy” Ford, with crowbars and baseball bats, despite the presence of television cameras. 
Ultimately, Noriega threw out the election results, but in lieu of another election, he 
simply appointed a former high school classmate, Francisco Rodríguez, as president. The 
repression continued. On “Black Friday,” July 10, 1987, Noriega’s security forces 
arrested 600 demonstrators and injured 600 others. 
For its part, the United States continued to recognize ousted President Delvalle, 
and Delvalle’s intrepid ambassador in the United States, Juan B. Sosa. That thrust 
Panama’s dirty laundry directly into the United States, and under the microscope of the 
U.S. media, Congress and public. Sosa, the former president of the American Chamber of 
Commerce in Panama, had strong ties to the U.S. government. Either way, the situation 
in Panama had become hard to ignore: Noriega was being represented in Washington by 
a diplomat whose priority was Noriega’s overthrow. As Sosa lobbied Reagan to freeze 
Panamanian assets in the United States – except for funds needed to keep the rouge 
embassy functioning – Noriega asked Interpol for Sosa’s arrest. Sosa refused to back 
down. On December 20, 1989, he got his wish of regime change, as 14,000 U.S. troops 
landed in Panama and began an assault on Noriega’s  
military headquarters, the Comandancia, in the heavily populated El Chorrillo district of 
Panama City, and at Panama’s main airports and military bases. The blitzkrieg invasion 
was a relatively straightforward affair. Still, it cost the United States 23 U.S. soldiers and 
three civilian personnel (an additional 323 U.S. military personnel were wounded) and 
$163.6 million.
994
 Meanwhile, Noriega continued to damage Panama’s reputation, even 
after his arrest: On April 10, 1992, he was convicted of eight criminal charges, and on 
July 10, 1992, he was sentenced to 40 years in prison. 
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The Carter Effect 
 
Panama’s mismanagement of the reverted land and assets, and the Noriega 
contretemps, were not the only strikes against the canal treaties for many U.S. observers. 
The indelible association of the canal treaties with the Carter Administration also failed 
to instill confidence in the transition process. Carter was an unpopular president; he 
ended his first term with an average approval rating of just 45.5 percent, lower than any 
of the six presidents who preceded him or the five that have come after.
995
 In the 1980 
presidential election, Reagan routed Carter, winning 489 electoral votes compared to 
Carter’s 49. The canal treaties appear to have contributed to that lopsided outcome,
996
 but 
the reverberations moved in both directions; that is to say, Carter’s unpopular, one-term 
presidency seems to have tarnished the idea of the canal turnover throughout the 
transition period. As discussed at length, the idea of a canal turnover, did not originate 
with Carter – a point Carter tried to convey by enlisting the Republicans Kissinger and 
Ford to lobby the Senate to pass the canal treaties.
997
 (Both ultimately testified before the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee.) In fact, the final language of the canal treaties 
mirrored the informal agreements reached by Johnson.
998
 Under Nixon, a John Birch 
Society bumper sticker had read, “Don’t give Panama our canal, give them Kissinger 
                                                             
995
 Gallup Historical Statistics and Trends, “Presidential Approval Ratings,” 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/116677/presidential-approval-ratings-gallup-historical-statistics-trends.aspx. 
996
 Carter and the journalist Adam Clymer both attribute support for the canal turnover to a handful of 
electoral defeats in 1978, such as occurred with U.S. Sen. Richard Clarence Clark, an Iowa Democrat, 
whose opponents distributed bumper stickers urging voters, “Help us defeat Dick Clark before he votes to 
give away the United States.” Two years later, opponents of U.S. Sen. Frank Church, who lost reelection in 
1980, aired a TV advertisement exhorting voters to “remember the Panama Canal, built with American 
blood and treasure.” 
997
 In his testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance said, “The 
treaties are the culmination of 13 years work by four American presidents of both major political parties.” 
998





 Years later, Kissinger had not backed down. In a speech at New York 
University, he warned that Senate rejection of the treaties “would suggest to friends and 
foes around the world that the United States could not deliver on an agreement negotiated 
by four presidents of both political parties over a period of 13 years.”
1000
 But in the public 
imagination, the canal turnover was and remains a Carter phenomenon. 
 Carter regarded the canal as the disgraceful detritus of American expansionism. 
But for Americans of a certain age, the loss of the canal continued to sting. For many in 
the United States, the waterway symbolized U.S. ingenuity,
10011002
 not imperialism, and 
U.S. global dominance, or at least preeminence in the U.S. “backyard.” The loss of the 
canal, by contrast, gave the same sinking feeling experienced by Britons as their empire 
fell apart.
1003
 The sensation was particularly acute given the U.S. defeat in the Vietnam 
War. 
In December 1999, President Bill Clinton (1993 to 2001) and Vice President Al 
Gore declined to participate in the historic canal turnover ceremony. Gore, who was 
preparing a presidential run, had a reasonable excuse. But not even Secretary of State 
Madeleine Albright agreed to attend, though she had developed arguments in favor of the 
canal treaties as a legislative assistant to U.S. Sen. Edmund Muskie,
1004
 a Republican 
from Maine; served in the Carter White House on the National Security Council; and 
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while teaching at Georgetown University, had assigned her students a role-playing 
exercise negotiating the Panama Canal treaties.
1005
 In the end, Carter led the 29-member 
U.S. delegation.
1006
 As Time Magazine reported at the time: “Hey, Jimmy Carter made 
this deal, let him take the heat.”
1007
 
 Carter seems to have accepted, or perhaps even encouraged, his reputation as the 
solitary driver of the canal turnover. His presidential museum, on a 35-acre campus 1.5 
miles east of downtown Atlanta, Ga., lends substantial real estate to Panama: one display 
lists the canal turnover number six on a list of 17 “notable achievements”; another shows 
a letter from Thurmond raising money for activists opposing the treaties (“There is no 
Panama Canal! There is an American canal at Panama.”); there are multiple photos of 
Torrijos, including one taken at the Organization of American States treaty signing 
ceremony and another – a life-sized banner – that shows Carter standing beside the 
general; and there is a photo of Carter and the first lady in Panama in April 1978 touring 
the canal. The museum section on Carter’s post-presidency notes that the Carter Center’s 
first election monitoring activities were in Panama, in 1989.
1008
 Indeed, the Carter Center, 
and Carter himself, have stayed closely involved in Panamanian affairs; the Carter Center 
also monitored Panama’s 1994 election; participated in Panama’s post-election national 
dialogues; and later monitored Panama’s 2014 election. The Carter Center’s Council of 
Presidents and Prime Ministers of the Americas –  tasked with promoting democracy, 
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resolving regional conflicts, monitoring elections and fighting corruption – has included 
at least two former Panamanian presidents, Ernesto Pérez Balladares and Barletta. In 





 The average U.S. voter could be forgiven for misjudging Panama’s capacity to 
run the canal. In the United States, any number of common cognitive biases were 
probably at play, such as anchoring bias (overreliance on the first piece of information 
consumed, in this case a negative portrayal of Panama); the bandwagon effect; 
confirmation bias; conservatism bias (the preference for older evidence over newer data); 
and stereotyping (in this case, of Latin Americans). Even inside the Carter White House, 
not everyone apparently thought Panama was ready for prime time. In one classified 
memorandum, a White House official scrutinized the agenda for an upcoming visit to 




 In the global shipping industry, there was also unease. Samuel Lewis Navarro, 
Panama’s former vice president and foreign minister, traveled to Japan, South Korea, the 
Philippines and Taiwan as a member of the canal transition commission to learn about 
past governance transitions. Anxiety prevailed. “Shipping lines were constantly looking 
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for alternatives,” he said.
1011
 A 1978 book, “The Truth about the Panama Canal,” warned 
ominously that Panama, a “mere fledgling”
1012
 of mostly “impenetrable jungle,”
1013
 was 
“seeking to assume vast responsibilities, in fact to take the place of the United States, in a 
unique enterprise that is of great importance to the entire world and of particular 
importance to the United States.”
1014
 It added: “Is Panama capable of fulfilling these 
responsibilities? This is the $64,000 question.”
1015
 The book was categorical in its 
criticisms – one chapter was titled, “No Job for Amateurs” – and detailed Panama’s 
supposed weaknesses in dredging, maintenance (“She creaks in spots. She tends to fall 
apart in places. It takes a sizable team of ‘doctors,’ a team of experienced, imaginative, 
devoted managers, engineers and mechanics, to keep her operating”) and operational skill 
to deal with the canal’s twisting shape, challenging currents, winds and fog. 
Running the canal, an “elderly, fragile and unpredictable prima donna,” is “not 
that simple. Far from it. There are a thousand and one things that go on behind the 
scenes, day and night, to produce this appearance of simplicity. Things that 
require special skills, special knowhow, special equipment, special effort – even 
special loyalty and special dedication…. The canal is not just a complex of 
engineering and machinery. The canal does not run by itself. It is run by 
conscientious, experienced human beings, and the role these people play in its 
operation becomes increasingly greater as the canal grows older and as more and 
more ships that nudge the maximum dimensions for canal transit are designed and 
built. These two factors, canal age and ship size, combine to place an ever higher 





Though Reagan largely dropped the canal issue during his presidency, 
conservatives never warmed to the turnover. In August 1999, three months before the 
canal handover, U.S. Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott, a Mississippi Republican, 
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complained that the United States had “given the farm away without a shot being 
fired.”
1017
 In 2000, John F. McManus, president of The John Birch Society, delivered an 
ominous hourlong presentation on the canal turnover. He summed up prevailing 
conservative views of the canal treaties: a “monumental mistake,” “a blunder of immense 
proportions,” “prime evidence of stupidity at the highest levels of governance,” a 
“betrayal of American interests” and a “travesty.” (The John Birch Society’s view was 
distinct, though no less critical; McManus called the turnover a conspiracy designed to 
bring about global governance by a totalitarian UN, and he flogged for House Resolution 
77, calling on President Clinton to trash the Carter-Torrijos treaties.
1018
 “The Panama 
Canal must be reclaimed,” McManus said.) 
At the canal turnover ceremony, Robert R. McMillan, the former Panama Canal 
Commission chairman, felt certain Panama had the technical wherewithal to run the 
canal. He remained, however, “apprehensive about how efficiently Panama would run the 
canal,” because it was still unclear “whether the politics of Panama might interfere with 
canal operations and maintenance.”
1019
 
 As discussed, Panamanians had their doubts, too. Eduardo Antonio Quirós, the 
president of two leading Panamanian newspapers, El Siglo and La Estrella, and a former 
canal board member, compared Panama’s success running the canal to a rambunctious, 
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inattentive student who pulls off a high score on the final exam. “The way Panama has 
managed the canal is a surprise,” he said.
1020
 
Still, close observers of the canal turnover process should surely have known 
better. At least by 1999. Conservatives might have portrayed Panama as an “unstable, ill-
prepared country.”
1021
 But there were other voices, such as supporters from business 
groups, including the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the Council of the Americas. In an 
article entered into the congressional record during the canal treaties debate, Abraham F. 
Lowenthal and Milton Charlton argued that the criticism about Panama’s managerial 
capabilities “substitutes prejudice for prudential judgment.” There was no reason, they 
wrote, “to think that Panamanians are any less capable than Egyptians of learning how to 
manage complex operations. Whatever competence they lack now will probably be 
acquired before the proposed new treaty expires two decades from now. If not, Panama, 
like other countries, would be able to hire the required expertise.”
1022
 Moreover, it was 
not as if the United States was the very model of a modern canal administration, contrary 
to the idealized view of the Panama Canal Zone advanced by partisans.
1023
 “There is 
significant evidence that the United States managed the canal particularly poorly during 
the postwar period.”
1024
 U.S. canal authorities never established an incentive structure for 
canal managers; afforded military officers an outsized managerial role; and permitted 
Zonians to ward off private sector-style reforms. In 1947, U.S. government inspectors 
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described the U.S. canal administration as “a museum of administrative antiquities.”
1025
 
The U.S. Army long dominated the canal. The dimensions of the original lock chambers 
were determined by the size of U.S. battleships, and when the canal opened, it was run by 
a general, usually from the Army Corps of Engineers. These were not expert 
businessmen. The canal ran its first deficit in 1973 ($1.3 million), and by 1974, the deficit 
had increased to $11.9 million. As far back as the 1930s, outsiders thought the canal 
needed new blood. “Tropical climates are enervating,” one observer reported.
1026
 
“Government work, like the business of any large-scale organization, is likely to result 
in… red tape and lack of initiative. This natural tendency is strengthened in the 
enervating climate of Panama. After a few years, mental curiosity is diminished, and in 
most cases an all-consuming complacency gets into the very blood.” 
For all their flaws, the canal treaties had explicitly addressed fears of exorbitant 
toll hikes, one of the major and enduring preoccupations of Carter’s critics. The 
Neutrality Treaty states: “Tolls and other charges for transit and ancillary services shall 
be just, reasonable, equitable and consistent with the principles of international law.”
1027
 
In terms of fears of Panama’s administrative skills, “the timing and transition mechanism 
were important,” Christopher L. Koch, the president of the World Shipping Council, said. 
“You had people from Panama who were engaged in the management and operation of 
the canal. You weren’t handing this over to a bunch of newbies.” (Koch added: “Did 
people raise questions? Yes. In hindsight, were they overblown? Yes.”) Pastor, Carter’s 
top Latin America adviser and a major driver of the treaties, said there was little cause for 
concern regarding Panamanian canal ownership. “We managed it like a socialist 
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enterprise,” he said. “For some reason, we think the market works everywhere but 
Panama.” Pastor said Panama’s performance validated his confidence. “In every 
parameter, the Panamanians have done better than us,” he said.
1028
 In fact, the U.S. 
performance in Panama was in some ways even worse during the canal transition – a 
period of supercharged U.S. skepticism of Panama – when the new, congressionally 




To dispassionate observers, it should have been clear that many of the anti-treaty 
arguments were unrelated to the future health of the canal. Rep. Crane’s writings are a 
perfect example. It would be a “criminal blunder” to hand over the canal, he argued, the 
“cowardly retreat of a tired, toothless paper tiger” and “one more nail in the coffin of 
American sea power.” Perhaps. Perhaps it was “one more crucial American step in a 
descent to ignominy.” But those warnings should not have left the impression that 
Panama could not open and close the canal locks. During the canal debates in the 1970s, 
business groups had debunked the arguments that the proposed canal turnover would 
increase inflation, disrupt trade and increase unemployment. Even Reagan, after finally 
winning the presidency, stopped bringing up the canal issue. “It’s telling that Reagan, 
once he was president, did nothing to revoke or to alter the treaties. No more was heard 
of the economic and national-security horrors he had predicted as a candidate.”
1030
 
Panama’s canal negotiators had shared Pastor’s confidence. Royo said: “There 
were some senators and journalists who prior to the Senate debates raised concerns over 
how turning over the canal to a small country could affect the infrastructure the United 
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States had built there. Torrijos address this various times with visiting senators, noting 
that the canal was completed in 1914 with a system of locks in use since ancient times. 
How would it be possible that people at the end of the Twentieth Century could not 
manage infrastructure from the beginning of the century?” Carlos Ernesto González de la 
Lastra, of the Asociación Panameña de Ejecutivos de Empresa, agreed. “The Panama 
Canal is not a complicated operation; in reality, it is a river with a system of elevators for 
boats, its technology is basically from early last century, and it isn’t complicated,”
1031
 he 
said. “There should have been no fear that Panamanians could not operate a river.” 
In fact, despite Panama’s railroad and ports fiasco, the U.S. Government 
Accountability Office gave Panama high scores in the early years of treaty 
implementation, finding “no apparent degradation of service or major negative 
impacts.”
1032
 The railroad itself was aged at the time of the transfer, and the ports were 
unprepared for the containerization revolution in global shipping. Ten percent of the 
1,424 buildings the United States gave Panama were more than 70 years old, and another 
15 percent were more than 60 years old.
1033
 As the imminent canal turnover revived the 
debate in the United States over the canal issue,
1034
 the influential newspaper columnist 
Andres Oppenheimer toured the former Panama Canal Zone in 1999 and found the 
concerns about Panama exaggerated. It was not Switzerland, he said, but it was in fine 
shape.
1035
 Perhaps most surprisingly – and most importantly for the canal’s future and an 
objective analysis of the canal’s prospects under Panamanian control – Panamanian 
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democracy had become strongly institutionalized by the canal turnover. Since Noriega’s 
removal, the country had carried out presidential elections in 1994 and 1999 that involved 
healthy competition, high levels of participation and the peaceful transfer of power 
between parties.  
248 
 
Chapter 6: Conclusion: Forecasting risks to the Panama Canal’s future 
success, and extracting lessons from its past performance 
 
Introduction 
 The Panama Canal Authority could still stumble. Just as predictions of failure 
following the canal turnover proved misguided, it would be folly to forecast success 
going forward without at least a mention of risk factors. In other words, past performance 
is no guarantee of future results, as they say on Wall Street.
1036
 Ironically, given the 
historical pessimism regarding Panama’s canal management, it the canal’s vulnerabilities 
that are now often overlooked. 
 These days, there is far less discussion of the canal’s future than in previous eras. 
In the construction phase, in the early 20th century, the canal was the toast of the town. 
Later, the canal treaty negotiations, in the 1960s and 1970s, were a bête noir for U.S. 
conservatives. The rocky transition to Panamanian ownership kept international attention 
focused on the canal, especially after U.S. paratroopers invaded Panama to depose 
Manuel Noriega in 1989. By contrast, the era of Panamanian canal control has chugged 
along in relative obscurity. For journalists, it is the dog that didn’t bite. Canal 
infrastructure never collapsed. Corruption never metastasized. Mismanagement never 
materialized. Even the canal’s 100th anniversary, in 2014, was acknowledged primarily 
in Panama. This anonymity lends a sense of comfortable status quo to Panama’s canal 
operation. A reassuring measure of positive momentum. The appearance of a virtuous 
circle, powered by deepening Panamanian expertise. Panama’s mountain of impressive 
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performance data triggered a tectonic shift in international opinion of Panama’s canal 
authority. 
Many of the biggest threats to the canal have become historical artifacts. The end 
of the Cold War eliminated the Soviet menace to the canal, and to its host nation. 
Similarly, the absence of major wars – armed conflicts involving global powers – greatly 
lowers the chances of a foreign military assault on the canal. Panamanian canal 
ownership means Panamanian security forces will not target the waterway, and gives 






Still, it appears the pendulum may have swung too far when it comes to judging 
the Panama Canal’s prospects. The list of threats to the canal is lengthy, and growing. Put 
another way, if Panama Canal Authority stock were traded on the New York Stock 
Exchange, its risk factor disclosures would spook cautious investors. For starters, a 
variety of external factors still greatly influence the canal’s success. Global economic 
misfortune reduces international trade, which eats away at the Panama Canal’s bottom 
line. The 2008 global economic meltdown offers a cautionary tale. The United States, by 
far the canal’s biggest user,
1038
 saw its over all goods exports plummet from $1.29 trillion 
in 2008 to $1.06 trillion in 2009, an 18 percent decline.
1039
 U.S. imports saw an even 
steeper contraction, dropping from $2.10 trillion in 2008 to $1.56 trillion in 2009, a 26 
percent decline. The impacts of the global financial crisis also hit other canal users; in all, 
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total global merchandise exports and imports fell 19 percent in first quarter of 2009 
compared to the corresponding period in 2008.
1040
 Consequently, total Panama Canal 
revenue declined in 2009 for the first time under Panamanian ownership, falling by 2.3 
percent, to $1.96 billion.
1041
 That revenue decline would have been significantly worse if 
not for a 10.1 percent toll increase, phased in during May and October of 2009.
1042
 
The canal also remains vulnerable to shifting trade patterns. On October 5, 2015, 
11 Pacific Rim countries approved the Trans-Pacific Partnership free trade agreement.
1043
 
The pact could reshape maritime commerce, increasing trade between East Asia and 
countries on South America’s Pacific coast, a route that does not cross the Panama Canal. 
That potential diversion of business is emblematic of a chronic, structural weakness at the 
waterway: The canal is simply insufficiently diversified, and bound by its geography. The 
United States still accounts for 70 percent of canal traffic, followed by China, the origin 
or destination of 23 percent of cargo. That could conceivably change with economic 
growth in South America, where only Chile (13 percent) and Colombia (9.6 percent) 
figure among the top five canal users. Peru, for example, relies upon the canal for 31 
percent of its maritime trade, and its economy has been growing steadily in recent years. 
For the foreseeable future, however, Panama’s fortunes will be linked to economic trends 
in the United States and China. 
The canal is also threatened by increased competition. The reduction of Arctic ice 
brought about by climate change is creating a new, summertime shipping route that could 
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eventually draw business away from the Panama Canal.
1044
 A 2009 report by the Arctic 
Council, an intergovernmental forum,
1045
 noted that “Arctic sea ice has been observed to 
be decreasing in extent and thickness during the second half of the 20th century and early 
21st century.” Computer models, the council reported, predicted “a continuing retreat of 
sea ice” and raised the possibility of an ice-free Arctic Ocean in the summer months.
1046
 
The resulting Northern Sea Route begins at the Kara Strait in northern Russia, east of 
Finland, and stretches circuitously around Greenland and North America to the Bering 
Straight, between Russia and Alaska. The route, also known as the Northeast Passage, 
shaves between 35 to 60 percent off the distance between northern European ports and 
ports in East Asia, compared to trips through the Panama Canal or the Suez Canal. The 
journey is still treacherous; mariners face drifting icebergs even in the summer, and cargo 
ships are typically chaperoned by icebreakers. In bad news for Panama, however, the 
environmental trends highlighted in the 2009 Arctic Council report have continued. On 
February 25, 2015, scientists observed the lowest Arctic maximum extent (i.e., the ice 
coverage at the beginning of the sea ice melt season) in the satellite record,
1047
 and saw 
downward trends in over all Arctic sea ice concentration
1048
 and extent in all months.
1049
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A proposed canal across Nicaragua poses another threat to the Panama Canal. As 
discussed, the idea of a Nicaragua waterway was long considered an attractive alternative 
to a canal in Panama. In 1901, a commission set up by President William McKinley 
(1897 to 1901) to identify the “most practicable and feasible route” for a transisthmian 
canal concluded two years of scientific research.
1050
 Its findings endorsed Nicaragua as 
the ideal canal site.
1051
 Panama, of course, ultimately won the political debate in the U.S. 
Congress. However, a century later, in 2013, Wang Jing, a little known Chinese 
telecommunications tycoon, revived Nicaragua’s long deferred canal dream. He proposed 
a $50 billion, 173-mile transoceanic waterway running through Lake Nicaragua, the 
largest lake in Central America. To many, Wang’s project has always seemed far-fetched. 
His proposed canal would be wider, deeper and three and a half times the length of the 
Panama Canal. Lake Nicaragua is 95 feet above sea level,
1052
 and his proposed waterway 
would require an estimated 4.6 billion cubic meters of excavation.
1053
 The Panama Canal 
Authority – hardly objective, but always analytical – is skeptical of Wang’s so-called 
Grand Nicaragua Canal.
1054
 Given the scale of the project, “they’ll have a very difficult 
time to compete,” Jorge L. Quijano, the Panama Canal CEO, said. He estimated 
construction would actually cost $70 billion. To be profitable, Nicaragua would have to 
charge double the Panama Canal tolls, a rate that would send ships fleeing around the 
Cape of Good Hope. 
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The Grand Nicaragua Canal has attracted fierce opposition locally, from both 
indigenous communities and conservationists in an uproar over a project they say would 
destroy or alter 1 million acres of rainforest and wetland, and foul Lake Nicaragua, the 
country’s principle source of drinking water.
1055
 Because Nicaragua’s concession to 
Wang, published in English only,
1056
 permits construction of an airport, two seaside ports, 
a railroad, an oil pipeline, a four-lane highway, hotels and free-trade zones, some say he 
hoodwinked Nicaragua and never actually planned to build the promised waterway. 
(Whatever his intensions at the outset, it appears unlikely Wang now has the financial 
wherewithal for the project; in 2015, a steep Chinese stock market decline reportedly 
deprived him of 85 percent of his $10 billion fortune.) Skepticism about Wang’s 
intensions is popular among those who deeply mistrust Nicaraguan President Daniel 
Ortega,
1057
 a former Sandinista guerrilla. Ortega’s formal announcement of the Grand 
Nicaragua Canal followed a long period of unfriendly speculation, with questions raised 
about the feasibility of the project, which has been described as “one of the region’s 
biggest financial scams.”
1058
 Some even doubted Wang’s existence. “Here is our brother 
Wang Jing,” Ortega said at the canal announcement, dressed in a suede jacket and 
collarless white shirt. “Here is the phantom, in flesh and blood!”
1059
 
Ortega might be something of a clown, but the Grand Nicaragua Canal is not 
wholly laughable. The proposed Nicaragua waterway would have distinct advantages 
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over its neighborhood rival, such as its proposed dimensions, large enough to 
accommodate supertankers too large even for the expanded Panama Canal to handle.
1060
 
(These ships, of mindboggling size, have been at sea since at least 2014 and include the 
Maersk Triple-E’s,
1061
 which carry more than 18,000 containers.
1062
 Many liquefied 
natural gas carriers are also too large even for the expanded Panama Canal. Nicaragua 
says its canal would accommodate ships moving as many as 20,000 containers at a time 
and bulk carriers the length of 12 football fields.
1063
) Meanwhile, it is possible that 
Wang’s HK Nicaragua Canal Development Investment Company is merely a stalking 
horse for the Chinese government, as many have suggested. In that case, astronomically 
high tolls would not be required to satisfy investors whose primary interest is a 
transoceanic waterway not dominated by the United States. That could yield costly 
competition driving down Panama Canal tolls. Questioned about the Grand Nicaragua 
Canal, Quijano once acknowledged that the Panama Canal might have to expand yet 
again in only 25 years.
1064








The Panama Canal is also subject to dramatic technological changes and global 
economic phenomena out of its control. Historically, technological advancement and 
                                                             
1060
 Panama Canal officials downplay any limitations based on the size of the new locks, estimating that 98 
percent of vessels would fit through the new lane. 
1061
 Hakim, Danny, “Aboard a Cargo Colossus,” The New York Times, October 3, 2014. 
1062
 Each Triple E is large enough to transport 144 million pairs of sneakers. The downside: the 194-foot 
wide hull is wider than the 160-foot capacity of the new canal locks. 
1063
 Johnson, Tim, “A Skeptical Panama Pays Heed to Possible Rival Nicaraguan Canal,” McClatchy, 
February 9, 2015. 
1064
 “Panama Canal to Get New Upgrade Within 25 Years,” Agence France-Presse, September 23, 2014. 
1065
 Former Panamanian President Martín Torrijos, in an interview by author, mentioned the arctic route. 
255 
 
long-term global economic transformations have been a boon for the Panama Canal. 
Globalization provided the strongest tailwinds. International trade exploded after World 
War Two, with global merchandise exports increasing by over 9 percent annually in real 
terms from 1950 to 1973.
1066
 Oil shocks and inflation helped slow the growth in trade. 
But global export growth accelerated again in the 1990s, averaging 6 percent from 2000 
to 2007, leading up to the 2008 global economic crisis. Similarly, containerization was a 
blessing for the canal business in Panama. Nowadays, this ubiquitous technique seems 
both obvious and timeless. But containerization is actually a fairly recent phenomenon. 
The transport of freight in large, uniform containers did not become common in ocean 
shipping until the 1960s, after shipyards began building vessels specially designed to 
carry containers, above and below deck.
1067
 (Railroads relied upon a similar process 
decades earlier.) The method is particularly efficient because of the way ports have 
adapted to containerization, acquiring equipment including towering, 200-foot tall cranes 
that rapidly load and unload ships, trucks and railroads – all designed to carry standard, 
forty foot steel or aluminum boxes. As a result, the cost of shipping greatly declined, as 
shippers no longer relied upon “armies of ill-paid, ill-treated workers who once made 
their livings loading and unloading ships.”
1068
 Poor countries, often distant from major 
global markets, could suddenly attract foreign manufacturers to set up shop and churn out 
clothes, shoes and electronics. In industrialized countries, manufactures increasingly 
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discovered exporting. In both cases, much of the new maritime trading flowed through 
the Panama Canal. 
The Panama Canal is also positioned to benefit from advances in horizontal 
drilling and hydraulic fracturing technologies that have given drillers access to the natural 
gas and oil in the vast U.S. shale formations. That technology as propelled the United 
States to the number one spot on the list of global petroleum producers, ahead of Saudi 
Arabia and Russia,
1069
 and to the top position among natural gas producers.
1070
 The U.S. 
natural gas bonanza is particularly relevant to the Panama Canal. Whereas in an earlier 
era, U.S. Alaskan and California crude generated significant northbound traffic on the 
canal, now exporters along the U.S. Gulf Coast are poised to ship massive amounts of 
liquefied natural gas southbound through the canal to Asia. The U.S. Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission has approved multiple liquefied natural gas export terminals, 
including Cheniere Energy’s Sabine Pass liquefaction complex on the Louisiana coast. 
That $12 billion facility is designed to chill natural gas to -260 Fahrenheit so it is 
transportable on tankers that will ply the newly expanded Panama Canal. In the case of 
the global energy market, volatility cuts both ways for Panama. Increasing global natural 
gas supplies are expected to slow investment in liquefaction projects in the United States. 
The plummeting price of energy will also hurt the Panama Canal; oil prices are below 
$40 a barrel, down from $126 in 2012, a 68 percent decline. Still, the five liquefied 
natural gas export terminals under construction in the United States, including Sabine 
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Pass, likely have multiyear contracts in place with buyers, guaranteeing at least a medium 





In general, however, technological change creates winners and losers. Just look at 
Eastman Kodak. In 1976, the company, founded in 1880, produced 90 percent of all film 
and 85 percent of all cameras sold in the United States.
1071
 Eventually, digital cameras 
began eroding the sale of both film and film cameras. Kodak’s revenue fell from $16 
billion in 1996 to $2.5 billion three years later.
1072
 At its 1,300-acre corporate campus in 
Rochester, N.Y., Kodak demolished 80 of its 200 buildings and sold another 59.
1073
 Its 
payroll fell from 145,000 to 8,000.
1074
 Digital technology is also no friend to the U.S. 
Postal Service. The widespread use of e-mail has helped reduce total mail volume from 
211.7 billion in 2005 to 155.4 billion in 2014,
1075
 a 27 percent decline. For U.S. 
newspapers, the advent of free online content – including from their own Web sites – has 
brought about relentless declines in circulation and revenue. Total daily circulation of 
U.S. newspapers fell from $62 million in 1989 to $40 million in 2014, a 35 percent 
drop.
1076
 Total print ad revenue fell from $45 billion in 2003 to $16 billion in 2014,
1077
 a 
64 percent decline. The examples of Kodak, the U.S. Postal Service and newspapers are 
clearly unrelated to the maritime shipping business. But they illustrate the 
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unpredictability of technological change, and the potentially disruptive effects on well-
established businesses. So yes, containerization and fracking have given Panama’s 
waterway a leg up in recent years. There is no reason, however, to believe in the future 
that all technological advances will benefit the Panama Canal. 
Panama is also helpless to combat changes in the planet’s climate that could 
profoundly impact the Panama Canal business model. The biggest threat is drought. The 
Panama Canal Authority fastidiously manages the canal watershed, through surveillance 
of deforestation and the use of water-saving technology in the new canal locks. Still, the 
canal authority does not control rainfall. That is a problem, given the waterway’s thirst 
for water. Every ship that transits the canal requires 52 million gallons of freshwater from 
Gatun Lake, equal to the combined volume of 82 Olympic-sized swimming pools.
1078
 In 
recent years, prolonged dry spells have significantly lowered the level of the lake, 
threatening the canal’s viability as a shipping lane for large ships. As a result, in 2015, 
the canal authority temporarily prohibited transit by ships exceeding 39 feet of draft.
1079
 
Climate change will make extreme weather events more common. Scientists expect a 
greater frequency of El Niño occurrences, involving a warming of ocean sea surface 
temperatures that causes warmer temperatures and drier-than-average conditions in 
Panama. Over all, annual precipitation is expected to decrease in most of Central 
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 In the canal management categories that it controls, Panama has shined thus far, 
even if President Jimmy Carter is still waiting for his mea cuplas. (“It’s hard for 
politicians to admit that they were wrong,” Carter said.
1080
) Nevertheless, there are threats 
to the Panama Canal’s success that originate inside Panama’s borders and keep canal 
watchers up at night. These principally fall into two separate, but potentially interlinked, 
categories: (1) The potential rise of a Panamanian president who does not respect the 
canal’s autonomy; and (2) a severe economic crisis that leads Panamanian policymakers 
to raid the canal’s coffers, or to use its payroll as a dumping ground for the unemployed 
(Figure 1). Both scenarios are plausible. Panama does not permit consecutive presidential 
reelection, but its political system is still dominated by the executive branch. The 
Panamanian president serves a five year term, dominates the unicameral legislature and 
wields broad powers, including the right to decree a state of emergency and suspend 
constitutional guarantees. Given those prerogatives, the election of a populist 
authoritarian in Panama could jeopardize the Panama Canal’s indispensible autonomy. 
Even in Panama’s baseline scenario, corruption is rampant, as is patronage.
1081
 
“Presidents in this country are so powerful they can do a lot of damage,” Enrique E. 
Sánchez, the canal’s top procurement official, said. “Organizations like ours can be 
threatened if you get a Chávez.”
1082
 Though the Panama Canal remains meritocratic, 
there were widespread fears that President Ricardo Martinelli would meddle in the 
selection in 2012 of a successor to longtime canal CEO Alberto Alemán. Ultimately, the 
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hiring process advanced independently, and the canal kept its strong reputation. 
Panamanians, however, recall other moments when the canal appointment process did not 
meet expectations, such as in the late 1990s, when President Ernesto Pérez Balladares 
appointed four members of his family to the canal’s governing board,
1083
 alongside a 
handful of cronies.
1084
 That troubling experience, shortly before the canal turnover, helps 
explain the concerns regarding Martinelli. “I was surprised myself,” Quijano said of his 
appointment as Alemán’s replacement, the first time a career canal official landed the top 
job. “I thought it would be more political.”
1085
 Martinelli “exposed a vulnerability,” Gene 
Bigler, who served in U.S. Embassy in Panama City after the turnover, concluded.
1086
 
A severe recession – especially if coupled with the election of a strongman – 
could also constrain canal autonomy. The Panama Canal has not faced either of these 
tests since its transfer to Panama. Since 2000, Panama has experienced 16 consecutive 
years of positive economic growth. In the last six years, GDP growth has not fallen below 
five percent. Still, Panama has many of the ingredients that often promote heavy handed, 
redistributive policies, and hyperpresidentialism. Poverty remains high; Panama ranked 
60th on the United Nations Development Program’s Human Development Index in 2014, 
below Belarus (50th), Kazakhstan (56th) and Bulgaria (59th). 
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Despite increasing per capita income – $19,455 in 2014, the highest in Central America – 
life expectancy in Panama is only 77 years old, compared to 80 in the United States.
1087
 
The poverty rate is particularly egregious in rural areas, home to the most disadvantaged 
Panamanians, including indigenous communities where sanitation is limited. Panama is 
one of the world’s most unequal countries. The richest 20 percent of Panamanians hoard 
56 percent of all income.
1088
 Panama’s Gini coefficient of 51.7
1089
 puts Panama in the top 
20 globally, worse than Swaziland (50.4) and Papua New Guinea (50.9).
1090
 In these 
conditions, it is not hard to imagine a populist president questioning whether the Panama 
Canal Authority should retain $11.2 billion in reserves
1091
 while 3 percent of the 
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population lives on $1.90 a day.
1092
 “You look at the balance sheet of the canal and what 
do you see? Cash,” Ricaurte Vásquez, the former deputy administrator of the canal, 
said.
1093
 In normal times, even a populist leader of Panama would be unlikely to pressure 
the canal authority to auction off its dredges, towboats, floating cranes and launches to 
cushion government accounts. Deep fiscal troubles, however, could put severe pressure 
on canal independence. 
Panama might be headed in that direction. Lately, Panamanian officials have 
loosened the purse strings, with the 2016 fiscal deficit estimated at 1.2 percent of GDP. 
Public sector debt has increased from 43 percent of GDP in 2012 to an estimated 47 
percent in 2015,
1094
 the result of extravagant infrastructure spending. In times of growth – 
GDP increased by 8.5 percent in 2014 – that level of public spending is arguably 
sustainable. But on a rainy day, Panamanian budget writers might begin to question the 
Panama Canal Authority’s significant reinvestment of profits. In 2014, for example, the 
canal board set aside nearly $300 million of the $1.325 billion net profits. (Even in 
Panama’s fat-cow years, there is grumbling about the size of the canal dividend.
1095
) 
“They’re not a hermetically sealed entity that no one in the government is paying 
attention to,” Christopher L. Koch, president of the World Shipping Council, said.
1096
 For 
that reason, canal officials often express interest in the national economy, and look for 
linkages to other sectors. The canal authority coordinates closely with the National 
Competitiveness Center, run by former President Nicolás Ardito Barletta.
1097
 There is 
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great promise. Eighty percent of container vessels that transit the canal stop at a port to 
drop off or pick up cargo – an important transshipment business for Panama. “I’m not 
just pushing the canal, I’m pushing Panama,” Quijano said in a speech in Washington in 
2015. At the end of the day, however, the canal cannot shield Panama from the business 
cycle or control global trade, any more than it can make it rain over Lake Gatun. Nor 
does the canal control other public institutions in Panama, despite expectations that its 
example might professionalize, and clean up, the rest of the Panamanian government. 
There are some spillovers; Panama’s Ministry of Education, for example, has adopted the 
canal authority’s contracting regulations, which Panamanian authorities also used for its 
first subway.
1098
 In general, however, many in Panama fear the influence could go in the 








 The Panama Canal Authority also has an image problem that could jeopardize its 
operations in tougher times. Outside Panama, the canal authority is widely respected in 
the maritime industry, as demonstrated by private surveys.
1100
 The canal authority’s 
official Customer Satisfaction Index hit 98.5 percent in the 2014 fiscal year.
1101
 Inside 
Panama, the canal itself is an unalloyed emblem of Panamanians nationhood. Panama 
Canal Zone independence is modern Panama’s proudest accomplishment. The 
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independence of the Panama Canal Authority, on the other hand, tends to irritate 
Panamanians. Former Panamanian strongman Omar Torrijos foresaw this problem after 
he signed the Carter-Torrijos treaties. In a speech, he acknowledged fears that Panama 
would “recover this expanse of land merely to change owners, to change a blond master 
for a dark master.” To critics, the administrative policies and cultural norms lovingly 
preserved from the U.S. canal era are a colonial hangover, and the authority’s autonomy 
from Panama’s elected leaders is undemocratic. Surveys suggest Panamanians feel 
distant from the canal.
1102
 In 2002, one Panamanian critic, Virgilio Araúz, published a 
book lambasting the Panama Canal Authority for behaving like a “government within a 
government.”
1103
 In his cri de coeur, “The Fight for Sovereignty and the Policies of the 
Panama Canal Authority,” he criticized the canal authority for siphoning resources from 
Panama to reinvest in the canal,
1104
 and he called for the canal’s finances to be 
incorporated into the national budget. “Our fight is not over,”
1105
 he said. Many 
Panamanians bemoan the elitist attitudes of canal executives. They also grumble about 
the persistent exclusivity of the former Panama Canal Zone, where gated communities, 
hot stone massages at the Gamboa Rainforest Resort and the Victoria Secret outlet at the 
upscale Albrook Mall draw wealthy foreigners and price out working class locals. “A few 
Panamanian intellectuals and leftists dislike the autonomy,” Roberto Roy, chairman of 
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 Panama Canal Authority executives understand that their operational 
independence depends not only on constitutional prerogatives and solid financial 
performance, but also on the willingness of Panamanians to give them plenty of breathing 
room. For that reason, as discussed, the canal budget supports a constellation of outreach 
programs, including literal bridge building in Colón, where canal authority volunteers 
also rehabilitate schools and clean up beaches. Like a U.S. defense contractor sourcing 
airplane parts in every congressional district, the Panama Canal Authority boasts of 
employees from even distant provinces.
1107
 These investments in corporate social 
responsibility, however, have failed to make the canal relatable.
1108
 Despite its consistent 
and impressive financial performance, the Panama Canal Authority is not particularly 
popular. Vanderbilt University, in Nashville, Tenn., has been biannually surveying 
Panamanians about the Panama Canal Authority since 2008.
1109
 In each survey, 
respondents are asked to rate their confidence in the canal authority on a scale of 1 to 7. 
The results are not encouraging. The mean response has never exceed 5.2, and it has 
fallen in each of the past two surveys.
1110
 The canal authority is also struggling to 
differentiate itself from other public institutions and businesses in Panama. Under 
Aléman, canal officials used to invite survivors of the January 9, 1964 canal riots to visit 
the waterway and discuss their role in the canal’s history. Today, those stories resonate 
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less and less. Eighty-four percent of Panamanians were either not born at the time of the 
riots, or were less than two year old. 
Panama’s youthful demographics have significant implications for the attitudes 
and morale of canal employees. There are fewer and fewer canal workers whose 
professional commitment and motivation are fueled by personal memories of the 
country’s struggle to recover the Panama Canal Zone. At the same time, there are fewer 
and fewer canal employees who were mentored by U.S. canal officials. Taken together, 
some observers say, that has made the average canal worker less dedicated and arguably 
less technically prepared. Eventually, the canal “is going to be like any other government 
institution, full of bureaucrats and political appointees,” Fernando Cardoze, who served 
twice on the Panama Canal Commission’s Board of Directors, said.
1111
 There are signs 
that such a transition is already underway. Historically, every Panamanian mother 
dreamed of landing her child a job at the canal. Those lucky enough to work at the 
waterway felt intimately linked to the operation. Enrique E. Sánchez, the head of canal 
procurement, is a telling example. Sánchez is a third generation canal employee: his 
Jamaican-born grandparents worked at the canal, with his mother’s father hired as a canal 
laborer and his father’s father working as a carpenter at the canal railroad. His own father 
was a technician for water meters in the former Panama Canal Zone. These days, a 
worker’s connection to the canal does not always last a career, let alone span generations 
in one family. As Panama’s economy has grown and diversified, the private sector has 
begun luring away the next generation of canal leaders. In 2013, for example, two heavy 
machinery operators resigned, the first time in recent memory that employees at that level 
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had ditched the canal for another job.
1112
 Recruitment is also a growing challenge. The 
authority hires 50 new employees every year, and it has increasingly found itself going 
head-to-head with multinational companies that operate their regional headquarters in 
Panama City. “The canal is not necessarily the first option anymore,” Francisco Loaiza, 
the canal’s top human resources official, said.
1113
 To improve recruitment, retention and 
the canal’s esprit de corps, Loaiza set up a professional development program titled, 
“Identidad Canalera,” which attempts to differentiate the canal experience from a job at, 
say, General Electric or Google. The effort is critical, as young Panamanians often have 
little appreciation for the canal’s traditional special status in Panamanian society. “The 
new generation sees the canal as just another business,” Loaiza said, not as the “the 
product of a generational battle.”
1114
 
 A survey in September 2015 revealed more fundamental troubles with the canal’s 
public profile in Panama.
1115
 Prior to the canal turnover, 49 percent of Panamanians 
expected Panama to manage the canal somewhat or very efficiently.
1116
 Today, 15 years, 
224,424 transits
1117
 and billions of dollars in revenue later, the perception of canal 
performance has barely budged (Figure 2).
1118
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 In all administrative categories, the number of respondents who say the quality of canal 
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Figure 2. 
Perception of 




For example, nearly a quarter of respondents (23 percent) say maintenance is worse under 
Panamanian management. In terms of customer service, the Panama Canal Authority’s 
supposed specialty, 60 percent of respondents see a deterioration or no improvement, 
though it is not clear how respondents are judging that category. Most worrisome of all, 
less than a third of Panamanians (29 percent) say the canal contributes more to 
Panamanian wellbeing under Panamanian ownership than under U.S. control. Perhaps 
that is not the relevant comparison; there is no plausible scenario involving a return of the 
canal to the United States. Arguably, it would be sufficient if the average Panamanian 
shared the elite opinion that the Panama Canal Authority is immeasurably superior to 
other Panamanian institutions. That way, Panamanian society would be more likely to 








however, the survey gives cause for concern. Only 21 percent of Panamanians say the 
Panama Canal Authority is better than Panama’s executive branch (Figure 4). 
 
 
The contrast between the canal authority’s self image and the public perception is stark. 
The canal authority projects incorruptibility, bolstered by an independent and crusading 
inspector general. Still, 38 percent of Panamanians see corruption as the greatest 
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The survey results were not entirely grave, however. The Panamanians with arguably the 
most political influence – the most urban and the most educated – have a higher than 
average opinion of the canal authority. For example, 32 percent of college educated 
Panamanians say the canal contributes more to Panamanian society now than it did in the 
U.S. era, compared to 27 percent of those without a high school education. Similarly, 28 
percent of college educated Panamanians consider the canal authority superior to the 
executive branch, compared to 18 percent of the least educated respondents. 
The Panama Canal Authority still enjoys significant constitutional and legal 
protections. It has elite backing. It has earned international admiration, and could rely 
upon the implicit support of multinational shippers and sympathetic governments in any 
conflict with the political branches of the Panamanian government. Still, if canal official 
thought they were protected by a bulwark of favorable public opinion, they should think 
again. 







Case Study Disease 
 
 A final threat to the canal’s future is vague and paradoxical, but still worth 
mentioning. To cynics, the very fact of Panama’s success running the canal is foreboding. 
Why? Because today’s case studies are tomorrow’s cautionary tales. This is a fairly 
universal phenomenon, but what might be called the “case study disease” appears 
especially common with state-owned enterprises. The reason is not clear. Perhaps 
observers are so excited to find a rare example of successful state-owned enterprise 
management that they ignore the vulnerabilities. Or maybe it is that state-owned 
enterprises are human constructs, and therefore inherently imperfect. Either way, the long 
history of case studies gone wrong is enough to induce a panic attack when considering 
the seemingly bright future of the Panama Canal. 
Examples of chronically mismanaged state-owned enterprises are legion, as 
discussed. The most recent example is in Puerto Rico, where irresponsible state-owned 
enterprises have helped push the island toward financial ruin. (The Puerto Rican power 
authority notoriously accumulated $9 billion in debt by providing free power to Puerto 
Rico’s 78 municipalities, many other state-owned enterprises and to a handful of private 
businesses.) However, there are also worrisome instances of state-owned enterprises that 
have thrived, and then fallen from grace. Brazil offers two compelling examples: Petroleo 
Brasileiro, known as Petrobrás, and the Brazilian Development Bank, known as BNDES. 
For decades, Petrobrás was the pride of Brazil. The integrated energy company handled 
exploration and production, refining, distribution, dabbled in petrochemicals and worked 
in conventional and shale oil and gas, as well as ethanol. Its size, track record, operational 
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independence, and 49 percent ownership by private investors challenged the notion that a 
state-owned enterprise could not go toe-to-toe with private sector competitors. Today, 
Petrobrás is shorthand for government corruption. In 2014, a massive Petrobrás scandal 
came to light that has destabilized Brazilian politics, deepened a recession, left thousands 
of Brazilians out of a job and “all but devastated Brazil’s status as an up-and-comer on 
the world stage.”
1121
 Beginning in 2014, investigators have learned, Petrobrás executives 
began soliciting bribes – including cash, Rolexes, $3,000 bottles of wine, yachts, 
helicopters and prostitutes – in return for letting companies overcharge Petrobrás for a 
range of services, such as maintaining an oil rig or building a refinery. In all, the 
kickbacks totaled $3 billion – bribes that Petrobrás executives split with members of the 
ruling Workers Party, which allegedly pocketed $200 million through the “Operation 
Carwash” scheme. During part of that period, Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff served 
as the Petrobrás chairman. As a result of the scandal, 117 Brazilian individuals and 13 
companies face criminal charges; prosecutors have arrested five Brazilian politicians; and 
Petrobrás, once the sixth-largest company in the world, has lost $70 billion, about half its 
pre-scandal value. The value of Petrobrás shares has plummeted from $72.38 on May 23, 
2008 to $3.03 on January 22, 2016. In November 2015, Petrobrás Chairman Murilo 
Ferreira resigned, disrupting the company’s desperate attempts to sell $57 billion in 
assets by the end of 2017.
1122
 
As with Petrobrás, the Brazilian government used to get kudos for its 
management of BNDES, the massive development bank. As recently as 2013, Johns 
Hopkins University researcher Seth Colby highlighted BNDES’s role in Brazil’s 
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economic development, and declared it free of the rent-seeking and corruption that 
plague so many state-owned financial institutions globally.
1123
 Colby acknowledged that 
BNDES had critics. For example, in a 2012 paper, Mansueto Almeida and Ben Ross 
Schneider argued that BNDES primarily subsidized so-called national champions, an 
approach similar to the policies that contributed to the 1980s Latin America debt crisis. In 
particular, the authors criticized BNDES for locking Brazil into its position as an 
economy specializing in commodities and low-tech exports. Today, as Brazil struggles to 
overcome a deepening recession, BNDES has come under even greater scrutiny. BNDES 
does not face the accusations of corruption that dog Petrobrás. However, its critics, 
including the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, say BNDES’s 
size and subsidized interest rates are crowding out private loans: BNDES is the largest 
development lender in Latin America, with outstanding loans equal to 6 percent of 
Brazil’s gross domestic product
1124
 and a pace of lending that far outstrips the World 
Bank.
1125
 The subsidies – Brazil has shoveled $138 billion into BNDES – have permitted 
BNDES to dominate the country’s financial sector, controlling a quarter of outstanding 
loans. Other critiques call on BNDES to pay more attention to infrastructure projects and 
small and medium-sized enterprises. For now, critics say, four-fifths of BNDES lending 
goes to large companies, such as Marfrig, the food processing giant and, of course, 
Petrobrás. Public spending on BNDES now exceeds the cost of Bolsa Familía, Brazil’s 
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mega monthly cash transfer program. That milestone, and BNDES’s lending style, have 







 Can Panama avoid the fate of the once-admired Venezuelan or Brazilian oil 
companies? Can it sustain its success in the face of drought, competition from the 
Northern Sea Route, an expanding Suez Canal
1127
 and a possible Grand Nicaragua Canal? 
Can it survive an economic downturn in Panama, and the election of a populist hell-bent 
on stripping the canal of its independence, and dipping into its bank accounts? It is 
impossible to say. As Juan Sosa, Panama’s former U.S. ambassador, wrote in his memoir, 
“only time will tell.”
1128
 
Panama’s failure, however, is hardly inevitable. Not all state-owned enterprises 
stumble. As Mariana Mazzucato writes in “The Entrepreneurial State,” the popular view 
of national governments as “bureaucratic, inertial, heavy-handed” is a crude 
stereotype.
1129
 So far, at the Panama Canal, the evidence of state capacity is impressive. 
Opponents of the Carter-Torrijos treaties had portrayed Panamanians as “subhumans,” 
dedicated to the narcotics trade and too incompetent to operate the canal, President 
Jimmy Carter wrote in his diary during the treaty negotiations.
1130
 In fact, the canal 
business has been strong since the first day after the turnover, 16 years ago. Toll revenue 
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in the 2014 fiscal year amounted to $1.9 billion, compared to $769 million in 2000. 
Despite repeated and sizable toll hikes, alternative routes have not lured away canal 
customers. The Panama Canal’s “value is unquestioned, and its value in the future will be 
every bit as important as it was in the past,” James E. Caponiti, president of the American 
Maritime Congress, said.
1131
 The data for canal transits and tonnage is astounding, even 
as Panama’s performance fluctuates with global economic trends. As discussed, accidents 
are down, transit speed is respectable and customers are thrilled. There has been no hint 
of corruption or patronage, even as the Panama Canal Authority undertook a $5.25 billion 
expansion project. Unlike most state-owned enterprises – like state-owned railroads in the 
United Kingdom or most public utilities – the Panamanian public does not pressure the 
canal to keep prices low, since few Panamanians are canal customers. As long as 
Panamanians keep seeing the dividends flowing, the canal gets to go about its business. 
“They feed the bear,” Richard Morgan, a former senior U.S. canal official said. “If they 
keep on paying that to the government, the government is unlikely to mess with 
them.”
1132
 The Panamanian public, in a 2006 referendum, expressed its confidence in 
canal management by authorizing the costly expansion. In 2012, the canal authorities 
appointed a new administrator without any apparent political intervention, cronyism or 
favoritism. Politicization “is always a risk,” Manuel E. Benítez, the deputy canal 
administrator, said.
1133
 But it is unlikely, he said: “Putting that at risk puts at risk the 
image of the country.” So while the canal’s future is uncertain, the baseline scenario is 
continued professionalism and financial success. 
                                                             
1131
 Interview by author with James E. Caponiti, December 2, 2014. 
1132
 Interview by author with Richard Morgan, May 11, 2015. 
1133
 Interview by author with Manuel E. Benítez, Panama City, Panama, August 5, 2013. 
277 
 
 Given the mixed track record of most state-owned enterprises, Panama’s success 
is unlikely the result of dumb luck. Rather, Panama’s unique approach to structuring and 
managing the Panama deserves considerable credit, as do the public, elite and 
government commitments to preserving that successful model. As discussed at length, the 
foundation of the Panamanian model was the determined effort to build a national 
consensus about the canal’s structure and future management. In the years after the 
devastating 1989 U.S. invasion, Panama, with help from the United Nations, held 
national dialogues on the future of the canal that spread responsibility for the waterway to 
all sectors of Panamanian society. Suddenly, the canal had millions of guardians, and 
anyone who wished it harm expected sharp public disapproval. 
The canal’s institutional framework is similarly unique and estimable. Both the 
Panama Canal’s constitutional foundation, approved in 1995, and the 1997 canal 
legislation represented an astonishing delegation of power by the Panamanian presidency 
and legislature. The Panama Canal Authority, as a result, is truly an autonomous legal 
entity. The Panamanian president can unilaterally appoint only one member of the canal’s 
11-member governing board. Board members serve staggered, nine-year terms. The 
board is invested with quasi-legislative authority, including the right to set tolls. Canal 
employees are subject to a special, merit-based labor regime, and prohibited from 
striking. The canal is financially independent, and required to turn a profit. It is 
prohibited from buying government debt, or from guaranteeing government obligations. 
Taken together, this institutional design and the societal consensus that sustains have 
turned Panama into an unlikely case study in successful state-owned enterprise 
management. These advantages will not make it rain in Panama, stop Nicaragua from 
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building a rival waterway, or keep the Trans-Pacific Partnership or melting Arctic ice 
from diverting trade. However, it seems clear that “if the Panama Canal declines in the 
future, it will be because of shifts in the global economy,” and “not because of a 
Panamanian inability to run the Panama Canal.”
1134
 Walter Bottin, who worked for the 
canal from 1963 to 2000 and still lives in the former Panama Canal Zone, puts it plainly: 
“If they were going to screw it up, they’d have screwed it up already.” 
 At the canal, screw ups are rare nowadays. The Panamanians make it look easy. 
The Panamanian flagged NYK Meteor, a full container ship traveling between Shanghai 
and New York,
1135
 regularly transits the canal carrying 4,067 containers. It is gigantic; at 
965 feet long, with a beam (width) of 106 feet, the NYK Meteor barely fits inside the 
canal’s 1,000 feet long, 110-feet wide locks. Its transit require help from 22 linehandlers 
and eight locomotives. Nevertheless, the NYK Meteor’s shortcut across Panama is 
routine, and borderline mundane. In a recent transit, the vessel made a predawn approach 
to the canal’s Pacific entrance, with lighting and the Panama City skyline visible in the 
distance. In the pitch black, choppy Pacific waters, a launch approached to drop off a 
Panama Canal Authority pilot, who climbed a ladder to board the container ship and take 
command of the bridge from the captain, helmsman and third mate. Nearby, a car carrier 
edged into the canal channel, as a Maersk post-Panamax vessel at the Balboa port 
unloaded cargo for a transit aboard the Panama Canal Railroad. Meanwhile, on the NYK 
Meteor, a boarding officer took measurements, found everything in good order and 
authorized the passage. “I wish you well,” he said and moments later, at 4:29 a.m., the 
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canal pilot called for “dead slow ahead” and the transit began. From that point on, the 
hours passed slowly and with little drama. In addition to the linehandlers and 
locomotives, the journey was made possible by help from the tug boats Bocas del Toro 
and D. P. McAuliffe, and two additional canal pilots who boarded the vessel as it entered 
the Miraflores locks. The NYK Line got what it paid for, a $390,086 eventless trip to the 
Atlantic Ocean. 
 As with any case study, it would be risky to suggest that Panama’s experience is 
universally applicable. Process tracing is useful, but the reach of its conclusions is always 
limited. The steps Panama pursued in the former Panama Canal Zone are not an 
exportable roadmap for China’s struggling state-owned banks or Nigeria’s state-owned 
oil company. It would take a very different research approach – perhaps randomly 
assigning several similar countries to dig canals – to control for all the variables that led 
to Panama’s success. The Panama case study is even more idiosyncratic than most; 
Panama’s premier state-owned enterprise inherited from the United States its 
infrastructure and long-established corporate norms and management structures. “This 
institution had a long, good tradition,” Roy, the chairman of the Panama Canal 




Moreover, the basics of effective state-owned enterprises management are not a 
complete mystery. In 2005, the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development 
put out its first edition of its “Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned 
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 The effort recognized that in many countries, particularly emerging 
markets, state-owned enterprises are the principle providers of public services, such as 
utilities, energy, transportation and telecommunications. Given this central economic 
role, the guidelines emphasize the importance of addressing the many struggles of state-
owned enterprises, which range from excessive and politically motivated government 
intervention to excessive government neglect. To address these and other challenges, the 
2015 guidelines for helping state-owned enterprises increase efficiency, transparency and 
accountability include disclosure of clear corporate objectives and encouragement of 
private sector competition. 
Despite the idiosyncrasies of Panama Canal history and the established best 
practices in state-owned enterprise management, Panama might still have something to 
offer policymakers struggling with state-owned enterprise design and to technical experts 
at the International Monetary Fund and multilateral development banks who struggle 
with the consequences of state-owned enterprise mismanagement. Even the statist Cuban 
regime is now open to experimentation with its state-owned enterprises; in 2014, Cuban 
authorities authorized state-owned enterprises to retain up to 50 percent of their 
profits.
1138
 In the near future, it is highly probable that a new Venezuelan government 
will come along and attempt a rebirth of PDVSA. For that and similar reorganizations, 
Panama offers a strong counterpoint to critics who insist governments simply can never 
succeed in running a business. In direct contrast to the “case study disease” predictions, 
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Panama’s triumph appears to be self-perpetuating. “The best protection for the canal,” 
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